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CORNELL

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3 1924 079 598 227

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Library produced this

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1997

(!l0rneU Uttiucrsitij SItbcary

Jtl}aca, SJedj Sork

BERNARD ALBERT SINN

COLLECTION

NAVAL HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY

THE GIFT OF

BERNARD A. SINN. -97

1919

THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

THE XEXIA SIKEIXG THE MOXITOn SEIFE.

[Frontispiece.

THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

ITS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

BY

FRED. T. JANE

author of

" the port gc.\sd ship "

"all the world's fighting ships" (naval annual)

*"THE TORPEDO IN PEACE AND WAR"

inventor of the jane naval war game (naval kriegspiel)

ETC. ETC.

WITH OVER l6o ILLUSTRATIONS FROM SKETCHES AND DRAWINGS BY THE AUTHOR AND FROM PHOTOGRAPHS

LONDON W. THACKER & CO.

CALCUTTA AND SIMLA . THACKER, SPINK & CO.

NEW YORK : 67 FIFTH AVENUE 1899

jill rights reser'ued

TO MONSEIGNEUR HIS IMPERIAL HIGHNESS

GRAND DUKE ALEXANDER MIHAILOVITCH

OF RUSSIA CAPTAIN, IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

TO WHOSE KINDNESS IT IS DUE THAT I AM ENABLED TO DESCRIBE MUCH OF WHAT IS SET DOWN IN THESE PAGES

CONCERNING A NAVY

OF WHICH INCREASED KNOWLEDGE HAS LED TO INCREASED ADMIRATION

PREFACE

nPHE object of this book is to give as fully as possible the essential history of the Russian Navy in the past, a full and detailed account of the Navy as it is, and, finally, to include all those side questions which, though not directly naval matters, are yet intimately connected with the Russian sea service.

Here and there critical readers may discover gaps, or at least a diflerence in perspectiA^e to what they may be inclined to look for after a course of reading aliout the British or American Navy. As this book claims to be fully complete, it is due to myself, and possibly to the reader also, to make some specific references to these gaps here. In particular I might draw attention to the almost total absence of "budget" and monetary statistics. These are pur- posely minimised ; the reason being that such figures are well-nigh valueless, in some ways worse than value- less. For not only does the cost of production difler in every country, so that comparisons of sums of money mean next to nothing, but the cost of warship con- struction also varies from year to year. A million spent to-day has no relation to half a million spent some years ago. It may be double ; it may equally

lo PREFACE

well l)e half. Ships to-day need manv things that the}' did not require ten, or even fi\-e. years ago, and statistics of cx^^enditure upon war material are useful to no one except financial politicians. Consequently expenditure is a good deal shelved in this book.

Another point is that though maUriel is most fully and amply dealt with, I have laid the greater stress upon the pei'sonnel. Here again a practical reason is at the bottom of the matter. It is a saying in the British Navy that " one ship which has been a year or so in commission is worth three of her sisters just mobilised." Broadly speaking this is true, and it is an instance of how much more important than the ship are the men on board of her. It is usual to reckon up navies bv the number and tonnage of their warships or by the gun-power of those warships. It is a useful exercise for the statistician, but so far as giving any index to the fighting value is concerned he might almost as well be employed upon similar data regard- ing the fleets of a hundred vears ago. The men are the thing : all else is secondary.

For the rest, the order of arrangement followed is that .which appeared most logical — a so far as possible strictly chronological one.

Two minor matters require a brief reference. The illustrations of historical subjects are not inserted as " pictures,' but with the prosaic and utilitarian object of conveying some idea of the marine architecture of the period, the conditions of naval warfare at that period, and occasionally the meteorological conditions during

PREFACE II

the battle also. It will be noted that where modern ships are illustrated they are, where possible, rejjro- duced from photographs. When otherwise, they are in each case drawn either from my own sketches of the actual ships or from photographs that did not lend themselves to direct reproduction.

As everyone has his own rendering of Russian spelling, and as of many ships several widely different spellings are in existence, the more popular forms of spelling are here and there adopted. As a general rule, however, the correct more or less phonetic spelling suitable for the English language is also introduced.

The name Ksenia — Xenia, or Zenia — is a case in point, the first being a Russian spelling, the last an English adaption. When possible the phonetic sound is indicated by the use of accents over the vowels in order to avoid an ugly appearance. Rossia and Sevastopol are names in point.

The matter is not one of supreme importance, and is only drawn attention to because in a number of cases the usual English pronunciation bears no relation at all to the Russian one. When such a simple name as Rossia is s]3elt in English (as it occasionally is) " Rossija," and recklessly pronounced " Rossyjar," one may well acquit the Russian officer who told an Englishman that they had no such ship in their Navy.

The substance of the chapter on Anglo-Russian relations, though some definite alterations have since been made, appeared serially in the Daily Chronicle,

12 PREFACE

and most of the sections relating to Dockyards were published in the course of a series of articles in the Engineer. To the proprietors and editors of these newspapers I desire to tender my thanks. I am also indebted to the Engineer for the loan of certain blocks. Most of the plans and two or three of the illustrations of vessels are taken from Tlie Jane Naval War Game, or from All the World's Figliting Ships by courtesy of the publishers, Messrs Sampson Low, ]\Iarston, & Co.

I owe it chiefly to the great kindness of His Imperial Highness Captain the Grand Duke Alexander Mihailovitch of Russia that I am in a position to write at all this book about the Na^'v of a great nation, with whom I am proud to claim some ties of consanguinity.

I am also deeplv indebted to Herr C. G. Bjorkman of Stockholm for his kind and untiring assistance, by means of which I have secured the deeply interesting historical matter in the Appendix. Others to whom I chiefly owe thanks are Mr. C. de Grave Sells ; Messrs. Yarrow (for the excellent photograph of the Sokol) ; Mr. John Sampson of Messrs. ]\laudslav. Sojis, & Field ; ]Messrs. Hawthorn Leslie ; Mr. Soper of Messrs. Humphrys & Tenuant ; Mrs. Kinsman ; and several British and Eussian naval officers. For assistance in sifting matter for the eaxXy historical chapter I owe much to my brother, jMr. L. Cecil Jane.

Much is written in England and America about the secrec}^ with which the Piussians shroud their dockyards and ships. It may 1je so ; but my own experience has not tallied with the legend ; indeed,

PREFACE 13

everything was the direct antithesis, nor were any restrictions of any sort laid upon rae as to what I might afterwards write concerning this particular piece of globe - trotting. Much that is in this book is certainly not Eussoj)hile ; in the historical chapters it may perhaps seem distinctly the reverse — no curtain is discreetly drawn over Russian blunders and defeats. To these things, indeed. I would rather draw attention ; for if a lesson lies an3'\vhere it lies in the history of how Russia has ever marched to victory through blunders and disaster. Almost invariably she has won by sheer "' pegging " against heavy odds ; in the end, either with the peace or after it she has secured her object. England has in the past been more often with her than against her. She may be both many times yet, though the truest interests of both countries lie in the former.

FRED. T. JANE.

CONTENTS

PREFACE . . 9

I. THE GERM OF THE RUf?.SIAX NAVY, 865-1613 23

II. 1613-1645 . 40

III. THE BIRTH OF THE RUS.SIAX XAVY, 1645-1725 44

IV. 1725-1762 71 V. THE RUSSIAN NAVY UNDER EKATERINA II. 77

VI. PAUL, 1796-1801 . 110

VII. ALEXANDER I., 1801-1825 . 118

VIII. NAVAKINO AND THE CRIMEAN WAR, 1825-1855. 127

IX. THE EARLIER IRONCLADS, 1855-1877 . 151

X. NAVAL HISTORY OF THE TURCO-RUSSIAN ^YAR 180

XL 1878-1885 202

XII. 1S86-1890 223

XIIL 1891-1898 252

XIV. SHIPS COMPLETING FOR SEA IN 1899 308

XV. THE VOLUNTEER FLEET . . 333

XVI. THE RUSSIAN DOCKYARDS, ADMINISTRATION . 337

XVII. THE RUSSIAN DOCKYARDS, DESCRIPTIONS 340

1. New Admiralty 341 8. Vladivostok. 394

2. Galbrxii Islaxd 346 9. Port Arthur 399

3. The Baltic Works 356 10. Taliex-ivan . 402

4. SiiALLER Y'ards 365 11. Sevastopol . 403

5. Kroxstadt. 366 12. Nikolaif 409

6. Revel 389 13. Other Naval Ports 412

7. LiBAU . 390

XVIIL NEW PORTS AND SHIP CANALS 413 XIX. SHIPS UNDER CONSTRUCTION OR " PROJECTED" 417 XX. EVOLUTION OF TYPE IN RUSSIAN WARSHIPS 429 XXI. FINANCE . . .435 XXII. THE SLOWNESS OF RUSSIAN NAVAL CON- STRUCTION 437 XXIII. THE RUSSIAN ADMIRALTY 446 Naval Ixielligencb Department . . 448 Persoxxel Department . 454

15

I 6 CONTEXTS

XXIV. ENTRY AND TRAINING OF OFFICERS 4:.T

XXV. ENTRY AND TRAINING OF MEN. 46r)

XXVI. PAY . 470

XXVII. RETIREMENT, PENSIONS, ETC. 478

XXVIII. WATCHES 480

XXIX. RUSSIAN NAVAL FLAGS 481

XXX. ORGANISATION 484

XXXI. DISCIPLINE 4.94

XXXII. DRESS 501

XXXIII. DISTINGUISHING MARKS FOR RANK 507

XXXIV. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RUSSIAN

OFFICERS AND MEN 513 XXXA'. THE ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT OF THE

FLEET . 520 XXXVI. THE INFLUENCE OF PETER THE GREAT ON

THE RUSSIAN NAVY TO-DAY . 545

XXXVII. ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 549

XXXVIII. SOME CONCLUSIONS 562

XXXIX. RUSSIA'S POSITION IN CHINA 578

XL. OUR MISTAKE IN DEALING WITH RUSSIA 589

XLI. OTHER NAVIES AS SEEN BY THE RUSSIANS 601

XLII. ANGLO-SAXON U SLAV 605

APPENDICES- HISTORICAL APPENDIX 613 CONDENSED BIOGRAPHIES OF SOME DISTIN- GUISHED RUSSIAN NAVAL OFFICERS 704 CONDENSED BIOGRAPHIES OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN OFFICERS IN THE RUSSIAN SERVICE . 714 RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITISH AND RUS- SIAN OR OTHER FOREIGN OFFICERS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY . 72.5 TABLE OF RUSSIAN WARSHIPS TO-DAY 731 HISTORICAL SHIP- NAMES IN THE RUSSIAN

NAVY 741

SOME NOTES 747

INDEX TO SUB.IECT-MATTER 749

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE

The Xexia sinking the Monitor Seife Frontiqneci

Map of Turkey, etc. io

The Russian Fleet before Constantinople, a.d. 865 27

Sectional Plan, Earliest Russian Warship . . .29

A Ship op the Russian Black Sea Fleet, a.d. 865, and the

Ironclad Tri Svititelia of the Present Day . .30 Destruction op the Russian Fleet by Greek Fire outside

Constantinople . . 35

"The Little Father of the Russian Fleet" . 42

Map of the Baltic . . 56

Warships tempos Peter the Great . 59

The Battle op Gangoot (map) . 63

Facsimile of Autograph Letter of Peter the Great's 65

Map of the Crimea . . . 72

Map of Black Sea, Turkey, etc. 81

Map of the Baltic . . . '9S

The Battle op Viborg . 103

Map of theJBaltic . . . 117

Map of Black Sea, etc. . . 119

Frig.vte and Schooner, cieca 1810 . 125

Russian Warships, 1830 . . 131

The Battle of Sinope . 137

Map of Turkey and Black Sea . . 143

Cliff at Inkerman . - 1-45

IxKERJiAN Heights . . 1^5

Balaklava Field . 1-45

Kronstadt in 1854 . 1-49

Idem . 1-49

The Kreml 154

The Netron Menia . • 155

The Kniaz-Pojarsky . . 157

The Brononosetz . 159

The British Penelope ..... 159

i8 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

The Eur-SALKA (j,hoi'jynq,li) Kil

The Admiral Sfiridoff {photogi-apli) 103

The Admirai, Greig (pholor/raph) IGo

The Peter A'eliky 109

The General Admiral IVl

The Gep.zog EDiNfaouRsKi 173

The Popoff 170 The Av.ni Illah . 182

The Feth-i-Bulend 182

The Assar-i-Shevket 182

The Lutfi D.tkl . . 182

HoiiART Pasha's Tokfedo Poxd 183

Sketch Map of Crimea axd Adjacent Coasts 184

LlEUTEXAXT (xow Admiral) Makaroff {pliotofjraph) 188 Defeat ^jf a Eussiax Torpedo Boat Attack i.\ the Danube . 191

The Attack ox the Assar-iChevket 193

Sinking of the Suxina 197

Eetern of Torpei-j Boats . 201

The MI^^N 205

Plan of Vladimir Monomakh 207 The Dmitri Donskoi, 1886 (old rig) . 209

Plan of the Xahimoff 212

The Admiral Xaeimoff {photograph) 213

The Pamiat Merkuria (photograph) 215

The Easboynik (^jhotograph) 216

The Eynda (^ihotograph) 217

The Strelok 219

The Bobr 220

EussiAN "Flat-iron" Gunboat 220

The Asia 220

The Afrika 221

The Zabiaka . 221

The Ekaterina ii. (jihotograph) 224

The Tchesma in Ifi'O 225

Plan of Sinope Class 227

Plan of Alexandes ii. 230

Plan of Pamiat Azota 232

The Pamiat Azova 233

The Dyenadsat Apostoloy 237

Plan of the Dyenadsat Apostoloy 238

The Gang-oot Sinking 241

The Groziastchy 245

The Korniloff . 247

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 19

ThIO KoUJiAKBTZ 249

The Tchernomoret/, . 249

The Koreitz 250

The Maxdjour 250

The Liedtexaxt Ilyix 251

The iSTAVARiN . 253

Plan of the Navarin 254

The Rdrik {photograph) . 255

Plan of the Rdrik . 258

Plan of the EossIa . 259

The Eossia {photograph) . . 2G1

Plan of the Georgi Pobedoxosetz 266

The Georgi Pobedonosetz at Sevastopol {photograph) 267

The Oushakoff in Kronstadt Dockyard {photograph) . 271

Plan of the Apraksin . 273

Engines of the Oushakoff {photograph) 275

The Tki Svititelia . 280

Plan of the Tri Svititelia 281

The Sissoi Veliky 283

Plan of the Sissoi Veliky 285 Interior of the Sissoi Yelikt's Turret after the Disaster

{photograph) 287

Plan of the Khrabey 289

The Dmitri Donskoi Reconstructed {photograph) 291

Plan of the Rostislav 293

The S^^ETLANA {photograph) . 295

The Kazarski . 297

The Sokol {photograph) 299

The Russian Fleet at Toulon {photograph) 301

L'entente Cordiale at Toulon {phAograph) 303

The Imperial Yacht Sthandart {photograph) . 305

The Petropavlovsk {photograph) 309

The U. S. Indiana . 311

The French Brennds {plwtograph) . 313

Plan of Poltava, etc. 316

Bow YiEW of the Sevastopol 317

The Sevastopol {photograph) 351

The Peresvet and Sevastopol 324

Plan of the Peresvet . 325

The Osliabia. New Admiralty Yard from the River 342

Facsimile of Permit Card to view a Russlan Dockyard 344

Galernii Island Dockyard. . . . 347

The Diana (as she will be when complete) . . 348

20 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

I-AGE

Ox Board the Pallada— Buildixu . • 352

The French Cruiser Guichex (jihologroph) 354

Russian- Dockyardsman 355

Ide.ii . . 35G

Outside the Baltic Works . . 35 1

IxsiDE THE Baltic Works (photograph) 358

Plans of the Gromovoi . 360 Putting in the Engines of the Amoor • 365

Kronstadt Dockyard 371

Approaches to Kronstadt . 376

Engine-Room of the Sevastopol 377

On the Road to the Gunnery School, Kronstadt 382

Map of Libau and District 391

Map of Vladivostok. 395

Map of the " Far East " 400

Panorama of Sevastopol {photograph) 405

Sevastopol Docky'ard {photngrapih) . 407

House after the Bombardment (jihotograph) 407

The Dockyard. Another View {photograph) 407

Plan of the K. Potemkin Tavritchesky 411

Plan of the Retvisan 419

Plan of the AVaryag 425

H.I.H. Grand Duke Alexander Mihailovitch {photograph) 461

Russian Xaval Flags 482

Officer's Overcoat . 502

A Corporal (photograph) 504

Marching Uniform, Russian Bluejacket (photograph) 506

A Russian Bluejacket (photograph) 506

A Miichman . 507

Shoulder-Straps and Epaulettes . 509

Distinguishing Marks for Men . 512

Ivan in Repose (photograph) . 519

6-iN. Gun Drill on board the Djidjit (photograph) 521

The Belleville Boiler 531

Idem 533

The Barr and Stroud Range-Finder (diagram). 537 Ide.\[ (photograph) . 542 Naval War Game Pieces made for H.I.H. Grand Duke

Alexander (photograph) . 573

Map of the Baltic 621

Plan of Battle of Gogland, July 1788 . 629

Plan of Battle of Oland, July 1789 651

Repulse of the Swedish Fleet at Revel, 1790 656

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 21

PAGE

Plan of Battle off Revel, 1790 . . . 063

Plan of the Battle of Viboug, 1790 007

Plan of Battle of Svensksund, 1789 071

Plan of Battle of Svensksund (Rotgensalm), 1790 073

Plan of Petty Fleet Battle 087

Idem 095

The Late Tsarvitch . . 707

THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

THE G-ERM OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY

nnHE Russian Navy, thougli generally regarded as a comparatively modern institution, founded by Peter the Great, can, as a matter of fact, lay greater claim to antiquity than the British fleet. A century before Alfred built the first Enoiish warships, Russians Antiquity of ue

o -L J Russian Nauy.

had fought in desperate sea-fights, and a thousand

years ago the foremost sailors of the time were

Russians. This nav_y died, it is true, — it met its end

in absolute annihilation, — but the nation that owned

it did not die; and to-day the root of all the Eastern /fs /mportance.

