Director of

~ Central

Intelligence

The Prospects for Change
in Sino-Soviet Relations

National Intelligence Estimate

This Estimate represents the views
of the Director of Central inteiti

with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.

NIE 13/11-22-88

The Prospects for Change
in Sino-Soviet Relations |

information available as of 19 August 1983 was used
in the preparation of this Esiimare.

The fottowing intetiigence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Estimate:

The Central intefigence Agency

The Defense intalligence Agency

The National Secunty Agency

The Bureau of Inteligence and Research,
Department of State

The Office of Intelligence Suppor,

Department of the Treasury

i890 participating:

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelhgence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelgence,
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Sta#, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force

This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign imeiigence Board.

Serres

August 1988

Soviet Union

doevan Ocean

Key Judgments

We believe there is a high probability of significant improvement in Sino-
Soviet relations in the next six months or so that will ultimately lead to a
Sino-Soviet summit within the two- to three-year time frame covered by
this Estimate. While Sino-Soviet relations have been improving since the
early 1980s, General Secretary Gorbachev's ascendancy and his subse-
quent reorientation of Soviet policies have added significant impetus to the
process. In particular, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the
warming of US-Soviet relations, and Progress on the Cambodian issue have
changed China's attitudes and increased its fexibility in dealing with the
USSR:
* The Sino-Soviet relationship could even advance to the point where there
is also a Sino-Soviet border agreement, resumption of party-to-party ties,
@ statement of principles on relations, and perhaps the beginning of talks
to reduce forces along the border.

Relations, however, are not likely to progress to the point where China
moves to a truly equidistant position in the Sino-Soviet-US triangular
relationship or $ ops competing with the USSR in many regions of the
world. Although we expect military contacts to develop, we do not believe
they will extend to major arms sales, advanced technology transfer, or
genuine military cvoperation. Past disputes, lingering distrust, geopolitical
rivalry, and conflicting national ambitions will continue to bound the
reconciliation and promote disagreements.

The pace and extent of improvement will depend in large part on whether:

* Both sides maintain a reformist course at home and continue to sce a
more peaceful international environment as essential to the Dursuit of
domestic reforms.

* The Soviet-US and Sino-US dialogues remain essentially on track.

* There is continued progress toward resolution of the Cambodian conflict,

* The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is interrupted.

* The Chinese maintain their positive assessment of Gorbachev and his
staying power,

Improved Sino-Soviet relations will increase Chinese and Sovier leverage in
relations with the United States and add to Gorbachev's image as a
peacemaker. The already minimal potential for Sino-Sovict military
conflict will recede even further. This will increase pressure on the United
States to articulate its policies in a more challenging political vironment,

In addition, the more rapid the pace of improvements in Sino-Soviet
relations, the more pronounced wil! be their impact on US freedom of
maneuver in East Asia. For example, in an atmosphere of triangular
detente, Japan probably will be under greater pressure to improve its
relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, if the image of the Sovict
military threat in East Asia is diminished, US allies muy sce less need to
spend money on defense or permit US military access,

Nonetheless, the improvements in Sino-Sovict retations envisioned in this
Estimate will not, in our view, fundamentally threaten US interests in the
Next two to three years:

* Expanding contacts will make it easier for the two sides to coordinate ac-
tions where their interests coincide, but they will remain competitors
Pursuing their own very different geopolitical agendas,

* We do not believe that any Chinese or Soviet forces withdrawn from the
border region as a result of diminished military competition will be
redeployed to measurably augment the threat to NATO or to US allies in
the Pacific.

* Although Moscow will try to take advantage of increased Sino-Soviet
economic interaction to try to get more Western technology, China will
act to limit such gains lest it jeopardize its own access to such technology.

« If Sino-Soviet relations improve sufficiently to be perceived as threaten-

ing, Asian countries may seek greater US suppor,

This information is Serene!

Contents

Chinese and Soviet Goals in Developing Better Ties
Progress to Date :
Factors Likely To Affect Sino-Soviet Relations in the Next
Two to Three Years 7 a
Soviet Internal Scene—The Role of Gorbachev
7 Chinese Internal Developments—The Role of D ng
__._ External Influences on Sino-Soviet Relations
The US Factor =
Conflict Over Cambodia i -
The Impact of the Afghan Settlement
North Korea
Japan
Other Actors

Prospects for Sino-Soviet Relations Over the Next Two to
Three Years

Implications for the United States

feats

Discussion

Chimese and Soriet Goals in Developing Better Ties '

The coming to power of reform-minded leadershins in
both China and the USSR has already significantly
changed each side's perception of the other and
Spurred substantial improvement of Sino-Soviet rela-
tions. We believe the relationship is destined for
further advances as a result of recent events in US-
Soviet relations, the Soviet decision to withdraw from
Afghanistan, and the efforts the Soviets are making to
foster a settlement of the Cambodian problem. The
Chinese attribute these changes to General Secretary
Gorbachev personally, want to reinforce his new
directions in foreign policy, and seem on the verge of 2
decision to expand and elevate political contacts with
the USSR. We believe the ultimate outcome of these
contacts will be a Sino-Soviet summit, at which the
normalization of Sino-Soviet relations may be formal-
ly acknowledged. We also believe this could occur
well before the end of the two- to three-year time
frame of this Estimate,

For China, the objectives of its changed policies

toward the USSR are to:

* Diminish the Soviet threat to Chinese security and
free up more resources for economic development at
home,

+ Improve Beijing's leverage in Washington at a time
of increased US-Soviet cooperation,

* Buttress Gorbachev's internal position.