Question, and hence of the Far Eastern Question too,

lies in the enterprise of early Russian warships.

Into the details of the exjDedition of Darius against oarius and the

Scythians.

the Scythians, some two thousand odd years ago, it is unnecessary to enter ; the Scythians had no sea powder, and adopted in the place of it those tactics which Napoleon at a later period w^as unable to appreciate without practical test. Had the Scythians

24 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

possessed that "Sea Power"' of which nowadays we read so much, Darius would never have crossed into Europe. In connection with the frequent question: "What does Russia want with a navy?" this incident has some bearing. The future may yet see Oriental armies seeking to pour into Europe across the Bosphorus and Dardanelles ; the thing that has happened more than once in the past ma}- yet come, about again in the future. The probabilities of such an event are small enough to-day, and certainly the Russian Black Sea Fleet does not exist because of such a possibility.

On the other hand, the place where Darius made his bridge of boats would be one of the objectives of that fleet, given certain eventualities ; and the most cursory glance at a map v.-ill show how in the Turco- Russian War of 1877 thousands of lives micrht have been saved had Russia but possessed a fleet capable of striking at once at the heart of the Turkish Empire. Russia and "\Yg ^Ys,t hear of Russia in connection with the

Constantinople.

channel dividing Europe from Asia. More than two thousand years have passed since then, — to-dav this same channel is supposed to mark the bounds of Russia's southward ambition in Europe, and towards this channel and the city upon it have Russian eftorts been directed for a great many of the two thousand years between. Ever since Byzantium was founded, Russians have at intervals made efforts to take it to themselves ; — if persistence goes for aught the two- headed eagle should yet again fly wjiere it used to fly

MAP OF TURKEY, THE BLACK SEA, ETC.

26 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

before the crescent took its place. Empires have been bom and died since then, even the races tliemselves have changed or died, but always the people inhabiting what is now the Imperial Russian Empire have striven to capture the blue w^aters of the Bosphorus. It is a thino- too little recognised, this hereditary trend of Russia to Constantinople.

In attacks upon the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire we, too, find the earliest mention of Russians on the sea. The Scythians changed into Slavs, the Goths took possession of almost all of what is now European Russia, and founded a sort of empire, which Huns and others a little later overthrew, till in the vear 862 Rurik arose, created a central Russian state, and took to himself the title of Grand Duke.

Rurik was originally the chief of the ^'araugians, a Norse tribe, and he appears to have come to the aid of the orio-inal Slavs much as Hengist and Horsa came to help the ancient Britons — a fairly close parallel can be drawn ; though the Saxon king Edgar is the monarch Pairik would more nearly resemble otherwise.

The Varangians being Scandinavian were originally, of course, a seafaring people, and some faint transmitted original A'arangian strain may possibly account for the fact that at the present day moujiks from the interior of Russia can be turned into tolerably capable sailors.

It was not long before the Varangians, working southward, turned their e^yes towards Constantinople ; their natural instincts led them to naval expeditions both piratical and trading on the shores of the Black

TilK r.rs^IAX FLEET liEFOIIE CONST AXTIXOPLE, Stff. A.D.

GERM OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY 29

Sea, and there, naturally enough too, they soon heard '"'«* ""^w"" of the wealthy city on the Bosphorus. At this period, %"g^^"f "'"'"'■ Cherson (now Sevastdpol) was a Byzantine possession, and wuth this place the Russians carried on a good deal of legitimate trade. Commercial rivalry, therefore, equally with piratical intent, may have been at the bottom of the first Russian expedition, which in 865 A.D., in the reign of the Greek Emperor ]\lichael iii., attacked Constantinople.

The attacking fleet consisted of 200 small ships — fiovo^vXa the Greeks called them, which means literally " made of one single piece of wood." They were, how- earnest Russia,

warships.

ever, more than that, the sides being built up with planks above the main boat h, b, as indicated in the

sectional drawina;. With all these old-time w-arships a certain amount of doubt has to be used ; but the illustrations convey some idea of their probable form. sECTiox, EAP.LT RUSSIAN They werc 60 fcet loug, prob-

BATTLESHir.

ably very broad for their length, and the freeboard is always spoken of as 12 feet above the water level. The modern Russians have a penchant for a high freeboard, as the Peresvet and a good many other of their ships attest, but these ancient warships were probably scarcely so high as the old historians make out. On such a scale a ship like the modern Peresvet would have sides nearly 90 feet high ! In ancient shipping generally the height

^o

THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

(if the side took that place in naval ethics now occupied by the " nominal speed." However, for purposes of comparison 1 have drawn one of these old warships on scale alongside one of the latest completed Black Sea Fleet ironclads, the Tri S^dtitelia.

Crew.

Motiue power.

The crew of these old warships is a doubtful f[uantit_v. Twenty is the number stated Ijy Finlay ; while Gibbon, with a cautious liberality, savs from 40 to 90. Possibly 20 men constituted the normal crew, while 90 could be stowed on board upon special occasions. When we rememl^er that an Athenian trireme of almost the same dimensions as a modern torpedo boat carried 200 men, there is nothing out of the way in these old Russian ships carrying 90. A modern torpedo boat carries less than a score of men ; the ironclad Tri Svititelia has a complement of about 580, but machiner}' now takes the place of the rowers.

It appears that these early Russian ships used sail as a motive power as well as oars, for " by fortune of a favourable wind " they reached and passed the Bosphorus, and anchored at the mouth of the Black

GERM OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY 31

River in the Propoiitis (Sea of Marmora). j\Jeaiiwliile the Greek Emperor was away iu Asia fighting the Saracens, having left an admiral of the Byzantine fleet to act as governor of the capital. Byzantium was completely surprised by this unexpected attack ; and the passing of the Bosphorus by the Russian fleet produced an immediate panic.

After passing the Bosphorus, the Russians under Askold and Dir, princes of Kieff, Rurik's " lieutenants," ravaged the Princes Islands in the Propontis, pillaging the rich mona.steries, killing the monks, and laying waste all the country round about Constantinople. Their ferocity and cruelty aggravated the panic in the Byzan- tine capital ; bur the Emperor, returning in haste, went out with his fleet, attacked, and utterly destroyed the Destruction 0]

the Russian

invaders : the small Russian vessels being helpless fieet. against the big Byzantine warships. Nevertheless, so deep a mark had the invasion left, that the Byzantines could at first scarcely credit the news of its destruction, and when finally convinced, at once attributed it to the special interposition of the Virgin.

In the tenth ceutur}^ the Russians held the highest reputation as sailors. As the Turkish fleet of to-daj- employs Greeks, so the Byzantine fleet about the year 900 A.D. took to employing Russians. Special aud/russmM/n very high rates of pay were offered to them, and history records many specific instances of their emploj^- ment. Thus in 935 a.d., in the reign of the Emperor Romanus i., we read of Russian ships and 415 men being sent to Italy as part of a Byzantine expedition.

demand as sailors.

32 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

In 949, in the reign of Romauus ii., six Russian ships participated in an unsuccessful attack on Crete. In 966 again, Nicetas took Russian sailors with him to Sicily.

This recotrnirion of the value of Russian naval

auxiliaries did not, however, take place wdthout

further experiences on the part of the Byzantines

Second attack than the abortive expedition of Askold and Dir.

on Constanti- nople, 907 A D. In 907 the Russians made their second attack on

Constantinople, being led in person this time by

Oleg", resent for the vouno- foor — son of Rurik. The

Russian fleet this time consisted (if the historians

are to be believed) of no less than two thousand

vessels, which came down the Dnieper with its thirty

cataracts.

By means of these cataracts the two thousand ships got somewhat reduced in numbers, but eighty thousand men are spoken of as arriving before Constantinople — "the City of the Caesars" as the Russians used then to call it.

Outside Constantiuople the usual ravaging was carried on, and any prisoners taken were tortured to death in order to keep the invaders amused. Priests in particular were selected as victims, driving nails into their heads in sarcastic emulation of Jael's treatment of Sisera being the favourite method of disposal. Times have changed since then : to-day in Russia, subject of course to the variation consequent upon the lapse of a thousand years, the boot is on the other foot.

GERM OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY 3s

Constantinople itself was in no danger of capture, Vjut on the other hand the Russians appear to have had an equal immunity from risk of interference, since the "ravaging" continued without much hindrance for nearly four years; in fine, till in 912, when the Emperor Leo the Philosopher bought their retirement. A commercial dispute appears to have been at the bottom of this war, for at its ending a trade treaty was signed.

To this treaty the Russians adhered until 941, in the reign of Romanus i., when differences arose. This time the Russians are allowed no less than ten thousand mrd attack on

Constantinople,

ships by some of the historians ; others, more modest, 941 a.d. credit them with one thousand. The Grand Duke Igor appears to have been in personal command, and, as on the occasion of the two previous attacks, the time appears to have been well chosen, since the greater part of the Byzantine warships were in Italy, and only fifteen vessels at the capital.

In these cii'cumstances the Greek Emperor sent ambassadors to try and buy ofi" the Russians, but all such overtures were rejected ; nothing less than Con- stantinople itself was the prize aimed at this time. In despair the Byzantines, therefore, made ready such ships as they had, fitting them with an extra number of tubes for discharging Greek fire — that awful agent Gmk fre. by means of which the fragments of the Roman Empire held out against the barbarian world. Nowadays, when a hundred-pound melenite or lyddite shell is a mere everyday bagatelle in warfare, we are prone to

34 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

regard Greek fire as archaic, and in considerable danger of putting it in false perspective ; we are unable to realise its potency in those days of un- scientific warfare. Yet in comparison with the fighting appliances of those who had to face it, it was in much the same relation as would be the vnl of Lytton's Coming Race pitted against our modern weajDons.

On seeing these few ships moving out, Igor, who had heard of Greek fire but apparently had no practical knowledge of its effects, ordered his fleet to charge the Greeks, intent on capturing them at once by boarding, — tactics intelligible enough, and indeed on the face of them reasonable. Russian fleet The Grccks, however, meeting this attack with

annihitated.

streams of fire, burnt up the whole attack, and followed up their victory so thoroughly that Igor only escaped with some half-dozen boats. All the rest of his force was annihilated.

After this disaster Constantinople was let alone

for a hundred years ; then the death of a Russian

noble in a street tumult in 1043 was seized on as

Fourth attaci< on a, cGS'is belli. Thc Euiperor Coustantine ix. offered

Constantinople,

1043 AM. compensation, which was refused ; subsecpently, as the attack dre\\' nearer, he sued for peace. Vladimir, the Russian leader, fixed the price at three pounds weight of gold for each man in his force, and in face of these impossible terms Constantine prepared to resist.

As on the occasion of the previous attacks, very few Byzantine ships were off Constantinople, but these,

action.

sian fleet.

GERM OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY 37

having loaded up with Greek fire, went out to meet the enemy. An indecisive action was fought ; five inied,, of the Greek ships, getting cut oft' from their main body, were captured and destroyed, — an incident which, were reliable data concerning it procurable, Avould hold a certain amount of almost practical interest even at the present day. For to cut oft" those .ships must have been an operation of something more than difiiculty. Guns and torpedoes may miss, but when it is a case of covering the sea with fire the question of accurate aim scarcely enters.

A second and subsequent action was, howe%'er, rotai

destruction of

decisive, and the majority of the Russian ships burnt. *''« """" The remainder were destroyed in a storm, and practi- cally the whole expedition was annihilated. Thus in slaughter on a scale so complete that to-day we can scarcely picture ir, the early Russian striving after Sea Power ended. Those who prophesy that increased means of killing- by wliole.sale will end war mav be correct in their surmises, but in the matter of history supporting their theory perhaps the least said the better.

This ended the Russian attacks on the decaying Roman Empire, for subsequently a species of alliance grew up ; and when at last Constantinople fell before the Turks, Ivan the Great, who had married Sophia Paleologus, took to himself the title of Csesar (Tsar), and the double-headed eagle of Byzantium that has formed the arms of Russia ever since. For some time the Greek Church liad become the religion of Russia ; it

38 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

found its new head citv at j\Iosro\v, and, as mueli as the original Constantinople could be transfeiTed, it went to and remained at Moscow till this day. ^luch of the old Byzantium still lives in the city of the Kremlin.

Nothing of the Greek naval power seems to have

gone to Russia owing to the alliance ; between the last

attack and the fall of Constantinople the struggles of

Eieuenth to the eleveutli to the fifteenth centuries were internal

fifteenth

centuries. Strife, Hud a battling the Tartar invasion. Till well into the fifteenth century the Tirtars more or less overran the country ; not till the reign of Ivan iii. did Russia emero'e as a solid nation. When she did, the Turks were upon Constantinople, and her new liirth ver}' nearly coincided with the advent of that nation which has been her hereditary enemy ever since.

In the sixteeath century, however, the Tartars were still too near and great a menace for Russia's reception of the remains of the Eastern Roman Empire to be more than religious and nominal ; jMoscow itself was burned by the Tartars in 1572 ; and in 1598, the Roorik dynasty becoming extinct, the whole country was plunged into a civil war. of which the Poles were swift to take advantage, Ladislaus their king being even proclaimed Tsar in ^loscow. which he had occupied.

Minin. Then arose Kosma ^liuin, a butcher of Xijni

Novgorod, who started what Sir George Clark has termed the first national movement in Russian history.

GERM OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY 39

MiniQ was joiued by Prince (Kniaz) Pojarski, and between them these two brought about the expulsion of the Poles in 1612. In the following year Mihail Romanoff was elected Tsar of Russia, and founded the present dynasty.

II

1613-1645

rpHE Russian Navy during all the years of the Tartar invasion was as a fighting force almost non- existent, but the idea that the Russians had no ships at all of any sort is quite incorrect. What they did do, was to remain nautically more or less as they had been in the times of Igor, while England, Sweden, Holland, France, Denmark, Turkey, Venice, Genoa, Spain, and Portugal built seagoing ships and evolved improve- ments. The huge Russian rivers necessitated craft of elementary kinds for traffic and communication, and there were plenty of rough coasting craft and fishing boats about at Archangel. River boats, too, undoubt- edly penetrated at times into the Turkish districts on the Black Sea, and there were some, too, on the Caspian. There is reason to believe that now and again small naval actions — not entirely piratical — took place not only in the Caspian and in the Southern rivers, but also against the Swedes when they were capturing the Neva districts. In 1242 Alexander Nevski won a battle upon the banks of the Neva in which boats participated. Ivan the Terrible (Ivan iv.) made great eff"orts to promote commerce, and attempted minor naval operations against the Swedes in row-boats upon

1613-1645 4'

Lake Peipus aud the rivers round about it. Queen Elizabeth of England sent him a small sailino- boat — a present to his navy.

Boris Godunoff, who in 1598 usurped the throne, also had naval designs, and enlisted the services of between two and three thousand foreigners ; all drawn from maritime States.

Either in Peter the Great's reio-n or at some subsequent date, all, or nearly all, records of these events were destroyed. Peter the Great was the founder of Russia's seagoing navy, and people about the Court hastened to abolish anything that might in the slightest degree tend to minimise Peter's claims to be the sole founder. In much such fashion were the records of old Egyptian kings destroyed in the reigns of their descendants. Russian naval o^Dera- tions from the eleventh to the, and of the, seventeenth century were insignificant enough, and probably few, but from historical fraoments there is reason to believe that a sort of navy on a par with the Eno'lish Navy under the Norman kings existed and occasionally acted. In the fights against the Tartars the great Russian waterways must have been used, apart from the evidence of the boat which our Queen Elizabeth sent to Ivan the Terrible. Archangel from the earliest times was a trading port, and Mihail Romanoff engaged English shipwrights there in the period 1620-40 ; and his successor, Alexei, Peter the Great's father, had an imperial yacht ^ built for him

' Charnoclc.

42 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

at the Archangel Dock}-ard. Ilis son, Fcdor, in his brief reign (1G78-8-J), induced one hundred and fifty foreiouers, chiefiv Scotch and Dutch, to entei' his service, chiefly with a view to naval enterprise, both at Arch- angel, on the shores of Lake Peipus, and at Voronege, on the Don. (ienerally the craft built were flat- bottomed, but there were others built of more shipshape form.

"THE LITTLE FATHER OF THE KUSSIAX FLEET."

The period 1645-89, when Peter and Ivan both nominally occupied the throne, produced internal troubles in which much of this progress went under. But all did not go. Peter at Moscow in 1G88 saw Ivan the Terrible's boat, then stowed there, and at once wanted to get alioat in it. An Archangel shipwright (one of Alexei's importations) was sent for, and he re- paired and re-rigged the craft, also building a few more.

1613-1645 43

Queen Elizabeth's boat still exists : Peter christened it " The little father of the Russian fleet," and it is sacredly j^reserved as the first Paissian ship.

It is not the first, and it is not Russian, hut English ; iione the less it is to this boat that the Russian Kavy of to-day owes its origin, and from it the Peresviet, (.Troniovoi, and Kniaz Potemken Tavritchesky of to-day are directly descended.

P'

III

THE BIRTH OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY

1645-1725

Peter the Great

>ETER THE GREAT (Peter ^^eliky) liad not jjeen loug upon the throne before he realised that if his country was to expand, and otow civiHsed with that expansion, then the common highway, the sea, must lie at Ids doors. The Baltii; was practically a Swedish lake, the Black Sea belonged entirely to the Russia in 1645. Turk ; Russla was Httlc better than a mass of central territories. Ijounded on the west and south by more or less hosrile nations, on the east bv the savaiic and almost unknown wastes of Asia, while on the north, thouo-h she had some coastline, it was onh' on the inho.spitable Arctic seas.

Although Peter was nominally Tsar in 1645, it was 1689. not till 16S9 that he became actual ruler of Russia.

His energies were then occupied in the south : a war with Turkey was, as usual, in progress, and Russian efforts were concentrated upon the capture of Azov.

Here failure met them. The Turkish Heet was a

44

1645-1725 45

power in tlio.se days, and supplies were brought into the town oversea without let or hindrance. Realising the hopelessness of his efforts so long as the seaside of the place was open. Peter made preparations for marine operations. Europe was ransacked for volunteers, Foreigners

employed.

naval, artillery, and engineer officers were procured from foreign States, and a flotilla of about two hundred boats and galleys was rapidly constructed with their assistance ^«*«'''«J^"' on the banks of the Don. With these craft Peter secured command of the inland sea, and Azov being closely blockaded, it at length fell in 1696. Fifteen ^^-'capturerf. j^ears later the Turks recovered it ; and even while Russia possessed it, it was valueless to them so far as larger naval operations were concerned : the Turkish battleships would soon have made short work of Peter's small vessels. Finis, therefore, was written on his operations in this direction ; but the very fact of this failure led to Peter's inception of the idea that Russia must become a Kaval Power.

Full of this idea, in 1697 he started on his historical tour as Peter Mihailoft', shipbuilder, carpenter, Peter as a

docftyardsman.

and so on, visiting Dutch and English ports, and learn- ing nautical trades with his own hands. Though his methods were indeed different, yet, broadly speaking, Peter was the Kaiser Wilhelm 11. of Russia and of his century : the trades and professions in which he did not seek to shine were few. He M-as more practical, perhaps, than the Kaiser of the telegrams ; still, his greatness ran Peter the Great

and the Kaiser

in the same direction, and our common knowledge of '"'"'«''" "•

^ compared.

Wilhelm 11. to-day will help more than anything else to an

40 THH IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

appreciation of the lines upon wliicli Tsar Peter ni()\e<l.

Peters ti'avels weie not of lon,n" duration — a small

revolution necessitated his return — hut he brouaht with

him a number of British engineers, who proceeded to

voigaandDon work upou liis first proicct: the canal between tlie

canal. ^ ^ ■*

\'olna and tlie Don. Charles XII. of [\^l^^. foUowinii- vcaT l)rou<iiit Peter into conflict with

Sweden. '- > -

tlie famous Charles the Twelfth of Sweden. Sweden was at that time the principal Baltic Power, and, so far asPaissia was c(.)ncerned, had been frankly recognised as a superior force. Between Swedes and Russians small skirmishes had at different times taken place, but these had nothino- of the nature of a reo'ular war in them.

Peter, however, having allied with Denmark, Prus-ia. Poland, and Saxony, began to attempt active operations against Sweden, which was at first supported b\' Holland and England. These two Powers, however, were concerned cliiefiy with Denmark, and withdrew Russians invade their forces when Sweden made peace with the Danes.

Slued ish

territory. Charlcs liaviug settled matters in the west, then moved

eastward, concentrating his force upon the Russians, who under Peter had invaded the Swedish province of Inoria. and were besieoino; Karva with 67,000 soldiers.

Battle of N area. Qu this amiyGliarles suddenly descended with a force of only 8000 men ; but such was his genius, and the prestige and impetuosity of the Swedes, that he not only defeated but absolutely scattered and destroyed Peter's host ! Peter himself was not present : in his opinion the battle was lost before a shot had been fired.

1645-1725 47

and lie acted on the famous maxim that liokls out hopes of '■ another day." His doing so probahlv spelt Russia s ultimate success against Sweden, for he was the only man in the country possessed of sufficient ability to compete with the Swedish king. With an appreciation of this, characteristic of the great Tsar, Peter left his army to shift for itself, and was busy making preparations for a new campaign even while the smoke was rollina; over the field of Narva. It is useless to judge -his action in the light of the ethics of personal courage ^ : the result of his flight stands in the Russian Empire of to-day.

Charles, his force now raised to 60,000 men, proceeded southward, invaded Poland, deposed the king, Augustus, and placed Stanislaus Leczmski on the throne. Peter he ignored as a coward who had fled from the battlefield ; and though Swedish statesmen and friendly Powers warned him of his error, he marched away from the real menace to his empire, only realising his fatal error when, hemmed in by Peter's forces, his army was crushed and blotted out on the bloodv field of Poltava. p„,,„-„^

As soon as possible after Narva, Peter resumed his attacks upon the Baltic provinces of Sweden ; and while Charles was astonishing Europe, and his Swedish soldiers becoming the wonder of the world, Peter was slowly and surely taking all the count rv round about where St. Petersburg now stands. Ever}' piece of water that Russian ships

built in the

he gained soon saw Russian vessels being built upon its '^'"'^''■

^ See a later chapter on Peter the Great ; also the Appendices.

48 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

shores, and the Neva, and Lakes Ladopi and Pcipiis soon had Russian flotillas upon them.

7702. The year 1702 was the real hirth-ycai- of the

Russian Navy, and is very nearly analogous with the year 998 in English history. In 998 English coasts were almost Danish provinces, and Alfred's new war- ships first encountered the enem}' on his own element about that time. Russia in 1702 was overrun hy Swedes, in that year Peter launched two small sea- going warships at Archangel and laid the keel of a 26-guu liattleship, while on Lake Peipus a naval engaoement resultino- in the <lestruction of a Swedish vessel took place.

Nauai forces on Pcter's Pclpus flotiUa consisted of small galleys and

Lake Peipus,

7702. lodkys. The galleys each mounted four small guns

and carried a crew of fifty men ; the lodkys were merely four-oared row-boats. Of these there were several hundred : the exact number of the galleys is uncertain, but thev were fairly numerous.

The Swedish force was numerically vastly inferior. It consisted of fourteen yachts and sloops, which mounted between them twenty guns and carried about six hundred men. The northern and western portions

The first naval of the lakc wcrc Swedish, but the eastern side was Russian territory. In 1702 the Swedish commodore, Loschern von Herzfeldt, became aware of Peter's intention to try and annihilate the whole Swedish force upon the lake, and iu May he went down the lake with four yachts and some sloops, carrying between them sixteen guns and 200 men, on a reconnoitrino-

engagement.

1645-1725 49

expedition. In doing so he came suddenly and un- expectedly upon a Russian force of 90 to 100 small craft, carrying about 5000 men, and supported liy a shore batterv of six guns.

In such contempt did the Swedes hold the Russians in those days, that Loschern unhesitatingly attacked them. They attempted to outflank him. liut being received with a heavy and well-directed fire, the flank attack ended in failure. In the middle of it some of the Swedes landed and rushed the battery, while those still afloat, pressing their advantage, inflicted a total Swedish victory. defeat upon the Russians, capturing or destroying, besides the batterv. nearly half the flotilla, and killing- several hundred men.

After this victory Loschern withdrew to the mouth of the Emliach River, in order to refit and to prepare for a larger attack. His preparations being complete about the end of July, he sent the yacht Vivat, Captain Jonas Hokeflycht, four guns, and a complement of fifty men, to discover the whereabouts of the Russians. The Russian attack

upon the yacht

wind failing. Hokeflycht ran into a small bay and "''"'*• anchored : and here the Russians getting word of hi.-= presence, sent a hundred lodky.s to cut him out.

The Vivat opened fire at the longest possible range, with a view to delaying the advance as much as possible, and in the hope of attracting the main Swedish flotilla : but the wind beiuo- wantino- Loschern, thoug;h he heard the guns, was unable to come to the rescue. Dis- regarding the Yivat's fire, the Russians came on from all sides, and, after a desperate resistance, captured the

50 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

The V'luat blows up.

Russians tuithdraw.

1703.

vacht'.s decks. Ilokeflyflit, despcriitcly wouiuIeJ, crawled down to tlu' powder magazine and ))lew up the lioat. The Vivat was destroyed, Imt the action cost the Russians twenty lodlys, and over two hundred men killed.

On hearing of these two desperate affairs, Peter withdrew all his remaining forces to the south-eastern shore, where tliev lav idle under the i.)rotec,tion of shore-batteries too strong to l)e forced. But if the boats were idle their crews were not ; and the building of new and larger vessels was at once l)egun, and pressed forward during the remainder of the summer of 1702 and throughout the following year.

On the Neva the Swedes had liut two small galleys. These lieing cut off" from retreat, were surprised and Russia gains taken 1 )y the Russian force without much loss on

control of tile

NeuaandLai<e either sldc. Ou Lake Ladoga there was no Swedish

Ladoga. ^

force : Xoteberg was cut off', and surrendered ; the Swede-- found themselves confronted by a force against which it was hopeless to contend. At the end of 1703 the waters of Neva and Ladoga were practically com- pletely Russian, while Peipus was as completely in the hands of the Swedes.

In 1703 Peter founded the citv of St. Petersburg on the banks of the Neva, which at that time was simply a mass of half -sulmierged mud islets and treacherous swamps.

On Peter's selection of such a dreadful spot to luiild a city many morals have been drawn : it has been said— and without much exaggeration — that the founda-

Founding of St. Petersburg.

1645-1725 51

tions of St. Petersburg are dead men's bones. But when all is said and done, his choice of locality was e.xtremely limited, and, better than his latter-day critics, he recognised that nothing short of a great city and a capital would consolidate the new seacoast empire that he was building, or attract that trade and merchandise without which the city could not thrive.

Like the present Emperor of Germany, Tsar Petei- Peteri,is own

architect.

was a man of many parts. He himself plotted-out the new city, himself designed its bridges, its houses, and its palaces : St. Petersburg is essentially a one-man city.

High tides and inundations swept away his land- marks, quicksands swallowed the foundations of his houses, .the unhealthy climate swept off his workmen Difficulties met

in building St.

by the thousand — two hundred thousand men died Petersburg.

that St. Petersburo- .should be an everlastino- monument

to the persistence of its founder. I write these words

on that spot now. All around me the palatial houses,

the broad flat roads, the many islands, the great golden

dome of St. Isaac s cathedral looming up above the

haze, not all smoke as in other cities, but the mist and

vapour also from those pestilential marshes underneath

the buildings. Intersecting the city are many canals,

serving useful purposes as water highways ; but in

Peter's day the trenches by which he sought to drain st Petersburg

in 7899.

the dismal swamps.

And southward, below the wide spans of the bridges, and the lines for the electric trams laid across the frozen river, I see the huge building slips where Peter

0-

THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

mapped-out liis first dockyard. Alongside its river walls a roiiple of frozen-in ironclads stand black against the sunset.

Every city was once a desert ; but it is only St. Petersburo; that ^'ividlv recalls the thought to the beholder. And standing' looking; across it, one has onl}' to think of its name to arouse a longing similar to that experienced by so many travellers on the Xile : to see the past recalled, and to compare it 'with the very different present.

Peter, when he found the quicksands swallowing his foundations, filled them up with rock, stones, and rubbish till he had created solid OTOund. When the swift current of the Neva swept away the beginnings of his bridges, he overcame the difiiculty of communi- cation by bridges of boats. Every difiiculty that met him he combated and concjuered, and at last the city rose. Victory could onlv he accomplished by a total disregard of human life, and probably no one can calculate how many lives it cost — the proverb is true enough, its foundations are dead men's bones.

At St. Petersburo; the buildino- of seao'oinc:' war- ships was at once commenced under Peter's supervision. The designino- he seems to have wiselv left to his imported naval architects ; liut he gave all the stimulus he could to the work by sharing any suborciinate labour for which his Deptford work had fitted him. The Peter's excellent Tsslv himself thus Setting the example, his nol^les

example,

and subjects quickly followed suit, and there was no hampering of the work by officials taking posts for

Seagoing ships begun.

1645-1725 53

which they were unfitted : labour had its golden age wheu the Russiau fleet was born.

Meanwhile, on Lake Peipus work continued with vigour, and such progress had been made by the early spring of 1704 that preparations were made to assume the offensive against the isolated and unsup- ported Swedish force then controlling it. Loschern lay in winter quarters at Dorpt, and the Russians evolved the idea of shutting him in there and destroying him.

To this end they prepared a big flotilla, erected a strong boom at the narrow part of the river raouth, Destruction of

the Su/edish

threw up batteries to protect it, and e'arrisoned them nauaifone on

'^ X > D Lake Peipus,

with 9000 troops. They then brought up their entire '''"''■ force, and waited developments. Loschern, mean- while, though fully aware that prejoarations were being made to meet him, made no attempt to frustrate the Russian works. Either he felt that his course was run, or else, bearing in mind his easy victory on a previous occasion,^ despised his opponents too much to trouble about their movements, hi any case, his abilities as a commander were not on a par with his courage. He idled at Dorpt till the 4th of May, then went quietly down the river with his entire flotilla.^

The current was strong, and he approached the Russian works at a great rate. They received him with a heavy fire, which he returned as he drifted past, to be brought up helplessly against the boom.

' Page 49.

2 The total crews were 250 soldiers and 350 seamen.

54 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

Here all his vessels were crowded too-etlier, the Russians firiuii' "" into the In-i.iwn. "

The 250 Swedish soldiers leapt ashore, stormed and silenced a battery, then set to work to l)reak up the boom, but the Russians forced them back to their ships. A second attempt was repulsed. The remnant tlien made a thir<i attack, and, cutting their way through the Rusviaiis. escaped to Dorpt.

The sailors of Luschern s force stuck to their ships,

fighting like rats in a trap till all their vessels

Loschern bioujs \\&v& dcstroycd and themselves slain. Loschern's

up his fagsfiip.

yacht, the Carolus. was the last to survive ; she was taken bv boardino-. Loschern, however, maiiao-ed to reach his magazine, and blew himself up with his conc|uerors. Peter's order It was a pccuHar trait of Reter's to endeavour

about boarding.

always to at once adapt his war methods to circum- stances. Loschern's action, following quickly upon

«

that of the Vivat's captain, brought about the issue of

an imjDerial order that no Swedish ships were to be

boarded till the principal othcers had been killed !

7705. By the middle of 1705 Peter had got together

Russian a seagoiug fleet at Kronstadt, consisting of 9 line-of-

seagoing fleet.

battle ships, 4 Inigs, 5 galiots, 7 large and 8 small

galleys, and 12 fire-ships. Forts had been constructed,

as well as a boom defence behind which the ships la3^

In June of this year a Swedish fleet of 7 line-of-

The Swedes offer battle ships and 5 frigates came off Kronstadt, and

battle. ^

offered battle several times. Peter, however, was not to be drawn into losing his new fleet, as assuredly at

1645-1725 55

that early ilate lie would liaAc done had there been a general engagement, despite the difference in numbers. Strict orders were issued that the Swedes were not to be attacked, and eventually they gave u]) the attempt to provoke an action, and sailed away.