* Gain political concessions from the USSR.

* Secure economic and scientific and technological
benefits from the USSR and Eastern Europe,

+ Fan doubts in Hanoi and New Delhi about Soviet
reliability,

For the USSR, better Sino-Sovict rejations are de

signed to:

+ Diminish the leverage it believes the United States
enjoys in the triangular relationship.

+ Permit some reduction of military forces along the
Sino-Saviet border.

+ Promote an expanded Soviet role in Asia.

* Provide additional momentum to “new thinking” in
foreign poticy and help develap a more favorable
image of the Soviet Union and its leader, Gorba-
chev,

We judge, however, that the geopolitical ambitions of
the two sides will remain fundamentally antithetical,
and that historical disputes and fears will ultimately
Serve to preclude broad cooperation in the interiation-
al arena. China aims eventually to become the domi
nant power in Asia with major influence on the world
stage; the USSR hopes to prevent the Chinese from
achieving this goal, wants to carve out a larger role for
itself in Asia, and would like to move China at a
minimum into a position of true equidistance between
the United States and the USSR. [——}

Progress to Date

Much progress has been made in Sino-Sovict retations
since the Chinese changed tactics and became more
receptive to Soviet overtures for better relations in the
early 1980s, but the process has gathered more mo-
mentum since Gorbachev took over in 1985 (see inset,
“Recent Firsts in Sino-Soviet Relations”), The two
sides are beginning to seriously address political prob-
lems between them. The Soviets have already maved
part way to satisfy China's demands on the three
“obstacles”;
© Efforts to resolve the Cambodian problem are under
way, and the Chinese credit Soviet pressure on
Vietnam for Vietnam's recent show of flexibility.
* About half the Soviet troops in Afghanistan as of 1S
May have returned home, and the remainder are
expected to be gone by next February.

‘Seorat,

Late 1981

Simo-Soviet trade, static for over a decade, begins
to increase dramatically. Two sides resume aca~
demic and sports exchonges, suspended since the
1960s,

Cetober 1982

Two sides resume political talks at deputy forcign
minister level, suspended since invasion of
Afghasmistan.

September 1983

Two sides begin second series af political talks on
international icswes, also at deputy foreign minis-
ter level.

September 1984

Two countries’ foreign ministers meet at United
Nations for first time since China's admission in
1971.

December 1984

First Deputy Premier Arkhipov visits Beijing and
initials series of agreements to facilitate expanding
economic ties, highest ranking visitor since Pre~
nier Kosygin in 1969.

March 1985

Gorbachev receives Politburo member and Vice
Premier Li Peng at Chernenko's funeral, first
Chinese afficial receives! by a Soviet general secre~
tary since Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964.

China calls USSR “socialist” for first time since
1966.

Chinese National Peoples Congress sends first
parliamentary delegation to USSR in 20 years

Recent Firsts in Simo-Soviet Retations

First Soviet briefing uf Chinese on their disarnra-
ment negutiations with United States.

July 1985

Politburo member and Vive Premier Yau Yilin
reciprocates Arkhipov vicit. signs first five-vear
trade agreement in 2S years and a separate gecord
on technical couperation.

Soviets publish first favorable media comment on
Chinese reforms.

August 1985
Soviet trade wnion delegation visits China for first
time in 20 vears,

October 1985
Supreme Soviet delegation visits China for sirst
time in 20 years.

Soviet Friendship Society delegation visits China
Sor first time in over 20 years.

November 1985

Chinese Firsi Depucy Premier Song Ping stops aif
{a Moscow en route home from Eastern Europe
and sees Gosplan Chairman and candidate Polit-
buro member Talyzin.

Janwary 1986

Two sides sign agreement permitting resumption of
cross-border trade. which had been halted in the
1960s.

March 1986
fnawgural session af Joint Economic Commission.

July 1986

Gorbachcv sets forth his Asian policy in @ major
Speech in Viadivostox and makes first move to~
ward resolving China's demands om the three

| abstactes.

August 1986
First pre-UNGA consultations since 1960s.

September 1986

Candidate Politburo member Talyzin, first Polit-
buro visitor 10 Beijing since Kosygin in 1969,
finalizes agreements on 24 economic projects to be
undertaken by Soviets in China.

Polish General Secretary Jaruzeiski becames first
of five closest East European alties af USSR io
visit Chitin. and reestablish Party-to-party ties; the
other four Zast European general secretaries sub-
sequently Zcilow im his path,

October 1986
Two sides establish first committee to oversee
Joint development of boundary rivers,

December 1986
Soviets end clandestine radiobroadcasts to China.

February 1987
Sino-Soviet border tatts, Suspended since June
1978, resume.

June 1987

storing General Secretary Zhao Ziyung visits Po
Jand, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Bulgaria, thus completing normalization of
relations with USSR's closest allies.

July 1987

Soviet consulate in Shanghai and Chinese consul-
ate in Leningrad. closed during Cultural Revol
tion, reopen.

First policy planning talks since early 1960s,

August 1987

Soviet Defense Minister Yazov sends greetings to
Chinese counterpart, Zhang Aiping. for PLA anni-
versary for the first tinte in 20 years, although
China fails to acknowledge it.