In the meantime, land operations were vigorously uii. pushed, and town after town taken from Sweden on the southern shores of the Baltic. By 1711 all of them, including Riga, had Ijeen captured.

In the capture of Viborg the new navy participated, viboi-g, mo. the place being taken l)y Admiral Apraksin from the sea. The Swedish fleet failed to put in an appearance ; the battle of Poltava the year before had flung Sweden into something very like anarchy. Peter himself was afloat off Viborg, commanding a reserve squadron.

Not till his arm}' had been annihilated at Poltava 1709.

Pottaua.

did Charles xii. realise the fatal error that he had made. Escaping from that bloody field, he spent a couple of vears idly careering in the south ; then he attempted a counter-irritant, and induced the Turks to fight the Russians. Here the latter met disaster ; un. Peter's army was surrounded, and only saved from hopelessly

defeated by

annihilation by a peace whereby Azov was restored to "« Turks. Turkey, the Russian Black Sea Fleet destroyed, and a heavy indemnity paid. The peace, however, was fatal to Charles" schemes.

Having disposed of the Turkish War, and captured ma.

Capture of

all the Swedish territorj^ on the southern shores of the Heisingfors,

Abo, etc.

Baltic, Peter's genius led him to attack the northern side. In May 17 13, therefore, he sent his fleet to sea

MAr OF THE BALTIC. 3Vf. — Eciwerawick was a small harbour a little west of Eevel.

1645-1725 57

under General Admiral Graf Fcodor JMatveievitcli Apraksin, the first Russian admiral, to attack the coast '^p'"''^'". ^"*

Russian

of Finland, and himself took the post of second in '"'"">'>'■ command, which meant that he did not allow his position as Tsar to affect what he considered his own fighting value.^ He selected himself as second in command because he considered himself the next best man to Apraksin — a step characteristic of Peter Velikj^ and paralleled by no absolute monarch before or since.

No Swedish ships were encountered, and Abo and a number of smaller places were taken without x to *a/(en, difficulty : the Swedes, drained by Charles' wild campaigns, could put nothing but raw levies in the field, and Russian soldiers soon overran the southern shores of Finland.

The ships went back to Revel in the course of a month or two ; and in July the Swedes, having got their fleet together, sent three ships of 56, 54, and 48 guns respectively, under Commodore Raab, to re- connoitre Revel. On the nio-ht of 10th Julv these ships anchored at Gogiand (Hogland is the Swedish name), and tlie next morning, about three o'clock, found the Russian fleet coming under full sail to surprise them. Raab, however, managed to get under weigh and retreat, damagcins; two of the leadino- Russians somewhat badly. Sc-heltinga's flagship, the Viborg, then led the van, supported by Ea-uyis's ship, the Riga. Nauai Both these ships were better sailers than the Swedes, Hdgiand, 7713.

1 Peter served always as a subject, and was officially known not as Tsar but as Rear-admiral Mihailoff.

58 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

and Averc overhauling tlieni fast when Raab's ship gvounded on a hank. She succeeded, liowever, in sliding over it. The Riga having failed to oljservc the incident, struck the same bank, and, being of greater draught, stuck fast. The Vilwrg also struck, but scraped over. The Russians, anxious to save their flagship, stood by to haul her off, and Raab's squadron escaped into Helsingfors.

The state of affi\irs in Sweden produced by Charles'

defeat prevented any large action on the part of

Russia's opponents, and not till the following year did

the Swedes try to recover the command of the sea.

Battle of In the sprino- of 1714 the Swedish Admiral

Gangoot, 1714.

Wattraug put to sea with a fleet of 15 line-of-battle ships, 2 gun sloops or boats, and 2 galleys. Early in Mav he came oft' Hangoeud (Gangoot), making for Abo, and here fell in with and captured or sank a number of Russian galleys that were engaged in small isolated operations along the coast. A numl^er of others escaped into the bay formed by the Hango isthmus, then (the Finnish coast hereabouts rises almost perceptibly yearly) very low and narrow.

In this gulf the Russians were blockaded ; but finding themselves shut in, they began to try to move their o-allevs over the isthmus on rollers. To prevent this, Wattraug despatched Ehrenskold wdth a 14-gun sloop, ^ six of the captured galleys, and a couple of cutters round the peninsula.

' Tlie Elefantin. Tbe galleys carried 8 giiiis each. The cutters were a species of row-boat.

1645-1725 6i

Elirenskold had gone some twenty -five miles when he sighted 115 Russian ships and galleys, under Peter and Apraksin, coming up from the southward. He at once retreated into a channel between two islands, and sank one of his cutters astern, so as to protect himself from a double attack.

The Russians, under a flag of truce, demanded his f/irensAs/rfs

reply to the

surrender, to which he sent back the historical repty : request m

surrender.

'■' My king has not given me ships for the purpose of handing them over to the enemy, least of al] to an enemy on whose word none can rely."

Apraksin sent thirty-five galleys in to attack ; but the Swedes, reserving their fire till the galleys were within half-pistol range, easily repulsed them.

Peter then led the attack himself ^ with, the whole Peter in dose

action.

galley force, and, after a sanguinary conflict and heavy loss, got his own galley alongside the sloop of Ehrenskold. Defeat beino- now certain, the Swedish commander made off" for the powder magazine ; but the Russians, being on the lookout for such a move, shot him, boarded, and took the vessel as well as all her consorts. The Swedes lost 700 men killed or wounded ; the remainder of their force, 200 men, were taken prisoners. The loss of the attacking Russians was much more heavy, and has been estimated as high as 3000, while a good half of their galleys were sunk or badly injured. The big ships do not appear to have been ens-aofed on either side.

00

run rIpQnpT'pf'.AlAT urnnnrlprl \s7i:»« l'n'm_^„^

Ehrenskold, desperately wounded, was brought Peter and

EhrenskHld.

^ He was on board tlie galley commanded by General AVaide.

62 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

before tlic victorious Tsar, who, almost beside himself with delight, ran up to him, wiped the blood from his face, and kissed him. During the time he remained a prisoner, Peter treated the Swedish commander with e\erv mark of esteem, and oave him a "old snuft'-box set with brilliants when he liberated him. Peter promotes Qu the rctum of his fleet with the captured vessels,

himself.

Peter went into the Piussian Senate and, describing his ^'ictory, announced that he had promoted himself to the rank of vice-admiral. ''''s- In the followiuo- vear (1715) Enoiand, havino" some

England allies ^ ' ^ / O ' o

with Rnssm. quarrcl with Sweden, sent Sir John Norris into the Baltic with 18 ships-of-the-line. The Russians then had thirty 80-gun ships in those waters, and some Danish vessels also joined : the whole fleet, to the number of 80 ships, being under command of the Tsar himself. The SA\-edes remained shut up in their harbours, and nothing warlike was attempted.^ More- over, Peter appears to have had a secret alliance with Charles xii. about this time,- and was even suspected of having designs on the capital of his Danish friends. Charles xii. managed to run such blockade as the Danes kept up, and returned to his kingdom, but any naval operations on his side were out of the Cjuestion. The Augio-Russiau fleet cruised yearly off the Swedish

1 The Swedish version (Admiral Gyllengranat) says 10 English, 18 Danish, S Russian ships-of-the-liue 2'h's some galley.s ; and that a descent on the coast of Sweden was meditated but prevented owing to the exist- ence of a Swedisli fleet of 14 battleships and C fiigates.

- He had an intense personal admiration for the meteoric King of Sweden.

2. (ask

— CO o

=-=2 fcgQ	o
o MO^	^-^
	f>
cr^ 2 E^	t^
	o
■s-^.-s

64 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

24th May 1719. Capture of the Wachtmeister and other uessets.

Russian expedition to Sweden, 1719.

ports till ]7ls.^ ill wliicli year Charley, who had imaded Norway, was killed by a cannon ball at Frederickshald.

On the niorning of 24th ]\Iay of 1719 three Russian 50-guii ships cruising off Gotska Sandon (to the N.W. of Gotland) fell in with a reconnoitring force of Swedes — a 2-decker (Wachtmeister, 48 guns), a 24-gun frigate (Rushenfeldt), a IG-gun brig, and a schooner. They immediarely gave chase, and being better sailers soon overhauled and captured the three smaller Swedish vessels. The 2-decker, however, kept on, and brought chnwn the foremast of the leading and fastest Eussian. steerino- for Sandhamn. The Wacht- meister seemed likely to show her heels, but about midday two more Eussian 50-gun ships appeared between her and the Swedish coast, and brought her to acti<iu. The Wachtmeister having; lost her fore- mast, niaiutopmast, and 110 men Jiors de combat out of a crew of 260, was forced to strike. This was apparent!}^ the first sea - fight in which Russian big ships were ever eno-ao-ed as victors.

Following upon this action a Russian fleet of 30 battleships and 150 galleys and trausjDorts, with 30,000 men under Count Apraksin and Prince Galatzin, sailed for Sweden, and on the 9th of July appeared off the coast of Upland, to the north of Stockholm. Here they sacked and burned a great many villages, factories, and private residences, after which

^ In 1717 tlie Britisli fleet midei- B^'iig acted cliieflv with the Danes onlv, and entirely oft" the south-west coast of Sweden.

C tA i< 1 1 ,. Tu rrtj op y^tr £^ c/U ^Tsr l n^o ^oc<a ccKolL-l £ n.<t i. i 'C'iiikijc '^ i'f Hi tc'^rcMct onu^i t^ a 41 01.JI ac ■i^'X !X HMi^ 'i'hc 'Ci irno ^TSr d h-o € ^i- i h n o -^ y Ai. U h,o aa^T -^o^otn.t'^ '(i O oTn, I i t <- tzl Q, o ('not -Cifs ffjyi -ti%<< GTcr^ct ZTT o Z- o J> a^ a-

Ti a ■taJ'^c h> 'etc aTo" Ci.LM.6 !l .n. i<. a a_'(<t !3-y)/( its. H -<* * "g frXLto viv

/J<^ ^£ "ttoT-fC <j'tt_^ -^TZ^ ^"7^ "^J-^ ^CJ\i- TU^ii ^^/Mjio 0^ Koai'^ 7 € c, ^ e. A. i mjx. T^Lc/^o 'io^a (yttco'hjatti/

Ifi <tMi. O^' -^i^Kli. (^Js. M<<, -^ <i_LH 5- )^J ^ <itJr ao O Um jt^d JtI S¥: nzi

_cr /

REDUCED F.4.C3IMILE OF PETER THE GREAT's LETTER TO THE KING OF SWEDEN" CONCERNING EHREN.SKIOLD.

(OnZi/ the first line and the signature aye in I^eter's own hand, — See Appendix.)

1645-1725 6;

the fleet was split into three squadrons. One squadron remained in the Stockhohn Archipelago, the others went, one north, the other soutli. The northern expedition lasted from July 13th to August 19th, and during its continuance it destroyed the ironworks and sawmills at Harg and Ortaloo, the towns of Osthain- mar and Oregund, the factories at Forsmark, Lofsta, Akerby, Vestland, Harnjis, and Ostanci, then ter- minated operations with the destruction of Xorrtelge on August 19th.

The southern squadron sacked and destroyed between July 14th and August 3rd all the property down the coast as far as the Kalmar Sound, in- cluding the towns of Trosa, Nykoping, Sodertelge, and Norrkoeping.

On the 13th of Auo-ust 6000 Russian soldiers landed at Sodra Staket near Stockholm, and beran a march upon that city ; but meeting a repulse at the hands of the Sodermanland regiment, they retreated to their ships.

On August 20th the Russians collected in the Stockholm Archipelago and returned to Revel.

Considerable interest attaches to these operations, comwents in that they form one of several historical instances of the ignoring of the " fleet in being " and several other pretty theories of Sea Power. The Russians, indeed, seem to have got along ver}^ well without any know- ledge of these theories. The Swedish fleet, unbeaten, existed somewhere, but it made no attempt against them, though (in theory) it should have been capable

68 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

of doiuo- a g-ood deal. Of coiu'se Sweden was almost in a state of anarchy at that time, and any intelligent operations for defence were probably impossible, and the Russians no doubt were fully aware of it. But at the same time they knew perfectly well that England was premeditating coming to Sweden's assistance, and actuallv had a fleet en route. Denmark, too, was nominally about to change sides, now that Charles XII. was dead. British fleet In the spring of 1720 the British Heet under Admiral

arriiies. _ . . «

Norris in the Sandwich, 90 guns ; cousistmg of one 90, one 80, seven 70, six 60, and five 50-gun ships, altogether, 20 ships-of-the-liue, came with orders to attack the Russians. Forty-nine Swedish ships joined them under Count Sparre. Sparre and Norris spent much of their time in squabbling as to precedence, and though they stayed three weeks off Revel, they did not Second Russian fight auy Russlaus. The Russian fleet under Apraxine

expedition to n tt ^'ii-"\t r ^ '

devastate visltcd tlic coast of Upper JSorrland m May ot this

Swedisii coast,

'720. _year (1720), destroyed the town of Umea and the

surroundino- villao-es, without interference from the Anolo-Swedish fleet.

Third Russian In tliB foUowino' May the Russians, aa;ain directlv

expedition to

devastate [-^ face of tlic powcrful Aneio-Swedish " fleet in beina. '

Swedish coast, ± o ^ •

'^^'' devastated and destroyed the entire coast of Norrland

for a mouth (^fay l7th-June l7tli). Thousands of farms, villages, and private estates were destroyed, including the towns of Soderhamn, Sundsvall, Herno- sand; Pite, and Hudiksvall, and a number of important factories.

1645-1725 ^9

With tliis final exliibition of Sea Power of a most uuclassical sort the war ended, leaving Russia mistress of the Swedish Baltic provinces and a good deal of the Finnish coast. Sweden, exhausted by twenty-two years of warfare, was prostrate : Eussia was the pre- dominant Baltic Power.

In July 1723 Peter, being anxious to seat the fussian nauai

demonstration,

Duke of Holstein upon the Swedish throne, indulged '-'^3- in a big naval demonstration. Twenty-four ships-of- tlie-line and 10 frigates, together with a large coast flotilla, sailed about in the Baltic under the general command of Apraksin, the General Admiral, who personally commanded the central body. An ad- vance guard, with the 60-gun ship Svataya Ekaterina as flagship, was commanded by Vice-admiral Peter ilihailoff" (the Tsar himself) ; the rear-guard was under ^^ice-admiral Gordon, a Scotchman.

Two vears later Peter the Great died, \e&Ym^ Death of Peter

J725.

Prussia an important Naval Power. This new navy was brave perhaps, rather than efficient, but under Peter's guidance it had served its purpose and accom- plished all that could have been hoped or expected of it. That it did so was due to Peter's grasp of the real meaning of " Sea Power," to his recognition of the fact that his sailors were more or less amateurs, to his evolving tactics suitable for tliem, and, above all, to his realising that to defeat the enemy or to paralyse him were objectives, while mere "glorious actions" might be valueless.

His order about Swedish oflicers and their partiality

70 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

for powder magazines at the close of an unsuccessful battle, has already been referred to. A second order, one that was to bear queer fruit later,'^ was that no Swedish force was to be attacked unless the Russians had at least a one-third majority over the enemy.

' See ji. 7D.

IV

1725-1762

EKATEEIXA I. TO PETER III

pETER THE GREAT was succeeded by his widow the ex-Livonian peasant Ekaterina ; and the consequent change in policy produced a naval demon- stration in 1726. Twentv Enoiish and 12 Danish line-of-battle ships came off Ivronstadt when the Bntish and

. . . . Danish naual

Russians had only 1 6 effective ships-of-the-line. The demonstration

off Kronstadt,

Russians were under Admirals Gordon and Saunders '^•^^■ • — ■ both of them Scotchmen imported by Peter. Nothing came of the demonstration ; nor did a repetition of it in the following year lead to any fighting. In 1727 Ekaterina I. died, and was succeeded by Peter ii., who was followed in 1730 by the Empress Anne.

Poland was responsible for the next war ; and oantzig, 1733. Stanislaus having oroue to Dantzig, where an allied army of Russians, Saxons, and Poles besieged him and a French force that had been thrown in to his assist- ance, the Russian fleet sailed under Gordon to look for the French. No French were forthcoming ; but

' The Putrid Sea " is a local and old name for the Sea of Azov.

SKETCH MAI' OF THE CRIMEA AXD ADJACE>"T COASTS.

Xote. — It is not clear which part of the Sea of Azov was marched over by the Russians dry shod. Creas}' {History of (he Othmian Turk^) seems to imply that it was the Straits of Yenikale, that the phenomenon was locally kno^vn to occur with certain winds, and that Lascy marched down there to avidl himself of the circumstance.

1725-1762 73

the fleet efiectually blockaded Dantzig by sea, and produced its surrender.

In 1736, other relations being peaceful, Russia 7736.

. War with

embarked upon that campaign against Turkey which Turi<ey. Peter had had to abandon. Count Munnich in the 7737.

Invasion of

following year assembled a fleet of flat - bottomed Crimea. boats to attack the Crimea, and Bredal, a Russian admiral, supported him with a force of gunboats and armed rafts.

Lascy now took supreme command, and bv a capture of

Azou, 1737.

bridge of casks and rafts crossed the Straits of Yenikale. Azov was captured in June, but no very important operations took place, and in August the Russians left the Crimea by a bridge over " the Putrid Sea."

In the following year these semi-military, semi- 773s.

A chapter of

naval operations were resumed by Lascy, and a curious ^^odus in the incident took place. The waters of " the Putrid Sea " are verv shallow, and at times a strono- west wind drives back the water, leaving dry land. On 7th July 1738 Lascy marched his army across the sea, which returned just as the last Russian reached the Crimean shore. The parallel to a well-known incident in the Book of Exodus was sufliciently striking to make an immense impression upon the superstitious Russian soldiers, and perhaps it led to Austria's joining the attack on Turkey — a move that cost her dearly.

Bredal's fleet did not take any great share in the operations of

the Russian

operations. In August 1737, while lying under a fiotnia under

Bredal.

battery, it was attacked by a Turkish flotilla, which it

74 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

Treaty of Belgrade and the Euxine fleet, 1739.

Naual

operations,

1743.

repulsed ; but veuturing to sea in the following year, it was so damaged in a storm that it was practically useless. Along the Dneister the Russian soldiers won some victories ; but, on the whole, the war was very barren of results to either side, save to Russia's ally, Austria, which was heavily defeated in several actions.

In the foUowino- year the treat\- of Belgrade was signed. By it Russia gained a little territory ; Ijut Azov and Taganrog Avere dismantled, and an agreement entered into that Russia should maintain no ships in the Sea of x'^zov or in the Black Sea, nor build any vessels on the shores of the Euxine.

In 1740 Anne died, and in that same year the AVar of the Austrian Succession began to loom. Ivan vi., the new Tsar, started hostilities against Sweden, and o'ained some land advantage ; a revolution then dis- posed of him, and set Elizabeth, Peter the Great's dauo'hter, on the throne. Under Elizabeth the Russian arms were more successful, and Lasc}' brought about the capitulation of an entire Swedish army near Helsingfors.

In 1743 Lascv oot together at Kronstadt a Heet consisting of 17 line -of- battle shijDS,^ 5 frigates, and 48 galleys, the command of which fleet was given to Admiral GoUovin.

Off Haugo Point (Gangoot) lay a Swedish Heet, numbering 16 ships-of-the-line, 5 frigates, :2 brigs, 2 bomb ketches, and 1 fire-ship.

1 Some accounts sa,j 1 5 battleships.

1725-1762 75

Lascy sent Gollovin to attack this fleet ; but when Goiiouin declines

action witti

the Swedish admiral, Johan von Utfall, moved out "« S"""'"^'

' Mail 1743.

to meet him, Gollovin at once retreated to Revel, and merely a few long - range shots were exchanged. Gollovin excused his inaction by quoting Peter the his reasons. Great's order that the Swedes were n9t to be fought unless the Russians were in a big majority.

Probablv Gollovin was rio-ht. The Swedes had a comments. heavy naval prestige, — the past gave no hope or record of equal forces of Russian sailors beating Swedes ; to attack would have been but to court disaster. By retir- ing to Revel he occupied the Swedish fleet, and by remaining intact prevented their operating elsewhere.

In August a peace disadvantageous to Sweden Peace, 1743. was concluded.

In the general fighting which preceded the Treaty 1743. of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, Russia, though subsidised by England, took no active part, notwithstanding that 37,000 men and 40 galleys were kept in readiness to participate. Lack of transport appears to have been the reason of this inaction, and no attempt of any sort was made to remedy it b}' utilising the Russian Navy.

The Seven Years' War found Russia in conflict The seuen

Years' War,

with Prussia, and in 1757 a fleet of 15 Russian ?757. liattleships bombarded and captured Memel. Thence they blockaded the Prussian coast, till in 1758 the Russian land forces were compelled to withdraw from the scene of several victories owino- to shortness of provisions.

76 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

In 1758 the Russian Admiral Misbukoff was joined by 6 Swedish battleships and 2 frigates under Lagerbjclke, and some Danes under Schoutbynacht Fisher, and spent the summer looking for an opposing English fleet, that did not appear.

1760. In 1760 the fleet, now brought up to 27 vessels,

under Admiral MishukofF, attempted but failed to take Colberg in conjunction with a land force. The

i7ei. next year, increased to 40 ships and having been joined

also by Swedish vessels, they tried the same thing, and Colberg was taken on 16th December 1761.

1762. Some three weeks later the Empress Elizabeth died,

and was succeeded by Peter iii., who at once joined forces with Prussia and became at war with Sweden. Nothing, however, seems to have happened : Peter's energies were principally occupied in trying to rid him- self of his wife, Ekaterina, a German princess. Then Ekaterina, havino- o-ot some regiments of guards to espouse her cause, dethroned Peter, proclaimed herself Tsarina, and Peter, thrown into prison, was strangled by her orders a week after his deposition.

V

1762-1796

THE RUSSIAN NAVY UNDER EKATERINA THE GREAT

T?KATERINA II. (the Great) was undoubtedly the -^ most able woman who ever sat ou the Russian or, for that matter, any other throne. The means whereby she came to rule were ethically reprehensible enough, and, like every woman who has written her name in the pages of history, her morals were hardly such as meet with favour. But in this respect she was no worse — perhaps even she was better — than her predecessors, Anne and Elizabeth, while she was infinitely more able as a ruler. She introduced many wise reforms into the government, was a great patron of. art, literature, and science, and, from the imperial stand- point, raised her country to a pinnacle it had never before occupied. To the Imperial Navy her services were second only to those of Peter the Great : from some points of view they were indeed greater. During her reign appeared the most famous of Russian admii-als, Samuel Greig, a Scotchman, who had pre%dously served samuei ereig. in the British Navy, and participated in the battle of

77

yS THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

Quibeioii in 1759. He joined the Kussian Navy in

17G2, two years after Ekaterina came to the throne,

and soon rose to high rank. Ekaterina also induced a

other British nuniber of other British otticers to enter her service,

officers.

Elphinstone (who entered as a rear-admiral), Dugdale, Mackenzie, and ^Mitchell being those most celebrated after Greig. Under Peter the Russian Navy had been to some extent a child of the British one, Gordon and Saunders had already l^een heard of, but under Ekaterina these good offices were increased a hundredfold, and British officers entered her service in scores. At one time more than half the entire list of ofticers were of Anglo-Saxon and Celtic nationality — Scotchmen, in particular, showed a partiality for the service. War with The first event when Ekaterina assumed the reins

Prussia.

of government was a reversal of her husband's policy and a return to that of Elizabeth. No operations of much importance, however, on the part of Russia marked the close of the Seven Years' War ; and the small use that the fleet was may have turned Ekaterina's thoughts to the utilisation of British ofiicers. Russian historv was full of instances of British fleets entering and operating in the Baltic ; the power of the Swedes, though nearly dead in 1762, had been great and decisive upon the sea in earlier years. Contemplation of these facts must have fired Ekaterina's imagination ; and she it was who, having reorganised her navy, gave orders for the first attempt of a Russian fleet to operate in foreign waters.

In 1768 war was declared against Turkey; and in

1762-1796 79

the following year Ekateriua ordered Admiral Couut Russian feet

ordered to the

Alexis Orloff to take his fleet from Kronstadt, and Mediterranean,

1769.

operate against Turkey in the Levant. Such an absolutely novel departure made considerable stir in Europe at the time, and the Turks, amongst others, heard of Ekaterina's intentions. They, however, looked upon the projected expedition as so foolhardy and impossible that they made absolutely no preparations to meet it, contenting themselves with the assurance that Orloff would not manage to enter the Mediterranean.

Count Orloff left Kronstadt with a fleet consisting onof saus. of 12 ships-of-the-line, 12 frigates, and a number of transports and store-ships. After experiencing some bad weather in the German Ocean, he picked up English pilots and reached Portsmouth in a very bad condition. Reaches

Portsmouth.

At Portsmouth the dockyard was put at his disposal ; and having refitted, he sailed again, to meet more bad weather in the Bay of Biscay ; but eventually he got through the Straits of Gibraltar and anchored at Port owo# at

Port Mahon.

]Mahon, then occupied by the British. Here again he found himself among friends, his battered ships were put into trim, and his sea-sick and diseased men treated in the hospitals.

The Mediterranean Powers generally regarded the views of

Mediterranean

advent of a Russian fleet with extreme dislike ; the Pouiers.

Venetian action.

Venetians, in particular, would have none of it. They issued an order that no Russian ships were to be admitted into the ports, and sent out a fleet with orders to attack Orloff should he try to enter the

Views of

Adriatic. The Turks, meanwhile, were astounded to the Turks.

So THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

The Turkish fleet in 1770.

Hassan of Algiers.

Orloff moves, Feb. 1770.

Orloff's opinion of his fleet.

hear of the Russian fleet's arrival ; and promptly addressed a complaint to the representatives of Austria because the Venetians " had allowed Orloff to pass the Straits of Gibraltar."

Mustapha iii., the then Sultan of Turkey, had paid great attention to his fleet, and it was in a fairly efficient condition — eflicient, at least, for the Turks. Its chief admiral was Hassan of Algiers, a man of some fame and mark in his time. Born on the frontiers of Persia, Hassan when a boy was captured and sold as a slave in Algeria. After a time he became a boatman, then a soldier, and later still a pirate, in which capacity he gained so much renown that he became Port Admiral of Algiers. Here he quarrelled with the Dey, and was exiled or escaped to Italy ; and his fame having pre- ceded him, he secured a post in the Turkish fleet, and soon became a leading admiral.

Orloff" having refitted his ships, left Port Mahon in February 1770, and sailed for the Morea. Here he issued proclamations and jDi'oduced a revolt, and occupied Navarino, Modon, Patras, and several other ports. His soldiers, however, were too few to help the insurrection to any extent, and the Turkish army coming down in force, he first withdrew to Navarino and then left Greece altosrether.

He had written to Ekaterina a most trenchant criticism upon his fleet, describing it as nearly useless even against the Turks ; but the Tsarina was not to be discouraged. Rear- Admirals Elphinstoue and Spiridoff, with Greig, then a commodore, were despatched with

"^cai., £--,51.^.1 «,lc.

MAP OF BLACK SEA, TrRKEY, ETC.

82 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

Ehaterina sends reinforcements via Portsmouth and Port IMahon, and

reinforcements.

these reached Orloff early in 1770. In May, Hassan of Alpjiers came down the Dardenclles with a laro;e fleet, and the rivals tried each other's metal in a Small number of small long-range engagements that produced

little or no loss on either side.

encounters.

Battle of Chios On tlic 5th of July 1770 Admiral SpiridofF, with

and Jchesma,

5-7 July 1770. ten ^ ships-of-thc-line and five frigates, was cruising off Chios, when he encountered Hassan of Algiers. The Turkish fleet consisted of 15 ships-of-the-line (one of 100 guns, one of 96, four 84, one 74, one 70, one 62, and six 60 guns), 8 galliots, 5 xebecques, and 2 corvettes. Hassan ran his ship alongside that of Spiridofi", and both vessels took fire. They continued fighting till they blew up. Nearl}* the whole of the crews were killed on either side, but in both cases the admirals and principal officers escaped unhurt. The majority of the Turks were at anchor, and so remained during the battle, which led to no very decisive result, though such advantage as there was rested entirely with the Eussians. Night fell before the Turks could be destroyed ; but the fortunes of the day had gone against them enough to create panic in many of their vessels. Hassan's authority was set aside, and, bent only upon avoiding a repetition of the action on the morrow, the Turks cut their cables and drifted in disorder into the Bay of Tchesma, where they were more or less safe from Russian attack.

' Creasy's Histoni of Turhey says eight sliips-of-tlie-line and seven frigates. The biggest Russian sliip iras the Eostislav, 108 guns.

I762-I796 83

They were not, however, protected agaiust fire-ships (the old-tmie equivalent to torpedo boats), and Admiral Elphinstone prepared four. None of the Russians knew anything at all about fire - ships, and they evinced no desire to start learning ofi" Tchesma. Con- sequently the famous l)attle of Tchesma was practicall)' a British affaii' with Russian crews, and not invariabl}' Tchesma a

British affair.

even with these, as those in the fire-ships deserted at the critical moment.

Practically, what Spiridofi^ did was to very wisely decide not to interfere with an operation concerning which he had neither experience nor knowledge ; and when we make allowances for the natural gall that dependence upon foreigners must have produced, Russian behaviour at Tchesma was correct enough. The Russian ofticers folded their hands, and left the work to those who understood it. History has many instances of our people co-operating with foreigners, the foreigners busy hampering as much as possible. Spiridofi' did no hampering, and the command oispiridog's

wisdom in not

the entire fleet seems to have lieen in the hands oi interfering. Elphinstone that night. ^

The plan of attack was as follows : — pia„ 0/ attaci<.

Elphinstone, with the main liody of the fleet, lay out.side in case the Turks should attempt a rush.

Commodore Greig, detached with four ships-of-the- Grdg. line and two frigates, entered the mouth of the Imy, and stood by to cover the attack.

' SpiridofF may liave been incapacitated from wonnds.

84 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

The four fire-ships were under Dugdale, with jMackenzie as second in command. Dugdale. Thfec of the fire - ships ran aground and were

wasted, as the whole of the Russian bluejackets jumped overboard before the Turks were reached. Dugdale, however, manaoed to run his vessel alono-side a Turk and grapple her. He then fired his ship ; the fiames spread rapidly amid the crowded shipping, and in five hours only the 62-gun ship and a few small craft remained : the Turkish fleet was annihilated.

In consequence of this action, which ranks as one of the most famous battles in Russian history, Orloff received the surname of Tchesmeski. Naturally the Russians have to some extent concealed their de- pendence upon their British officers, and the critical have remarked that the names of Elphinstone, Dugdale, and Mackenzie are not to be found alongside that of the Tchesma. in the Russian Navy List. Neither, however, is that of Orloff", and Spiridoff's name is perpetuated for other actions than this one.i On the whole, we need nor grudge the Russians the triumph of their flag at Tchesma : apres tout, the ships and flag were theirs. Is it not taught in Belgium that Waterloo is a place where in 1815 the Belgians thrashed the French? And at Waterloo the panic-stricken Belgians nearly flung oiir troops into confusion ; while at Tchesma the Russians refused to hamper naval operations that they did not underst<ind, and helped in what was really the most effective way.

' "Admiral Greig" is a Russian ship-name.

1762-1796 §5

After Tchesma the whole Levant was at Russia's sipMnstone

proposes to

mercy, and Elphinstone blockaded the Dardenelles. Mce the

Dardenelies.

Numerous Turkish merchantmen were captured, and generally the Russians met with success, causing revolts in Egypt, and at one or two places in Greece. Elphinstone wished to force the Dardenelles, but Orloff, who, as before mentioned, had a very low opinion of the value of his fleet, hesitated. The Dardenelles, as it chanced, were at this time practically undefended, there being nothing save a few old tumbledown forts of scarcely any value at all between the Russian fleet and Constantinople.

While Orlofi' hesitated, the Turkish ex-Vizier hou, constanu.

■Airil T- T T -1 -1 nople was saued

JMoldow^endji w^as sendmg round men with pails 01 from Russia

after Tchesma.

whitewash. Every old fort was carefully whitewashed ; and wdien Orloff came to make a reconnaissance, he found what appeared to be a series of brand-new defences. It is indeed a curious freak of Fate that a few pails of whitewash should have barred Russia in 1770 from the city of her eternal desire!

Orloff would doubtless have discovered the decep- tion sooner or later, but his chance was only a transient one. The Turks had then in their service a French- man, one De Tott, and under De Tott's supervision real and efficient fortifications were rapidly constructed. Realisino- at lenoth what was in the wind, Orloff attacked one of these forts, but failing to make any impression on it whatever, he abandoned the Dardenelles and sailed away to attack Lemnos.

At Lemnos he landed all the men at his disposal, ''"^sians

■*- defeated before

Lemnos, 1770.

86 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

and l)esiegc(-l the Castle .sixty days. Provisions Ijeing exhausted, the garrison had ali'cady begun to treat for surrender and sent hostages, when Hassan of Algiers, who had l)eeu saved from the holocaust at Tchesma, appeared on the scene. He had got too'ether a numljer of lioht vessels, and these he manned with 4000 volunteers, the riff-raff of Constantinople, armed only with pistols and sabres. De Tott, the Frenchman at the Sultan's court, considered the plan ridiculous, liut the Grand Vizier approved of it. " If it succeeds," said he, " Lemnos will be .saved : if it fails, it will rid Constantinople of 4000 ruffians and roo-ues.''