Octobe 1987
First CPSU congratulatory messoge 10 CCP Con-
gress since 1956.

November 1987
First Chinese delegation to Saviet @naiversary
Sestivities since 1960.

January 1983
Chinese publish first interview by a Soviet general
Secretary in two decades,

Soviets publish collection af Deng Xiaopiras’s
Speeches.
February 1988

Two sides hold Foreign Ministry consultations on
Latin America.

Unclassified

Recent Firsts in Sino-Suwiet Relations (continued) {

!
|

+ Some Soviet troops have soft Mongolia, and there
may also have been other revuctions in Savvet
troops factng China.

In addition, talks on the two sades’ longstanding

Dorder dispute have progressed to the point where the

Soviets have agreed to conduct 2 joint aenal survey of

the eastera border. When completed next month, this

Survey will show that some key islands oppanite the

city of Khabavorosk now in Soviet possession should

belong to the Chinese. Soviet refusal to acknowledge
this in the past has blocked settlement of the riverine
border dispute,

Potitical consacts are expanding, although the two
sides still work against cach other on many foreign
policy issues. Moscow and Beijing have also moved
away from the ideological rigidity of the past and
found common ground ia the discussion of their
fespective reform efforts:

* The two sides will hold their first joint seminar on
economic reform in Dece:nber,

* Journalists and academics in each country are pub-
licly applauding the other's reform efforts in order
to farther advance the cause of their own leader-
ships’ reform efforts. Soviet reformers, for example,
Tecognize the limitations of the USSR’s economic
reform effort and would like to see the USSR
emulate some of China's agricultural and industrial
reforms, whereas Chinese intellectuals are closely
watching Soviet political reforms to provide justifi-
cation for political reform in China.{~ |

These contacts are taking place on a variety of levels,

including:

* Annual meetings of the foreign ministers at the
United Nations and of deputy premiers to discuss

+ Talks at the deputy foreign minister level on bitater-
al and international issues (primarily the three
obstacles), as well as the border dispute (see inset,
“The Sino-Sovi2t Border Dispute”)

* Discussions between lower level foreign ministry
officials on an expanding range of issues such as
UN affairs, the Middle East, Latin America, and
arms control.

+ Resumed parliamentary, academic, scientific, and
cultural exchanges.

‘Boerat,

On the ecomonne froat, the changes have been more
raped! Both ides are now willing to admit that trade
an facilitate accomplishment of their respective do-

+ Between 1980 and 1986, trade roughly quadrupled
ifrom a very Sow baved, (See figure 2.)

. The two sides are once again signing, long-term
trade agreements—largely barter—and probably
‘ill meet the goal of having 3 tota? trade turnover of
S14 billion by the end of the curvent five-year
agreement in 1990.

+ Cross-border trade (that is, trade that is negotiated
by local officials in the border regions as opposed 10
trade negotiated by central ministries in Moscow
and Beijing) has resumed and grown rapidly. The
two sides are developing the infrastructure (that is,
building new rail lines, expanding riverine port
opacity, establishing joint ventures, and so forth:
that will support an ever greater expansion.

The two sides have also successfully negotiated 2
new series of blanket economic accords under the
terms of which Moscow ultimately hopes to send
several hundred technicians to China to refurbish
about 10 to 20 of the hundreds of factories built
during the heyday of Sino-Soviet collaboration and
Provide credits and personnel for the construction of
seven mew ones

+ Sovict merchant and fishing ships are being re-
paired in Chinese harbors,

. ‘The two sides have exchanged more than 30 groups
of economic specialists and agreed in principle to
undertake other cooperative projects in agriculture,
fisheries, neteorology, nonferrous metallurgy, pet-
Tochemicals, machine building, oil and natural gas,
and railways! 1]

Milituriiy, the pvcture is more compbcated. The
forces cach side bas arrayed agaums the vther are
suatimuing to be modernucd apd are ure more
mulitanily capable than they were five pours age nee
iaset, “Recent Military Developments”) The retay-
atwn of tenuoes evident since 1992. Suwever, bus.
apparenily been one of the factors enabling leaders in
both counines to take what would otherwne be
Poliucally rsky steps to effect military economies.
Although the reductions they have made wo far bave
been largely symbolic, these developments have less.
ened cach side's threat perceptive. For example,
‘China has cut the size of its armed forces by over 1
mullian men, Moscow has withdrawe onc of the ve
divisions it had previously statiuned in Mongoliz, and
China accepts Soviet claims to have reduced the
number of troops along the Sino-Suviet border, The
Soviets also agreed to destroy their SS-20 force in
Asia, Although this was done primarily to secure an
INF agreement with the United States, the Chinese
were happy to packet the gain,

Although neither side admits it and the Chinese
actively deny it, these political, economic, and mili~
tary changes already add up to @ substantial “morme-
lization” of relations, State-to-state relations are
better and more ¢, namic than at any time since the
late 1950s. Each side judges that the activity of the
other is substantially bess threatening than it was 2
decade ago.

Despite this improvement, the relationship is stilt
more adversarial than it is cooperative. China still
uses the obstacles to modulate the pace of improve-
ment in ties to the USSR, to demonstrate its concern
over Soviet actions that affect China's security.’ and
also to prevent Sino-Sovie: relations fram adversely
affecting its relations with the United States. As a
part of this strategy, China thus far has stalled on
Soviet attempts to arrange a summit, exchange visits
between foreign ministers and premiers, or resume
Party-to-party ties, (See inset, “Sino-~Soviet Coopera-
tion in Content.”) (s NF)

* tn this respect, China's wie of the obstactes is similar no the way it
‘uses the Taiwan issue vis-a-vis the United States and the way it
weed t0 use the Sino-Soviet border dispmte again the USSR an the
1940s and 1970s, although. in the latter cane. the puerune then was
ssainly 10 minimize Moscow's ability to imerfere in Chinese
Smereal alfairs,

Facters Likety Te Affect Sine-Seviet Relations
im the Newt Two te Three Years

How fast Siso-Sonet retanoms will unpeure in the
Peet Tew to three years will depend om untetnal
devetopments in both Chins and the USSR. conuime-
ing Sosvet efforts 10 resolve longstanding Chinee
shevances fas sy mbulized by the three obwaciesi,
Chinese feubllty regardicg these grevamcey, the
status of US relanons with both cousins, and the
behawur of other countnes crer which the two adver-
sores have but limuted inituence,

Soviet Internal Sceme— The Role of Gertacker
Gorbachev has already demonstrated an ability 10
modify long-held Soviet postions elsewhere in the
world. and he also appears to be moving im this
direction vis-a-vis China:

° tn 2 speech in Viadivostok in July 1986, Gorbacter
first signaled his intention to improve relations,
engage the Chinese leadership directly, and deal
with China's obstacles. (See inset, “Gorbachev's
Statements on Asia,”)

* Gorbachev has replaced most of his predecessors”
key Sinologists—who were more interested in scor-
ing propaganda points against the Chinese than in
improving relations—with more flexible advisers
who have acknowledged past Soviet mistakes in
dealing with China and recognized the need to make
real concessions to halt China’s drift to the West."
(See insets for background on Gorbachev's Sinoko
gists and China's Kremlinologists.)

* As noted above, Gorbachev has maved at least part
way to resolve China's demands on the three
obstacles,

. The results of the soon-to-be-completed survey of
the Sino-Soviet border could provide Gorbachev
with a face-saving way to show further flexibility on
the border dispute,|

“Soviet Simologists and Chinese Kremlinologists like thee Amen
an coumterpans, are a divided lut who dave long hid a variety of
Views and theories about the behavive of their adversaries. In these
Paragraphs, what we are describing ts met the full range of views im
theve groups but only the view that sccms to be shaping the actions
of hele rexpective policy makers,

Figwee t
Mae-Seriet Barter Dispute

ed

feoeasnrenn,

Soviet Umon

Soviet Union

Mongolia

The Sino-Soviet Border

ispute

The Chinese had long resented Russian territorial
aagrandizement at their expense in the 19th centue«
1. but it was mot until after the success of the
Chinese Revolution and the downturn in Sino-
Soviet relations in the tate 1950s chat it became a
Serious issue in relations between Moscow and
Beijing. The Soviets were greatly alarmed by
Chinese territorial claims, which they saw as a
Jurdanremal threat to the security of the Soviet
Far East. Chinese claims were a major factor
Precipitating the Soviet military buildup opposite

China. |

By 1964, when China's claims firse surfaced pub-
liely, China was demanding that Moscow acknowl-
edge that it had “unjustly” acquired some 1S
million square kilometers of territory in Central
Asia and the Amur River Basin in the 19th
century. China sought the return af some 20,000
square kilometers in the Pamirs, aver 700 islands
in the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, and several smail-
er tracts of land in the Sino-Soviet-Mangolian
iriborder area that China claimed the USSR had
acquired in excess af the 19th-century treaties,

The first round of talks was held shortly before
Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, but then C ‘hina em-
barked on the Cultural Revolution, and there were
no more talks until after the Sino-Soviet border
clashes in 1969, Between 1969 und 1978, the
border tatks served as the only direct channel of
communication—apart from ambassadorial con-
fact—between the two sides. Between 1964 and
1978, Moscow, fearing that China was only pre-
[senting its first “bill” on the territorial question,

steadfastly refused to acknowledge the allegedly
“unequal” nature of the I9Mth-century treaties. At
the first rownd in (964, the Suviets agreed in
Principle ta use the thalwex {main navigation
channel) principle to resalve the riverine border
dispute, but they tried ta retain ownership of twe
key islands oppasite Khabarovsk by maintaining
that the main navigation channels uf the rivers
Howed south and west af the islands instead nf
north and east as they in fact do, China reportedly
offered in 1964 to relinguish its elqim to the Pamir

area but later withdrew the offer, |

The current series af negotiations resumed in
February 1987 after Gorbachev went public with
the thalweg offer and the plans for Suviet Iroop
withdrawals fram Mongolia were announced. In
the negotiations that have taken place since then,
the Chinese have not raised the unequal treaties of
the last century, and the two sides agreed once
again to focus first on trying to resolve disagree-
ments an the riverine border. Despite Gurbuchev's
speech, there is still some uncertainty regarding
Moscow's intentions on the islands apposite Khe-
barowsk. The Suviers may eventually be willing te
acknowledge Chinese ownership of thove islands,
but will probably withhold such a concession until
China seems more willing to make compromises in
return, such as abandoning its claim to the Pamir
region. The Soviets will also probably he careful to
claim that the natural fluw of the river has
changed the border in order two avoid setting a
Precedent for other disputed territories along the
USSR's barders.