Hassan landed secretlv on the east side of the island of Lemnos, and in the earlv mornino- of the 10th of October fell suddenh- and unexpectedly upon Orloft's lines. The Paissian artillerymen were cut to pieces, their guns captured and turned upon the rest of the Ijesiegers. A great many were killed, and only a percentage managed to reach the ships, which at once sailed away. For this, Hassan of Alo'iers was made chief admiral of the Turkish Navy.

A little later, Hassan encountered Orloff ag-aiu in a hard-fought battle at Munderos. Both sides claimed the victory. After the battle OrlofF sailed away, first giving up to Hassan the hostages who had been handed over at Lemnos and sent on board his fleet.

After this the Russian Mediterranean fleet did

I762-I796 87

practically nothing. The ships were in sad need of repairs, battle and sickness had seriously depleted their crews ; and for the rest of the war they spent such energies as were left them in attacks upon small towns, in order to get supplies of the necessaries of life.

In the Crimea and elsewhere the Russian soldiers Peace of

Kainardji, 1784.

had carried all before them; and in 1784, when the Peace of Kainardji w-as signed, Russia gained Kinburn, Kertch, Yenikale, and the country between the Bug and Dneiper. She also retained Azov and Taganrog, secured the right to build and maintain a Black Sea fleet, while the Bosphorus and Dardenelles were thrown open to her merchant ships. In securing all these results the Russian Navy may be said to have borne a full if indirect share : OrlofiTs unexpected attack in the Levant drained and divided the Turkish defence. Directly peace was signed, Orloff, via English ports, returned to Kronstadt with his fleet.

One curious circumstance remains to be recorded. Angio-Russian

^ _ Luar prevented

In 1780 Ekaterina joined the Armed ^Neutrality — owing to most

Russian nauat

allied with Prussia, Austria, Sweden, and Portugal "^"'"'^ '"'"^

' o British.

nominally for the protection of neutral commerce, but practically a pro-French combination. Russia, however, though opposed to Great Britain, found herself unable to act against her for the. simple reason that most of her naval officers were British, and her only bases outside her own coasts British harbours !

88 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

Netij war with Turkey, 1787.

Greig ordered to the Mediterranean.

British and other hostility prevents Greig from sailing.

Rupture with Sweden, 7788.

Turco-Russian War.

In 1787 a uew war with Turkey broke out. Mindful of the effect that Orloff's fleet had pro- duced, Ekaterina gave orders for Greig — now an admiral — to take eighteen ships-of-the-line, with a number of frigates and store-ships, to the Levant from Kronstadt.

The fleet, however, never sailed. On hearing of the projected expedition, everv State in the Mediter- ranean, except Genoa, refused to assist it, or admit it within its ports : the strained relations with Great Britain precluded the hope of friendly oflices such as had been accorded to Orloft", and though some British packet lines agreed to provide transport for stores, the British Government forbade such assist- ance. Finally, through Turkish diplomacy, a rupture occurred between Russia and her old enemy Sweden, which of course necessitated the retention of Greig's ships in the Baltic.

The R,ussian Kavy was not, however, altogether idle against Turkey. Hassan of Algiers, now Ghazi and commander-in-chief of the Turkish forces both on land and sea, attacked Kiuburn. The afterwards famous Suwarroff" marched to its relief, supjDorted by a large fleet of gunboats. The Turkish fleet (galleys and small craft of the gunboat order) was allowed to enter the Liman without resistance, and began to bombard Kinburn, when Suwarrofl" suddenly attacked the besiegers by land. While the Turkish ships bombarded, they were attacked in the rear by the Russian gunboats, and all, or nearly all,

of them, cauglit lietween so many fires, were destroyed.

Later, these Russian gunboats ojierated with Suwarroff" on the Danube. Larger ship fighting there was none : so far as big ships were concerned, the Euxine was still a Turkish lake.

One naval incident is worthy of record. Captain Kapnan

•' ^ Sahen's death.

Saken, of a 15-gun galley, fell in with thirteen small Turkish a;allevs, that "cut him off and surrounded him. Seeing that the dav was lost. Saken ordered his men into the boats, but himself remained on board. When four galleys had grappled his ship and were about to board, he blew up his magazine, destroying himself, his vessel, and her four antagon- ists. A torpedo gunboat commemorates this achieve- ment. Saken was a native of the erstwhile Swedish province of Esthonia.

Li 1790 that hardy annual " The Russian Menace" ^he first

•J appearance of

first made its appearance in England. In that year "^"^ ""*"'""

Menace " in

1790.

Pitt asked for an increase of the navy to balance "^'''"''' Russian shipbuilding, much as to-day our Governments do every year. Fox, being Pitt's political rival, advocated a Russian alliance. Pitt attempted to end the Turco-Russian war, and Ekaterina declined to listen to his proposals ; in consequence of which Pitt, enacting a role much akin to that of Beaconsfield ninety years later, nearly brought about an Anglo-Russian war. Popular opinion, however, was not in those days educated up to the good qualities of the Turk, or the necessity of retaining him in Europe, and Pitt

90 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

obtaiued little support from even his own [)arty in his anti Russian crusade. Speaking generally, we entertained in those days much the same kind of "tenderness" of public sentiment for Russia that now, a hundred odd years later, we have for Japan.

The French Revolution put a sudden end to Pitt's views and designs, if he had any, against Russian conquest in the South of Europe. As for Russia, her armies on land pursued a more or less victorious course, but much of her energy was occupied in dealing with Sweden ; and in those days, when most nations were liable to change sides a time or two in the course of a general war, Russia's distance from the centre of opera- tions demanded a large amount of circumspection in her movements. If it were not " history," a good deal of what took place in the general wars of the eighteenth Giiberterian ccnturv would strouffly suo-ffest the Gilbert and Sullivan

aspect of ' & y &&

European Qpcra of to-clay. Many books have been written on

politics in the ^ j j

18th century. j.j^g stratcglcal and political aspects of the Seven Years' War and other conflicts of the eighteenth century, but when one comes to regard them with an open mind, it is difficult to believe that any very serious strategical purposes were ever at work. ■ So long as their armies fought a battle now and again, most of the rulers and their generals seem to have been faii'ly indifferent as to who they fought, or what was secured or lost by the fighting ! The position of the Russian Navy in the foregoing pages has usually been one of strategical inutilit}', or else of tactical impotence

1762-1796 9^

occasionally of both comlnned ; but in none of the movements of Russia's allies or foes is any much greater purpose to be discerned, unless we look with a very fixed determination to discover one.

Mention has already been made of the rupture The war wuh

Sweden.

with Sweden in 1788. When Ekaterina declared war against Gustavus nr. of Sweden (then subsidised by Turkey), she had for allies Austria and Denmark. Great Britain, then involved with France, Spain, and Holland, was, as regards Russia, a species of malevolent neutral. She sent no ships to attack Russia, having none to spare, but a number of British naval officers, including the famous Sir Sidney Smith, went to Sweden, and served in the Swedish fleet. Elphinstone resigned his command in the Russian Xavy and re-entered the British service,^ but Greig and most of the others remained in the Russian fleet. Enoiand, so far as her naval officers were concerned, was occupying a sea position very nearly analogous to that occupied by the Swiss on shore — nearly every nation had Swiss mercenaries in its armies — most navies carried British or ex - British officers in some of their ships. ^

The first naval battle of the new Russo-Swedish *""'« "/

Hogland

War was that of Hogland (Gogiand), 17th July 1788, f/^^'";^^^- ^^^^ the Swedes having penetrated the Gulf of Finland with a view to attacking" St. Peterbours.

1 He served witli Byron and Roduej- as captain of the Magnificent, 1774-80.

" In the Kussian Xavv there were also many British seamen.

92 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

The Russian fleet under Greig was constituted as

follows : —

1 ship of 108 guns (Rostislav)

8 sliips of 74 ,,

8 „ 66 „

8 frigates 28-32 „

8 smaller ship;, various

with a total of 1452 guus

The Swedes under their Prince Carl (afterwards king) had a fleet consisting of —

4 ships of 70 guns 11 „ 60 „

5 big frigates 40 ,, 2 frigates 32 „ 4 smaller ships

■with a total of 1286 guns

The Russians had therefore some considerable superiority in number of guns ; but so far as number of line-of-battle ships went, their superiority was not very great — 17 ships-of-the-line against 15, aided by 5 40-guu frigates capable of "lying in the line," and certainly equal to a couple of third-rate 60-gun ships-of-the-line. Individually, of course, the Russian ships were larger, and history has always shown — except, perhaj)s, to the perennial contributor of " Pleas for Moderate Dimensions ' in Brassey's Naval Annual — that, other things being equal, oue big ship is always worth two smaller oues.^

1 Two brains, that must varj', pitted against one, work the mischief. In naval warfare the individual captain must act largely at times on his own judgment, and "tot homines, tot sententia3." Had Greig, instead of 17 sail-of- the -line of various sizes, had a dozen, or perhaps even ten, big three-deckers, he would probably have won the battle of Gogland. -

1762-1796 93

The battle began at 3.30 in the afternoon, and was commenced by Admiral Greig, who in the three-decker Rostislav charged right into the Swedish flagship. A seventv-four following, attacked her from the other side, ereig at

"" ^^ Gogland.

Three Swedish 60-gun ships, the Vasa, Aran, and Fadernistandet, came to the assistance of their prince, and for some while the battle was carried out by these vessels only. The two Russian ships fought desperately, but were eventually forced to retire on their main body, certain ships of which had evinced no great desire to fight. Peter's standing order about the correct propor- tion of Russians to Swedes was not a dead letter and noc forgotten : Greig had broken it by attacking, and Swedish prestige was yet a real thing to the Russians. On the other hand, the Swedes had to combat against the prestige of Greig and his British officers and men, two things that helped to make the action indecisive.

The Swedish Prince Gustav, which failed to chanee tack, got involved in the Russian line and was captured ; but almost at the same moment the Russian seventy - four Vladimir was forced to strike to the Swedes for a precisely similar cause.' The rest of the ships did a good deal of firing without doing any great harm on either side save to " sticks" ; the greatest loss was in those vessels that had begun the battle. In these it was very heavy. At 10 p.m. the fleets separated, and went back to their harbours. Greig

^ There was very little wind, and all manoeuvres were somewhat disorderly and difficult to carry out effectuallj'.

94

THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

returned liis loss at about 1000 men hois de combat} Prince Carl sent in his as 130 killed and 334 wounded — about half the Eussian loss. It was in this action that the captain of the Swedish Vasa, Count Balzar Horn, being mortally wounded and having to pass the command to a junior lieutenant, made to that officer the historical and oft-quoted speech : " You shall answer me before the Almighty if you yield ! "

The Swedes regarded the battle of Gogland as almost equivalent to a victory, on the score of the front that they showed to a British admiral with a certain number of British officers and seamen under him.- Their attack of St. Peterbourg was, however, frustrated by it- Details of the fleets eno'ao-ed^ at Goa-land will be found on the two pages following. The names of British commanding officers in Russian vessels are indicated with asterisks.

' He Tvas liimself wounded. He reported the Vladimir captured, and a second stip " missing."

^ There were also a good many picked Danish and Norwegian sea- men in the Russian fleet.

^ A nnxaher of additional details, official reports never before pub- lished, plans, the correspondence, etc. etc., of this and other battles, will be found in the General Appendix at the end of this book. The whole correspond ezice and Russian admissions as to the use of inflammable shell at the battle of Gogland will be found in the Appendix.

I762-I796

95

RUSSIAN FLEET

Ships-of-the-hn"e

?i'ame.	Gtt7lS.	Commander.
Rostislav .	. 108	Captain Odenzoff (Admiral Greig *).
MistislofF .	. 74	Captain Mautovski.
Peter Yeliky	. 74	,, Dennison.*
Vladimir .	. 74	Berch.
St. Helena	. 74	,, Brayer * (Rear- Admiral Grigorovitch Spiridoff).
Eetwisan .	74	Captain Todd* (Rear -Admiral van Oessen).
Yaroslav .	74	Captain Beakes.*
Viestnik .	. 74	,, Makaroff (Rear -Admiral CoDstantinoff).
Ivan Bohnslaff .	. 74	Captain ISTarland.*
Tchinslav .	. 66	„ Carston.* (?)
Eossia	. 66	,, Trevenna.*
Doris	. 66	Kukosoff.
Gremiastcliy	. 65	,, Borinofl'.
Victor	66	,, Obolianoff.
Miceslaff .	. 66	„ Borizofl'.
Vzadnik .	66	,, Elpliinstone * (not the admiral).
Boteslav .	. 66	Captain Dennison.*
	Frigates
Name.	Guns.	Comhiander.
Briantislav	. 32	Captain Seniavin.
Priamislav	. 32	,, Severs * ^ (or Siever).
Pozadnik .	. 36	,, Lomen.i
Sdwan	. 32	Chiroliskoff.
MistislofT .	28	., StamoutofF.
Xayezdnik	28	(?) ^
Penderaklia	. 32	„ Lolgnet.-
Vzadnik .	32	,, Liskovski.
2 bomb ket	dies, 1 cutter, and 3 transports.
Total broac	[side, 614 guns. Total guns, 1452.

' Uncertain whether Dutch or English.

- Said to have been English — name cannot be identified.

96 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

SWEDISH FLEET

iVa/?(e.	Guns	Commamler.
Hedwig Elisabeth Charlotte	60	Lieut.-Colonel Modee.
Gripen	44	Captain von Hoorn.
Omheten	60	Lieut.-Colonel Kuylenstjerna.
Prince Gustav .	68	Colonel Count Y'achtmeister.
Riittvisan ...	60	Lieut.-Colonel Fu.st.
Camilla	40	Captain Dufva.
Enigheten	68	Lieut.-Colonel Eneskicild.
Frqja	40	;Major Puke.
Dygden	60	Lieut.-Colonel Raab.
Yasa	60	,, Count Horn.
Gustaf III.	68	Flag-Captain Xordenskjold (Ad- miral, Prince Carl — and Count AYrangel).
Faderneslandet .	60	Lieut.-Colonel Kuylenstjerna.
Aran	60	„ Hysingskold.
Minerva .	40	?iIajor Nauekhoff.
Fcirsigtigheten .	60	Lieut.-Colonel Fahlstedt.
Thetis	40	]SIajor ^YoUyn.
Prins Carl	60	Lieut.-Colonel Psilanderhjelra.
Sophia Magdalena	68	,, Linderstedt.
Prins Fredrik Adolf	60	,, Leijonankar.
Prins Gustaf Adolf	60	,, Christiernin.
Yarramas (frigate)	3-2	Major Billing.
YarislaAvi:2 ( „ )	32	Lieutenant Hokenflykt.
Hector ( ,, )	22	,, IvuUenberg.

Eepeaters and Scouts not in the Line

Name. Sprengtporten Trolle Patrioteu Esi^lendian (yacht)

Gum. Commander.

24 Lieut.-Colonel Stedingk. 24 Major Gyllenskold. 16 Lieutenant Yirgin. Ensign Ekholm.

Total broadside, o68 guns. Total guns, 1286.

1762-1796 97

Greig, annoyed at his failure to win a victory, hastily refitted his fleet, collected a few reinforcements, then sailed for Sveaborg, whither the Swedes had Bawe 0/

Sueaborg,

retired and were still refitting;. Here he made a '^es.

bold attempt to destroy the lot of them, but failed.

He managed, however, to capture a line-of-battle ship. Death of oreig.

He then blockaded ; ^ but was taken ill and died ;

after which his fleet withdrew, losins; two frio-ates.

In the following year the British, Dutch, and Prussians intervened to the estent of neutralisins Denmark, and Gustavus iii. made a great and final effort to get together a fleet strong enough to defeat the Russians, of which, now that Greig was dead, he

was sanojume.

After Greig's death the command of the Russian fleet passed to the Prince of Nassau - Siegen.^ He had with him 21 ships - of - the - line and IQ Bawe of

^ Oland, 7789.

frigates, and with this force met the Swedish Crown Prince Carl, also with 21 ships - of - the - line and 9 frigates. The battle lasted six hours, from 2 to 8 p.m., and was again indecisive. Probably both sides had more ships than they could manage. The

^ An anecdote of the blockade is as follows. One of Greig's frigates captured a Swedish transport laden with cordage. Greig liberated the crew, a petty officer and seven men, and sent them under a flag of truce to the Mjolo Roads, where Prince Carl was lying. In return Prince Carl sent to Greig a Russian pett}" officer and seven men from the Vladimir, and also returned the master of a captured Russian merchant- man with his wife and three daughters. In a letter of thanks for this courtesy Greig expressed his pleasure, and "regretted that he was unable to exchange presents of the fair sex with the Prince, but he had not had the fortune to make any such prisoners."