—_—_—_—_———
Figure 2
Sino-Seviet Trade, 1946-87

Dhartyyeae treaty wqned, USSR sdeaaces
SJ) malin oat lorg-term sre

Kruvheney leungiys de Slalinizaion waenpaign
Moscow wuthilrawy Suvact exports and canuels Wade
ABFCMENED 1 wake ul Suna herriet Meader claves
Chima adopts pely} emphasing cumames
unwesiment -leauly tiv

Weerpng declares Upon thar Pulicy and

Uypem talks ih Sencine

Freesvcar pritocul fit itade ante

SOURMATINE CUP EEaMUm Negre

Eempurts om
Chena

ry
*Suvset trade woth Chine os fepartod om Sarvs france ac i Ube
stamiiety a the cucrency Fhe Seine Mame meaute cota
Jews Garvency dishortiem and iNerchore x 4 move rehable mutate
ad volume Ranges Hnmcect, ever (Mes Metanurement devinets
the sulume of trade ewer tome

aclansifed

—_
Recent Military De elopments

There are now some $00,000 Soviet troops (about
55 divisions) facing an estimated f.4 million Chi-
nese troops (about 4! divisions) along the Sino-

Soviet border and ia Mongolia.

Since Gorbachev took over in 1985, the Soviets
have continued to modernize the equipment of the
forces they have stationed there and have upgrad-
ed two more mobilization divisions to active sta-
tus, albett at low readiness levels. Soviet forces,
though substantially less numerous than thate af
the Chinese, have a considerable edge in rrability
and firepower. We estimate they are capable of
stopping a Chinese attack into the USSR and of
mounting a quick counterattack, They are also
capable af mounting a limited affensive imto north-
ern China. To take and hold all of northeastern
China, however, would require the doubling of the
force or the use of nuclear weapons, We believe
that the Soviets would be highly reluctant to
initlate the use af nuclear weapons against China
Sor limited objectives because of the danger of a
retaliatory strike.

Beijing, which for years planned to defend China
by luring the Soviets in deep, now plans to contest
@ Soviet invasion fram the first defensible terrain,
Accordingly. since the early 1980s, China has been
reorganizing and reequipping its forces for a more
conventional combined-arms defense, Since 1985,
some 3$ Chinese maneuver armies have been
reorganized into 24 more powerful combined-arms
formations called “group armies,” and China has
strengthened its 15 border defense divisions by

Although unlikely in the time frame of this Estimate,
both we and the Chinese believe that Gorbachev's
ouster would diminish the prospects for continuing
improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, Both we and
the Chinese also believe that, if Gorbachev is re-
maved, he almost certainly would be replaced by a
leader more cautious about domestic reform and less
flexible on foreign policy. Such a change, moreover,
would cause the Chinese to review their assessment

integrating some of them into the group armies
and modernizing their armor and artillery. None-
theless, it will take years for China to acquire all
the advanced weapons it needs to ensure these
divisions can halt a full-scale Soviet assault.

The Soviets want to reduce the military competi-
tion with the Chinese before China completes
modernization af its forces, Toward that end, they
have repeatedly proposed agreements on nonuse of
force, military confidence-building measures,
and/or farce reduction talks, China has repeatedly
rejected these proposals. Since Gorbachev took
ower. the USSR has taken additional unilateral
measures, such as the withdrawal of a division
from Mongolia and the planned destruction of its
SS-20 force in Asia.

fhe validity af Minister af Defense ¥:
zov's recent claims that they have also reduced
their forces along the Sino-Soviet border.

Mina recognizes
a3 yet substantially
reduced the Soviet military threat and thus far at
least has continued to reject Soviet proposals on
military confidence-building measures and/or
force reduction talks, China could agree to a
dialogue, however, there is a Sino-Soviet border
treaty or if lt came to believe that there would be
no significant cost in terms of its relotions with the
West.

about the direction of Soviet policy and perhaps
significantly dampen their inclination to deal with the

USSR,
Chinese Internal Developments—The Role of Deng
While Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping has been an

important obstacle to more rapid improvement in
Sino-Saviet ties, some Chinese are now saying that he

Sino-Sovier Cooperation in Context

The growth in political and econontic contacts
Jooks impressive when compared 10 the absence of
such contacts throughout the second half of the
1960s and the 1970s. It looks considerably less so
when compared to the relationship the two sides
enjoyed with each other in the 1930s or the ties
each country now has to the West. For example:

* The last Sino-Soviet summit took place when
Khrushchev visited China in 1959, although
Premier Kosygin made a hurried trip to China in
Octaber 1969 when Sino-Soviet tensions along
the border were at a peak, Since that time, there
have been 12 Soviet-US summits and four Sino-
US summits, not to mention a much broader US
dialogue with both countries at lawer levels and
in the people-to-people arena.

* The United States has already trained more
scholars from each country than either has
trained of the other. In 1987, there were over 250
Soviets and 27,000 Chinese students in the Unit-
ed States, but the USSR and China exchanged
only 200 students,

* In 1959, the USSR accounted for more than half
of China's foreign trade and China accounted for
one-fifth uf Soviet foreign trade; in 1987, the
Soviets accounted far about 3 percent af China's
trade and the Chinese for only 1 percent af
Soviet trade.