' Possibly, however, Tchitchagoff was in command at Oland.

' 7

5IAP OF THE BALTIC.

1762-1796 99

Swedes, however, never had their fulJ force engaged, as Liljehorn, who commanded their rear-guard, failed to support the main body.^ He subsequently gave as a reason his opinion that '"' two-thirds of the Swedish force were c^uite sufficient to defeat the Russians." His inaction has always remained inexplicable, as he had been noted hitherto for his bravery. He cer- tainly, however, lacked the ability to know what Xelson alway.s knew and acted on : "' Numbers only can annihilate, and that mere gallant engagements are useless. In this case the Swedes did not even win, and appear, if anything, to have had rather the worst of an encounter in which decisive victory would have rehabilitated their nation. Indeed, Liliehorn's inaction uijehorn seals

•' the fate of

may be said to have sealed the fate of Sweden : the ^"""'''"■ last chance to break the Eussian Naval Power was thrown away. To all intents and purposes this battle was what the Eussians claim it — a Russian victory ; and after it they felt themselves fully competent to meet the Swedes on equal terms.

They retii'ed, however, after this meeting,- and Swedish coast-vessels began to penetrate the Gulf of Finland. A coast - flotilla ' under Ehrensward came off" Korkiansaari, and was there attacked bv a miscel-

1 The Russians fouglit a retreating action. The Swedes say that they had several ships disabled in consequence of an epidemic caught from tlie crew of the captured Vladimir.

- The Russian version is that they did not want to fight till reinforce- ments that were exiiected arrived. Tlieir plan was to collect a huge force and annihilate the Swedes.

^ One frigate, 11 coast- frigates, 5 galleys, and 23 small gunboats.

loo THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

Roichensalm (or Suenbsund), 24th August 1789.

laueous Russian coast-defence force, consisting of 2 frigates, 3 xebecques, 19 galleys, and 37 small gunboats, on the loth of August. A desultory action ensued for five hours, the Swedes, little hurt, being driven into Eotchensalm (Svenksund) and there blockaded.

The Russians now collected a fleet to destroy the entrapped Swedes, and brought up two divisions, one under the Prince of Nassau - Sietren, the other under Admiral Kruse. Altogether they totalled 107 vessels, of which 8 were frigates and 22 galleys — the rest being- small gunboats.^ The action was begun by Kruse, who arrived a little too soon, and sustained a defeat. The Swedes, however, had not come off scathless ; and they were also getting short of ammunition when

'The coast - flotilla galleys and gunboats of this period were of various trpes. The principal were : —

! Name of Type.	Dimensions	in Feet.	Masts.	Oars.	Coinple- meiit.	Guns.
	Long.	Broad.	Draught
Hemmema .	146	36	10	3	40	2f,0	f24 36-pounder.s "( 2 12-pouuders
Turuma . .	126	31	11	3	-38	170	f24 18-pounders '[l6 3-pouuders
Udeina	121	29	Sh	o	30	J	C 4 12-pouuders ■ 2 8-poiinders (^ (in bow)
Poyema .	93	27	ei	"2	32		f i 24-pounders 1 (2 in bow. 2 1 in stern) t 2 3-pouuders
Gun sloops .	64	IT	1	2{sqi]are' sail) ^	28	?	f 1 18-pounder j \ 1 12-pouuder j 4 3-pouuders i
Galley	140	21	/	o	?	!	2 12-pounders ! 2 6-pounders [ 8 3-pounde.rs i
Sniall gun- boats	42	10	"2	0 ;	10	30 '	i i 1 24-pouuder I

1762-1796 lOI

the Duke of Nassau-Siegen came up. Ehrensward, despite his protests, was ordered by the King of Sweden (Gustavus lii.), who had watched the battle from a neighbouring height, to attack the Russians. He did so, and sustained a total defeat, losing his frigate, 3 coast-frigates, 1 galley, and IG gunboats. 1400 of his men were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. As a result of this action the Swedes had to withdraw from Finland. The Russian loss was 1 gun sloop; 15 officers and 368 men killed; 38 officers and 589 men wounded.

The following year Sweden made her final effort, ^^so.

^ •' Sweden's

The Duke of Sudermania^ was put in command oi i'^^* effort. the Grand fleet, while the king (Gustavus iii.) took command of a large galley fleet, said to have consisted of 19 transports, '27 galleys, and 236 gunboats, mounting altogether nearly 2000 guns.

Operations began by an attack upon the stores at Port Baltic, which were destroyed by Cederstroim with two frio-ates.

o

On the 30th of April Prince Carl left Carlscrona sudetmania

sails.

with a fleet of 52 sail, of which 22 were ships-of-the- line, 12 frigates, and the rest small craft.

On the 14th of May he was off Revel, and attempted Reuei,

14th May 1790.

to force the harbour and destrov ten Russian ships-of- """'ans

*' ^ repulse

the-line at anchor there under the batteries. He was S'"'^™'""'''- driven off, losing one ship-of-the-line captured and one other sunk.-

1 I.e. Prince Carl.

- This attempt was made in a strong gale. Another account gives

I02 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

Gustauus HI.

forces

Fredrifishamn.

Action off Revel.

On the .same dav the Kino; of >Sweclen forced an eiitnmce into Fredriksliamn harbour, in fece of a heavy eainionade from the forts and coast-Hotilla, which had a base there. Twenty-nine of these coast-ships were captured or sunk, while the docks and naval stores were destroyed/

Thence the king made course to Viljorg, where he hmded his troops withiji easy distance of St. Peterbours:, and then waited for Suderinania at Bjoruo.

Sudermania. with 21 ships - of - the - line and several frioates, meanwhile met the Kronstadt divi- sion of the Russian fleet, 17 ships - of - the - line and 7 frioates, uirder Kruse on 3rd June. A fierce but indecisive action ensued. Next day fight- ino- went on at intervals, and Kruse was reinforced bv Tchitchagoff, with 13 l^attleships and 11 frigates.^ Before this combined force Sudermania retreated to Bjorno. and thence to Viborg. where the Russians caught him. Practically the entire naval force of Sweden was here blockaded for a month, at the end of which time their provisions ran short. Outside, the whole availalile force of the Russian Navy was collected.

tlie Russian force at -2 ships of lOS guns, 6 of 74 guns, 6 frigates, and some coast-ships. The Swedes lost 51 killed and 81 wounded, be.sides prisoners.

1 The Bnssians lost 1 turunia, 2 gun barges, ii small and 4 galliots. Onlv 6 officers and 180 men were made prisoners. The Swedes paid for their victorv with 1 gun yawl, 30 wuunded and 30 killed.

- From Revel.

1762-1796 I05

The Swedish force consisted of —

1 ship	of 74	guns (Vladimir ex Russian).
5 ships	of 70	J)
0 „	64	)7
2	62
0	60	„
0 -^ It	44	))
6 „	42
3 frigates 32
1 frigate 26	)J
1 „	18	J)
1 „	16	,,
1 „	12

lu addition, there were a large number of schooners, galleys, gunboats, and transports. A good deal of uncertainty prevails as to what really took place ; but the Swedes attempted to break the blockade, and lost of their fleet 7 ships-of-the-line, 3 frigates, 1 schooner, 7 galleys, 4 gun sloops, 4 gun j^awls, and 30 transports.

They forced the blockade in the night,^ launching four fire-ships on Tchitchagoff's fleet. Several vessels had slipped out, when one of the lire-ships broke adrift and, coming on the Swedish rear, set a battleship and frigate on fire. Both these ships blowing up, the remainder were thrown into confusion, colliding and running aground. Those that escaped were hotly pursued by TchitchagofF, and two ships-of-the-line were captured. The liue-of-battle ships were as abso- lutely put out of it by this battle as were those of

^ See Appendix for official reports, plans, etc. Swedish accounts say it was in the davtime.

io6 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

France and Spain at Trafolgar : Viborg, indeed, was the Trafalgar or ^Egospotami of the Baltic ; and ever since that day Russia has been the priucij^al Baltic Xaval Power. Whether she will always remain so — whether she could prove herself so were war to suddenly happen — is a moot point : the German Heet is possibly a full match for such force as Russia maintains in her northern harbours. Sweden, again, is slowly but surely creep- ing up ; and though her battleships are small in size and still insignificant in numbers, their organisation is very complete, and their crews said by the Russians to be exceedingly efficient. Sooner or later Russia and Germany stand to be involved in hostilities, and the scale would be turned by Sweden throwing her forces into either side. That she should do so is not at first sight probable ; but the Norwegian question is always liable ro produce unexpected developments, which Great Britain — to whom the relations of Sweden and Norway have always been held up as an example of the benefits of Home Rule — little suspects or compre- hends. Norway is Sweden's Ireland : and, unlike Ireland, havino- Home Rule, is able and waitino- to seize an opportunity to assert herself

To return to the battle of Viborg. After Suder- mania had o-ot our. the Kino- of Sweden followed with his galley fleet, and reached Rotchensalm (Svenksund) with the loss of thirty ships of his command.

The force left to him still counted 195 vessels mounting 1124 guns, and 14,000 men. Mostly his craft were very small ; the largest were merely coast-

1762-1796 lO?

frigates — of which he had five. He had also a couple of brigs and sixteen galleys.

Ao'ainst this force the Prince of Nassau-Siegen moved, with a Heet of —

8 frigates.

6 xebecs. U galliots. 10 cutters and bomb ketche.-?.

3 floating batteries. 22 galleys.

S small galleys. 80 gun .sloops.

In all 151 vessels, carrvino- between them 18,500 men and 1412 guns.

Rather rashly the Eus.sians assumed that the Swedes were altoo-erher crushed bv the Viboro- affair : and so sure were they of victory that a cabin was specially fitted up ou board the Prince of Nassau-Siegen's flag- ship for the accommodation of the King of Sweden when he should surrender, and the 9tli of July, Ekaterina's birthday, was fixed as the day of battle as a compliment to the Tsarina. Unfortunately for Russia, the prince was a little too premature ; and he seems to have made few if any preparations for findiug a vio-orous resistance awaitino- him.

The battle began at 9.30 on the morning of 9th Ba"/e at

ffotscliensalm

Julv. and lasted without intermission till 10 o'clock on (Suenksund),

• ' 9th and 10th

the morning of the 10th. ■""' ''^'>-

The Russians at first went in without much order or precaution, and being received with a reserved fire, were thrown into tremendous confusion and suffered

io8 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

great loss. For the rest of the fight they made most gallant and vigorous attempts to get in, but each was as gallantly met and repulsed.

Eventually they were forced to retire, half their men (9500) having been killed, wounded, or captured. They also lost a third of their fleet, b'l ships and vessels, namely, 4 frigates, 4 xebecs, 1 coast-frigate, 16 gallevs, 6 bomb ketches or cutters, and 21 other vessels.

The Swedes onlv allowed having suffered the loss of 1 coast-frigate, 3 yawls, and 300 men liors de combat.

The Russian estimate fixed their loss considerably higher ; and it would appear probable that they must have lost more, if only on account of the close quarters at which the battle was fouo-ht. That redoubtable Englishman Sir Sidney Smith was fighting for the Swedes. English, both officers and men, were present in large numbers in hoth fleets : ^ of these. Captain Sir F. Thesiger particularly distinguished himself on the Russian side.

This repulse of the Russians at Svenksund was,

however, too late to save Sweden. — the Swedish force

^""''^ °.^., ,., „ was still blockaded, and Russia had command of the sea

"Sissoi V el iky,

2,thjuiy 1,90. ^^.:^^^Yl thirty ships-of-the-line, some of which defeated a

few Swedes off Gogland on •27th July, the festival-day

su,eden q£ ^j^g '&&mt Sissoi VeHkv. The battle of Svenksund,

makes peace,

14th Aug. 7700. i^Q^yQ^-^y^ savcd Stockholm for the moment ; and peace

' Swedes denj- the presence of any foreigneis in their fleet except Smith, and attribute the legend to the adventures of Mr. Chucks in Marrvat's Peter Simjih.

1762-1796 I09

proposals were made. These Ekateriua accepted, and peace was signed on the 14th of August 1790.

Russia was thus left with a free hand to deal with Sweden's ally, Turkey ; and after some land defeats, f"<' »/ """•

with Turkey.

the Turks were driven to sue for peace ; the prelimi- '''""'^ "f ''''"^'

■L ' J- 9th Jan. 1792.

naries were signed at Galatea in August 1791, and ratified at Jassy on 9th January 1792.

Ekaterina now turned her attention to Poland, the '™"«« "f

Russian coast-

partition of which was completed in 1795; and one """' '^®^' great source of trouble removed from Europe. Bv it Russia secured the rest of Courland, and the coastline from long. 23°, lat. 58°, to long. 21° 50', lat. 56° — from Dome Ness to a few miles north of Memel, the present frontier with Germany.

In this year there was an Ano-lo-Russian alliance, Angio-Russian

•' ° alliance, 1795.

and the British Admiral Duncan was joined off the Texel by the Russian Admiral Hanickoff, with 12 ships- of-the-line and 6 frigates.

Russia was then the second Naval Power in the world, — a position to which she had been raised by the ojenius and foresio;ht of Ekaterina. who died in 1796, and was succeeded by the more or less mad Tsar Paul.

The great Ekaterina's policy did not at once die with her. The British mutiny at the Nore put a temjDorary end to the fleet combination in 1797 ; but w^hen the Dutch fleet capitulated in August 1799, the Russian ships Retwisan and Mistisloff, under Mitchell, an En2;lish rear-admiral in the Russian service, went into the Texel.

VI

1796-1801

PAUL

T)OTH under Paul, the erratic successor of the great Catherine ii., and under Alexander i., the son of Paul, Russia fought on both sides in the teneral war produced by the French Pi.evolution and Xapoleon. Paul, however, was naturally disposed to Xapoleon's side, while his successor, Alexander i., though circum- stances at one period drove him to become an ally of France, was distinctl}^ anti-Napoleonic in sentiment.

Paul came to the throne in 1796, and almost immediately afterwards the French plan of trade campaign against Great Britain was put into execution. This action on the part of France naturally placed Russia against her, since by the decree of the Directorv issued 1798. in January 1798 auy neutral vessel found to contain a

single British article was to be seized as a prize. Aimed originallv at the British, this decree caused most, trouble to the neutrals, and four montlis after it was issued Paul despatched a iieet of twenty-two liue-of-battle ships and fifty galleys to protect Russian merchantmen in the Sound. Very shortly afterwards.

I796-I80I III

Nelson's crushing defeat of the French Heet at the Nile Effect of the

^ . battle of

settled the Russian course of action : war was formally "c mie. conducted against France, and England, Russia, Austria, Turkey, Naples, and Portugal formed a great anti- French alliance.

Russian armies overran Switzerland, while a com- bined Russo-Turkish fleet, under Admiral Oushakoff, passed the Dardenelles and captured the Ionian Islands in September. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the Russian fleet, with that eye to the main chance which her enemies always accuse Russia of possessing to an al)normal degree, troubled very little about its allies, and seemed rather bent on capturing harbours than operating a^-aiust the French. The letters of Nelson at this period clearly indicate that the great admiral was of opinion that the capture of Malta for themselves was all the Russians in the Mediterranean really aimed at. They had with them eleven ships-of- the-liue and a number of frigates and smaller vessels ; but if ^lalta was their real objective, they did no more than long for it.

In Nelson's eyes Oushakofl" was a very inefticieut Ancona, 1799. person. Beyond bombarding Ancona in 1799, an operation attended with more damage to himself than to Ancona, he did nothing. Probably some of his inactivity may have been due to his ships being in little better condition than Orlofi's had been.

Russian troops, conveyed from the Baltic in British vessels, operated for a short while in Holland ; but very little military advantage was obtained there, and

112 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

eventually the British stored their Russian allies in the Channel Islands.

In the meantime Suwarroft' met defeat in Switzer- land, and eight thousand of his men were taken prisoners. Napoleon, with clever forethought, put these troops into new uniforms and sent them back to Russia, a thing that appealed very much to Paul. In addition to that, he was filled with an immense personal admira- tion for Napoleon on account of his brilliant Italian

7800. victories. The little else that was needed. Napoleon

managed, and Paul laid an embargo upon all British ships in Rus.sian ports. As a result, there was angry correspondence between London and St. Petersburg, the principal result of which was that negotiations were opened between Russia, Sweden, and Denmark for the "' Armed Neutrality," which in one of Captain ]\Iarryat's novels is described as " generally meaning a charge of bayonets."

The case of the Tlic o;atherin2: trouble was broug;ht to a head bv

Freya,25th .

July 1800. tlie Danish frio-ate Freva. She, being- out with a

convoy, refused to allow the British the " right of

British method search,' to which the British replied by coming

of dealing with

the question, alougsidc and forcing her to surrender.