* Some of the 24 to 28 planned Sino-Soviet eco-
nomic couperation projects will not be completed
because the Chinese plant managers were free to
purchase Western equipment and did. Even if the
Chinese find other factories to replace them,
Soviet projects in China will be dwarfed by the
over 13.000 such projects China has contracted
Sor with the West,

* The potential far continued growth in Sino-
Soviet economic ties is limited by both sides"
desire to export their better goods to the West
for hard currency and by China's concern not to
sive the USSR the leverage it once enjoyed over
the Chinese economy.

would like to cap his carcer by taking part in a
summit to complete the “normalization” of Sino-
Soviet relations just as he completed the “normatiza-
tion” of Sino-US relations in 1979, This turnaround
in Deng’s attitude presumably results from the warm-
ing in US-Soviet relations and his changed assessment
of Gorbachev, While Deng initially thought Gorba-
chev and his policies represented nothing more than
old wine in new bottles, he has gradually come to
believe that Gorbachev is serious about reform, wants
@ prolonged international breathing space, and will
make concessions on issues important to China. Spe-
cifically, Deng expects that the Soviets under Gorba-
chev will:
* Postpone the quest for military superiority over the
United States and seek parity at lower force levels
through arms control,

* Reduce reliance on military power as the primary
instrument for expanding the USSR's influence.

There probably would be 2 temporary slowdown in
the process of improving Sino-Soviet relations if Deng
‘were to dic within the time frame of this Estimate, but
we believe it more likely than not that the succession
will go smoothly and that Deng’s foreign and domes-
tie policies will survive him. Nonetheless, given mod-
erm Chinese history and the problems accompanying
China's economic and political modernization efforts,
we cannot rule out the possibility of a sharp shift in
Chinese policy toward the USSR once Deng goes. In
that event, even if China opts for more emphasis on

Gorbacher'’s Statements on Asia

At Vladivostok im July 1986, Gorbachev an-
nounced Moscow's plans to broaden its overall
economic and political role in Asia and staked
out @ claim for more Soviet involvement in
Asian security issues. But his main message
was for the Chinese. Gorbachev indicated that:

* The Soviets were prepared to accept the thal-
weg (the main navigation channel) principle to
resolve their riverine border dispute, thereby
suggesting for the first time in public that
Moscow would give up possession af impor-
tant islands opposite Khabarovsk that had
blocked agreement in the past.

+ Amnounced that the USSR would withdraw a
Stnall number af troops from Afghanistan and
was engaged in talks with the Mongolians
about withdrawing troops from that country.

* Although the Soviet withdrawal from Afghan-
istan was largely a sham, and the Mongolian
withdrawal came only after a substantial
Strengthening in the Mongolian armed forces,
it was the first time any Soviet leader had
made a show of responding to China's de-
mands on any of the three obstacles.

* Gorbachev, however, failed to address the
issue that most concerned the Chinese: Soviet
backing for Vietnam's occupation af Cambo-
dia,

In ant interview with the Indonesian newspaper
Merdeka on the first anniversary of the Viadi-
vastok speech, the Soviet leader announced
Moscow's willingness to include Asian-based
SS-20s in a US-Soviet INF agreement, thus
preparing the for additional reductions

opposite China.

improving relations with the USSR, we would not
expect Beijing to adopt a genuinely equidistan, posi-
tion between the United States and the USSR or
change the prevailing Chinese view that Moscow
Doses the greatest long-term threat to China's securi-
ty. Any likely swocessor leadership, moreover, will see
the open door to the West as a useful counterbalance
to Moscow and as the main source for technology
needed for economic and military modernization and
thes would continue to protect China’s Western tics
from too much improvement in relations with Mos-

on]

External Influences oa Sino-Seviet Relations

Although not as important as the internal compul-
sions driving each state, other countries have had and
will continue to have some influence on the evolving
bilateral relationship, The United States is the most
important of these players, but a aumber of other
countries on China's periphery also loom large.[

The US Factor. Improving Sino-Sovict relations may
limit US leverage in the triangular relationship, but
US imBuence depends more on US bilateral relations
with the USSR and China than on relations between
Moscow and Beijing (see inset, “The Evolving US
Relationship With the USSR and China”). Given
China's more extensive ties to the West, the United
States has had and will continue to have somewhat
more influence an Chinese policy than on Soviet
policy.

Until recently, China's fear that developing too cozy a
relationship with Mascow too fast would endanger
Western assistance for its modernization effort led the
Chinese leadership to draw out the normalization of
its relations with the USSR and downplay its signifi-
cance. Now that US-Soviet relations have improved,
however, the Chinese seem to feel at a disadvantage in
the triangular relationship and are moving to right the
imbalance by trying to upgrade their own relations
with the USSR. The Chinese are still concerned about
the potential adverse reaction in Washington and will
proceed carefully, but they probably calculate that
Washington will accept even significant improvement
in Sino-Soviet relations because of the recent warm-
ing of US-Soviet relations, [4

‘Bemet,

a ey
| The Evotving US Relationship With the USSR |
| and Chine

| The US relationship with China and the USSR
| has pussed throwgh three distinet phases:

| © Until the Sino-Saviet split emerged in the
' open. the Soviets were in the strongest posi-

tion because the United States had no rela-
| tionship with the Chinese. '

Then the advantage shifted to the United
States, because, in accepting the reclity af the
Sino-Sovier split and acting to improve rela-
tions with Beijing. the United States was
heing courted by both sides and it was the
USSR that now had to prepare for the possi
bility af a two-from war.

Now that Sino-Soviet relations are improving,
it has become more difficult for any one wf the
three countries to play the other two against

each other.

Conflict Over Cambodia. China has long made this
isswe the number-one obstucle to better Sino-Soviet
relations and the litmus test of Soviet intentions.
After nearly a decade of conflict, however, the posi-
tions of all parties in the dispute appear to be in fux
and the prospects for a political settlement have
improved:

+ The USSR is encouraging a settlement in order to
improve relations with China and other East Asian
countries as well as to reduce the burden of aiding
Vietnam. Moscow appears ready to ran more risk of
friction with Vietnam to accomplish these goals.
Moscow, moreover, probably could live with a set-
tlement that allows real power sharing in a new
Cambodian regime.

China, which wants to avoid appearing obstruction-
ist, has exhibited more flexibility, although it con-
tinues to demand a full withdrawal of Vietnamese
troops and the dissolution of the Vietnamese puppet
regime in Cambodia.

‘Seem,

Although the obstacles in the way of a settlement are
still formidable, the Chinese appear to have redetined
the Cambodian obstacle so that a Vietnamese nmeta-
ble to withdraw alll forces befure the end of 1989

would satisfy Chinese demands for progress and pave
the way for a Simo-Suviet summit meeting.”

The Impact of the Afghan Settlement. Aighanotan
was always the least important of the three obstacles
from Beijing's perspective. Nonetheless. the beginning
of Seviet withdrawal probubly helped convince the
Chinese that the Soviets were, as they claimed, really
pressing Vietnam to resolve the Cambodian probie.a.
Compiction of the Soviet withdrawal may cnouurage
China to further upgrade the Sino-Soviet political
dialogue.

North Korea. The Sinv-Soviet rivalry for influcnee in
Pyongyang cuts both ways. On the one hand, Moscow
and Beijing have a common desire to moderate North
Korean behavior, are both unenthustastic about
North Korean leader Kim {I-song’s plans to have his
son succeed him, are developing trade and other ties
to the South, and will go to the Seoul Oiympres in
spite of P’yongyang’s opposition. Moreover, P’yong-
yang cuald be the venue for the highest-level —if
largely symbolic —Sina-Soviet meeting in nearly two
decades if President Gromyko travels there for North
Korea’s 40th anniversary celebrations next month and
meets with his Chinese counterpart. Yang Shangkun.

Cc

On the other hand, China resents how Moscow. in the
course of the last few years, has exploited P'yong-
yang’s concerns about China's growing ties to the
United States 10 enhance its influence in P’yongyang
at Chinese expense, China is also disturbed by Mos-
cow's success in gaining overfight rights from North
Korea that enhances its intelligence capabilities
against Chinese forces in the region as the apparent
quid pro quo for providing sophisticated military
hardware to P’yongyang. China will try to keep its
concerns below the Mashpoint, however, lest the North

16

TT I RT I a LC Rete. Nn hee

Koreans move further into the Soviet camp. Should
the Soviet-Narth Korean military relationship be-

come significantly cloxer—an unlikely event. in our
veew—Soviet behavior in North Korea could become
a fourth Chinese obstacle,

(ace Actors, Rekations could also be affected by
rer uermation.! developments:

2 Letom tie! conflict in the Spruv!y Islands would
ain Mi gow". efforts to Salance relations be-
wsvta H_ on aad Beilias

+ Cina proba! wou! ruld Sino-Suviet relations
Cla te Ago of any Simo-Indian conplict.

* indc-Faniston ‘ve -! tes would lead both Moscow
aml Beijing to «n ‘aye moderation by their re-
“evtive allies in weder to .reveat this issue from
suming a ier’ sus ors ‘wv Sto-Soviet relations.

oan

A ceo ogh the vuds are gzinst it during the course of
the

a ate, de comments is. Eastern Ewrope could
Bh wt 2 avam.tic ¢urnturn in Sino-Soviet
“ation. 1 thy Soviets once again have to resort to

_—USSH

military force to preserve Communist rule. China
likely to cilt even more decisively toward the United
States. J

While the Soviets and the Chinese wili continue to
compete far influence in Western Europe und in the
Third World, there is no ane county that is likely to
have the same kind of impact un Sino-Seweet relations
as the countries mentioned above. [——~]

Prospects fur Sino-Soviet Retations Over the Next
Tro to Three Years

The USSR and China have aimost always been rivals
and sometimes adversaries, even when they ostensibly
were friends. The Sino-Soviet relationship of the
1950s was the historical exception, not the rule. It
came into existence as a result of Chira’s solation
and its fears that the United States would seek to
overturn the Chinese revolution. Now that these fears
have disappeared and China is stronger and no longer
isolated. the Intelligence Community judges that
there is no chance of a return te the kind of superior /
subordinate relationship that prevailed in the 1950s.
Even Soviet officials admit this. Development of a less
hostile, more “normal” relationship, however, is a
virtual certainty, The issue during the time frame of
this Estimate is how far and how fast the two sides are
likely to move.

Until recently, the Chinese response to Gorbachev has
been a fairly cautious one. We believe, however, that
Chinese attitudes toward the USSR are changing and
that Beijing—concerned about Gorbachev's internat
Position, encouraged by the Soviet actions to satisfy
China’s demands on the three obstacles, and anxious
to right a perceived imbalance in the Sino-Soviet-US.
triangle—is on the verge of or may have recently
made a decision to accelerate its dialogue with the

7

Important indicators of progress will inctude the
feults of the planned Sino-Soviet discussions on
(Cambodia. the annual Meeting of the wo Countries
forergn ministers at the Uinited Nations, and any
interactiun between the Soviets and the Chinese at the
September anniversary festivities in P’yongyang. We
think there is a better-than-even chance that, a3 a
result of all these meetings. the two sides will agree to
go forward with the long-postponed exchange of
foreign ministers’ visits they agreed to in Principle in
1985 and then never scheduled, The tirst such mect-
ing could come this fall, but probably not until after
the US Presidential election in November,

Whether the Chinese then decide to exchange visits
by the 1wo countries’ premiers ar opt directly for a
summit probably will depend to some extent on their
assessment of the probable reaction in the United
States. Given the fact that Gorbachev has already
met with President Reagan four times, however, we
think it more likely than not that the Chine will use
the foreign ministers’ visits to begin laying the
groundwork for a summit,

A Sino-Soviet summit would be used by the two sides
to make further progress toward resolving the three
obstacles and the border dispute. Whether any of
these issues will go away as a result of a summit is
much less clear. Regardless, a Sino-Soviet summit
probably would end with the issuance of a document
that would acknowledge the improv~ment in relations
that has taken place since 1981 and effectively com-
plete “normalization.” A summit might also result in
formal reestablishment of party-to-party lies. a devel-
opment that would make it easier for the two sides to
exchange party as weil as government delegations,
although we think this less likely at a first meeting.
The Chinese would be concerned about 9 possible
Negative reaction in the United States and mi

to reserve this concession for a later mecting.

By the end of the period of this Estimate, the two
sides could agree to open talks to reduce forces along
the border. There is also some chance that they will
reach agreement on their border dispute]

Seecat_

Even under the best uf circumstances, however, we
believe tha: Sino-Sovier relations are not likely ta
Progress to the paint where China moves to 3 truly
‘Sduidistant pusition in the tnlateral retationship and
stops competing actively with (Le Soviets chewhere in
the world. Past disputes, lingering distrust, geupuliti-
sal rivalry, and conflicting national ambitions will
continue to bound the reconciliation and promote
disagreements.

There are some places in the world now where the
pusitions of the Soviets and the Chinese are closer to
ach other's than China’s are to the United States. [n
some uf these cases, appearances are misleading.
China's largely rhetorical positions om Nicaragua and
the debt question are aimed mainly at a Third World
audience to demonstrate China's independent foreign
policy. On a number of UN issues and arms control
Questions, however, we expect to see some increase in
Cooperation in multilateral forames as overall relations
improve,

China has already purchased limited amounts of some
dual-use equipment—asuch as passenger aircraft, heli-
Sopters. telecommuncations equipment, and trucks —
from Moscow and its East European allies. And we
expect Sino-Soviet mititary contacts to develop in
Parallel with the expanded political dialogue-/ a]

But, we

9 not believe that the military contacts will result in
major arms sales, advanced technology transfer, or
genuine military cooperation. The Chinese hope that,
by selectively purchasing US military equipment and
know-how, they will be able to catch up with Soviet
technological development, We think, therefore, that
Beijing would be reluctant to risk its nascent military
ties to the United States by engaging in significant
military purchases from the USSR. And Moscow, for
its part, while desirous of slowing the developing Sino-
US military relationship, probably would be retuctant
to provide the kind of high-technology equipment the

Chinese would likely seek,

Implications for the United States

Continued improvement in Sino-Seviet relanons will
werease Suvict und Chinese leverage in relatoons with
the United States and add to Gorbachev's image as a
peacemaker. The already minimai potential for Sino
Soviet military conflict will recede even further. This
‘ill increase the pressare on the United States to
articulate its pulicies in a more challenging political
environment. In addition. the mure rapid the pace of
improvements in Sino-S: +: relations, the more pro
nounced will be their i .; of US freedom of
maneuver in East Asia. For example. in an atmo-
sphere of triangular detente, Japan probably will be
under greater pressure to improve its relations with
the Soviet Union. Morevver, if the image of the Soviet
military threat in East Asia is diminished, US allies
May see less need 10 spend money on deferse or
permit US military access."

The improvements in Sino-Suviet relations envisioned
in this Estimate will not, in our view, fundamentally
threaten US interests aver the next two to three years:

+ Expanding contacts—including a summit and/or
resumption of purty-to-party ties—will make it casi-
et for the two sides to coordinate actiozs where theit
interests coincide. But they will remain competitors
pursuing their own very different geopolitical
interests,

+ Resolution uf the border depute and inatiates af on
arms control duslogue would make it pamsible for the
Senets and the Chinese to draw dawn forces alomz
‘herr common border, We believe, however, that
those foroes wuaid not be redeployed 1 measurably
augment the threat to NATO of to US allies in the
Pacific. The Sumets can, nonetheless, be expected to
use any reductions 10 press the United States and its
allies into accepting similar cuts,

{f improved retations are perceived as threatening,
Asian countries may seek greater LS support.

Increased Simo-Soviet econumic and scientific and
technological imerchange will increase the chances
that Mascuw may gain access to Western technol
ogy now denied it. Because China does not want to
Strengthen its primary adversary of jeopardize its
own access to such tochnobogy, it will act to limat
Soviet gains. Any technology leakage from China
will be less significant than that taking place else~
where in the world, particularly in Western Europe
and the noa-Communist countries of East Asia.

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