Lord Wliitworth was then sent on an embassy to Copenhagen ; and by way of assistance to his arguments, he was accompanied by inne ships-of-the- line, four - bombs, and five frio;ates, under Admiral Dickson.

Pauls anger. All tliis Paul took as a personal insult. He got

himself created Grand Master of the Knights of St.

1796-1801 "3

John at Malta, ^vhiell place was then tlireatened b}' the British, as the only means of getting possession of the island in face of the British fleet. Oushakoff's fleet beino- unlikelv to effect anythino- in the Mediterranean, Paul, just at the time when Dickson's squadron reached the Sound, seized all the British merchantmen (about three hundred) then in Eussian harbours, and published a declaration that he would keep them till Malta was handed over to him. The British Government making- no sign that it intended to acquiesce, and Tsar Paul being further irritated by the fashion in which, dis- regarding his embargo, some British merchant ships sailed away and escaped, he clinched the matter by ordering^ all the rest to be burned.

Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia having by now signified to Paul that their sentiments towards the British were at one with his, the Tsar wrote a letter to Napoleon and despatched an ambassador to Paris. At about the same time the island of Malta surrendered British

capture Malta.

to the British.

On the 16th of December 1800, Russia and Sweden Armed

Neutrality,

signed the "" Armed Neutrality'"' treaty, and three days isoo. later Prussia and Denmark were also sio-natories.

O

Pitt and the British Government were under no British reply. delusions as to what was intended. At once an embargo Avas laid on all Russian, Danish, and Swedish ships (Prussia was excluded), and letters of marque were issued for the capture of any ships belonging to these Baltic Powers. In the meantime British ships were excluded from every port from the North Cape to

in 1801.

114 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

Gibraltar. Exactly four weeks after the signing of the treaty a British fleet, consisting of eighteen line-of- battle ships and thirty-five smaller vessels, sailed for the Baltic.

Russian fleet The total Russian fleet at the day was eighty-two

ships-of-the-line and forty frigates. Forty-seven of these were in the Baltic or at Archangel, but of that number only fifteen were ready for active service.

The British fleet, with Sir Hyde Parker in command and Nelson under him, were under orders to tr}' diplomac}' first — " diplomacy " in this case representing great show of force. Denmark was to be the first point of attack in any case, — an impression was abroad that the Danes, despite the Frej^a incident, had been acting more or less under compulsion ; Denmark, therefore, was to be detached by whichever means might seem best. The instructions proceeded : — that after settling matters at Copenhagen the fleet was to go to Revel, to destroy all Russian ships, forts, and arsenal there, after that to treat Kronstadt in the same wa}', and generally to cause the Russian flag to dis- appear from the waters of the Baltic.

At the time these instructions were issued a suspicion began to grow that the Danes would not easily give in. Nelson was in favour of attacking the Russians, and wrote to Sir Hyde Parker for permission to take ten ships-of-the-line, one bomb, or else a couple of fire-ships, to Revel and destroy the Russian fleet with them, leaving the remainder of the British fleet to attend to Copenhagen. By this means the " Armed

to Revel.

1796-1801 115

Neut.ralitv " would have been smashed at a siuole blow. However, Sir Hyde Parker was of a diftereut opinion to Nelson, and the famous attack on Copenhagen took place. With Russian naval history this has small concern, save that when Nelson was treating for the armistice he demanded fourteen weeks "in order to allow him time to go and destroy the Paissian Heet, and come back again to destroy the Danes if they wanted more." Eventually Denmark was detached. Before much more could be done, ne"ws arrived that the mad Tsar Paul had been assassinated, and his successor, Alexander i., had no desire to continue hostilities.

Xelson, now in supreme command, was ordered to nelson goes open negotiations with the new Tsar, to find out what Russia intended doins;, and not to fioiit unless he found the Russians lient on it. He at once made a dash for Revel with eleven ships-of-the-line, a frigate, and two sloops, his intention being to impress upon the Russians that he meant business, and to prevent their Kronstadt fleet joining the ships at Revel. However, he found that, the ice having broken , the Russians Avere all inside Kronstadt. At Revel, he wrote, he could have destroyed the whole lot of them.

Nelson, indeed, appears to have been exceedingly annoyed at having been compelled to let the Russians slip through his fingers, and the Russian Government seem to have had a fairlv clear inklino- of his sentiments and a mistrust of his intentions — while his views, freelv expressed aliout their fleet under Oushakoft' in the Mediterranean, had been both free and uncomplimentary.

ii6 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN KAYV

A o'ood deal of correspoiKloucr passed between Count Pahlcii, tlie Tsai's secretary, and Nelson, and o)i the 16tli of ^lay the Tsar's astonislnnent was expressed tliat such a force as Nelson's slmuld be ))rouo;])t to Russian waters in view of tlie reputed pacific intentions of the British Government. It looked a good deal like pressure, to an appearance of which the Russians were particularly anxious not to yield. It was further demanded, that Nelson's fleet should withdraw.

Nelson's reply was to the effect that it was a mark of friendship, and that his fleet would he of great service in assistins; to uavioate to Eno-land manv of the English vessels which had remained all the winter in Russia — a rather neat hint that the principal busi- ness in hand had more to do with the merchantmen Paul had seized than with the now purely theoretical and innocuous " Armed Neutrality. ' Privately he wrote to St. Vincent and said that had any of the Russian fleet been inside Revel, the Tsar would never have made the demand he had.

However, Nelson left the gulf, and the Tsar removed the embargo from British shipping. He also invited Nelson to come and see him, if he would come with a single ship ; l)ut acceptance was postponed, and as Nelson soon afterwards left the Baltic, nothing ever came of it. Treaty with Qn oth Junc a treaty was sio-ned between Eno-land

England. ; J ^ O

and Ru.s.sia, 1))^ which Russia secured the right to trade between the j^orts of a belligerent. A concession so considerable, at a time when the British fleet was

I 796-1801

I r

clearly in a position to denv it without troulile, indicates that there can have l.ieen no particular liostility to Russia on the part of the British (Government. Apparently Paul's action was regarded as the freak of

MAI' OF THE BALTIC.

a mad ruler. Its ultimate result was advantageous to Ru.ssia rather than otherwise. But the whole affair seeins to have arisen out of the tailoring enterprise of Napoleon, when he re-clad those 8000 captured Russian soldiers.

in the Leuant.

W

VII

1801-1825

ALEXANDER I

"HEN oeneral war broke out aoain after the Peace of Amiens, Russia Avas engaged in completing the subjugation of Georgia, which was annexed in 1801, but o-ave some trouble for a while afterwards. Not till the beginning of 1805 did Alexander enter into the alliance with England, Austria, and Sweden against France, thouo-h for a twelvemonth before some such

O

act had been foreseen. Nelson's letters on the subject are couched in the usual strain : a hope that he would not have the assistance of a Russian squadron, and a firm conviction that if they joined with the Allies, they would merely use it as an occasion to capture the Ionian Republic and the whole of Turkey. In this he Russian fleet \vas iucorrect. Russia entered honestly into the war, and her fleet stood to bar the French from o-oing towards Egypt. Subsequently the French fleet met annihilation at Trafalgar,^ but the battle of Austerlitz upset all the projects of the Allies on land.

' There were one or two Russian officers serving in Nelson's fleet at Trafalgar.

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MAP OF BLACK SEA, ETC.

119

I20 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

Austerlitz.

7806.

Operations against Turkey.

Uwino; to Austeiiitz aii Aiioio-Russian exioeditioii to N;i]^.i]es fell tlirougli. The Russian troops in this }jr(»i('cted expedition were employed in tlie capture of C'attarc.i. Avhile the tleet opei'ated ^Yitllout success against Kagusa.

Al)Out this time Xapoleon was busy over his projected alliance with Turkey and Persia, in order to harrv Russia 1 ly tiieir means : and in the case of the Turks, getting them to close the Dardenelles and Bosporus to Russian warships.

In Februarv 1807 a British fleet forced the Dar- denelles. Senyavin, the Russian admiral, had been ordered to co-operate with four line-of-battle ships, but he tailed to arrive in time to do more than meet the British fleet coming back in a very disabled condi- tion. He had with him then eight ships-of-the-line, and was anxious that the Auo-lo-Russian fleet should again essay the passage of the Dardenelles. England, how- ever, if the first fiasco ^ had not been sufficient, was otherwise engaged in operations in Egypt. Senyavin was left blockadino- the Dardenelles, which he does not seem to have considered passable by his squadron — at least he made no such attempt. In the Black Sea a second Russian fleet blockaded the Bosporus.

Seeing the English go away, and having had ocular

1 Although the damage sustained was very small compared with what might have been e.xpected, it was none the less pretty heavy. Further, at Constantinople nothing had been effected, and the ships were in imminent danger of having their retreat cut off by new batteries that the Turks erected. They probably only retired in the nick of time. A second attempt would likely have led to total disaster.

180I-1825 121

demonstration that they had done them some harm, the Turks oot tooether a Ijis; fleet and came down the Dardenelles on the 1 9th of May. Ahnost immediately May wo?. they fell in with Senyavin, ])ut not caring to try con- senyavu, chases

bach the

elusions, they made l)ack again. In their haste t\i.\:e,e Turkish feet. ships ran aground and were captured by the pursuing Russians.

A mouth later the Turkish fleet came down again, accompanied by transports carrying between four and five thousand men. These — in defiance of all the theories of " Command of the Sea " — they landed at Tenedos. On the same day that the landing took place, Senyavin's squadron met the Turkish fleet off" Lemnos and inflicted Bawe 0/

Lemnos, 22nd

a severe defeat upon them. One ship was captured in •'""« '«"''• action, five were driven ashore in flight, and the rest dispersed. Four weeks later the troops landed in Tenedos had to surrender to Senyavin.

If victorious at sea, on land the Russian arms were fl"ss/a aja/n

changes sides.

anvthinp- but successful, and Alexander had to sign the Peace of Tilsit, whereby Russia became an ally of France and at war with England, Austria, and Sweden.

This sudden change of policy put Senyavin in rather a tight place. The French fleet was well-nigh non- existent, the British fleet was the commanding unit in the Mediterranean, and his new friends the Turks, who had so recently experienced disaster at his hands, were perhaps hardly to be trusted. He had with him altogether eleven line-of-battle ships and a number of smaller vessels. To stay where he was simply meant

122 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

destruction by the British lleet, and he formed the project of a rush for the Baltic. He, however, detached Greig,^ his rear-admiral, to capture the Ionian Isles, allowing him for this service two ships-of-the-line and four fria^ates. With the rest of his fleet he sailed out of the Mediterranean and reached the Tagus, where a British fleet promptly blockaded him.

Greig's ships were not attacked by the British, and for some time Avandered aimlessly in the Levant. In the end they were run to earth and taken possession of by an Austrian fleet, which conducted them to Trieste, where later on Napoleon's soldiers re- captured them. August 1808. Seuvavin stayed inside the Tagus for some while.

loss of Sen-

yauin-s fleet. Eveutually, however, he surrendered his ships to the British, on condition that he and his men should be free to go back to Russia, and that at the end of the war his ships should lie returned. These terms were granted without question. A curious feature of the case is that when Senvavin went into the Tao-us there was at that time no war between Russia and England, so far as any formal declaration was concerned. Senyavin's evacua- tion of the Mediterranean and the British blockade of him in the Tagus were merelv "precautionary measures." Xo direct Enoiish attack on the Russians was made till some while after the Peace of Tilsit. As a precautionary measure against a renewal of the Armed Neutrality, however, the British seized the entire Danish Nav}-.

' Rear- Admiral Gieig was tlie son of tlie ex-Britisli officer, Samuel Greig. See pp. 80 et seq.

1801-1825 123

This left the Baltic Powers with somewhat reduced forces; but in Maj^ 1808 the Russians had in those waters twenty line-of-battle ships and fourteen frigates, all effective, while Sweden possessed eleven line-of- battle ships and seven frigates, wdiich by dint of military pressure counted upon the Russian side.

A British expedition entered the Baltic in June isos. 1808, under Sir James Saumarez, with a view to assist- ing the Swedes to detach themselves from the Russian alliance ; and two months later two British ships-of-the- line reached Oro Sound, where six Swedish battleships were lying. Ofi' this place a Russian fleet of eleven ships - of - the - line under Hamkoff appeared the very next day, and the next day again four more Swedes arrived. The entire Anoio-Swedish fleet, now con- sisting of twelve battleships and five frigates, then put out to fight the Russians, who made ofi" towards Rogerswick ; and one of the two British ships, the Implacable, being swift, succeeded in overhauling and engaging the Russian Svlod. She had, however, to haul oft', as the entire Russian fleet turned about to attack.

The Svlod did not long escape, as the Centaur — the other British ship — managed to block her entry into Rogerswick harbour.

A fierce engagement took place, and, after a nght between

the Sulod and

gallant resistance in which she lost over three hundred British centaur. men, the Russian ship, dismasted and disabled, struck. She was burned immediatelv afterwards.

The rest of the Russian fleet were blockaded in

124 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY R()i>ei>wick, and showed un si<:iiis of coiuiii"' out. ']'lie\'

O CD 'J ^

August 1808. ercctc'l a liooin to kiMi'p out fire-ships, and liem^ well protected )»v the shored )attei'ie,s, attacks upon tliem were futile. After a con])Ie of mouths the hlockading fleets withdrew, and the Russians went back to Kronstadt, where they remain eil.

( )u neither side wcic operation^ conducted witli much vigour. The British Ciovernment, witli theii' hands full ciiouo-h elsewhere, had n<i desire to p)ress matter^ against the Tsar, whose alliance with Napoleon

Capture of alreadv showed siuns fif weakness. Russian troops

Finland, 1809.

overran and captured Finland, liut the Swi-dish ships do not seem to have attempted any counter attack as a diversion. Such naval actions as took place were minor operations conducted by fiotillas. At Gronvik, Pah'a., and Aland the Russian coast -Hotilla met with some small losses at the hands of the Swede.-. British capture I'he British line-ofdjattle ship Implacable, on the

seuen Russian

gunboats at nlo'lit of 7th Julv. scut seventceii boats to attack eiodit

Porcola, 7th o ^ o

July 1809. Russian gunboats, which, with some store-ships, lay at Porcola Point, in the Gulf of Finland. After a san- guinary confiict, seven of the gunboats and twelve store-ships were captured.

7uiyifo9 ^ fortnight later Subdieutenant Korobka. with four

gunboats c(.)nvoying a brig with stores to Rotchensalm, fell in with nineteen Enoiish l)oats.^ One o-unboat managed to show her heels ; l)ut with the remaining three Korobka made a most, stubborn resistance for

1 JMortar-Loats, according to Russian accounts, Ijut more probably tbe ships' boats of tbe Implacable and Centaur.

Anglo-Russian Alliance.

126 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

over two hours, and when finally forced to surrender, all but seven of hi.s men were killed oi' -wounded.

At the very time that these minor operations were in progress, British merchantmen were trading at Russian ports, and the oj^erations of 1810 were purely pacific ones of trade. Russia being nominally at war with England still, and this trade being in any case directly contrary to Napoleon's " Continental system." Franco-Russian relations soon grew very strained. The end was Xapoleon's fateful invasion of Russia, and the destruction of the Grand Armv, in which the crews of the Russian ships at Kronstadt, being landed, partici- pated.

Russia and England, from having been in a practical state of peace while nominally at war, were now formally allies once more, and the ships of Senyavin captured in the Tao-us were restored.

Beyond some boat affairs in the Danube, no naval ojjerations on the part of Russia marked this new and final phase of the Great War.

Alexander i. died in 1825. Dm-ina; his reisjn the dimensions of the Empire were considerably increased, and fresh coastline was o-ained on the shores of the Black Sea.

VIII NAVARINO AND THE CRIMEAX WAR

1825-1855

Nikolai I

A LEXANDER was succeeded by his younger brother Nikolai, an elder brother, the G-rand Duke Con- stantine, having renounced his succession to the throne. For the first few years of his reign Tsar Nikolai was occupied in a Persian war, but the problems produced by the Greek revolt against the Turks naturally eno-aged Russian attention. In June 1827 Nikolai joined France aud England in a league originally started to suppress Greek piracy in the Levant, but which soon became an engine for Greek freedom. A naval demonstration was decided upon, and Rear- admiral Count Heyden, flying his flag in the Azov, 74, and havino; with him three 74- and three 48-eun frigates, joined an Anglo-French fleet in the Levant. The whole force was under the British Vice-admiral,

28 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

Sir Echvard Codringtou, as senior made up : —

4 (Azov. Gangoot, Ezekiel,

Alexander I.) 74-gun ships.

3 . 48-gun frigates.

1 (Asia) 80-gun ship.

2 (Genoa and iVlbion) . 74-gun shi]is.

1 . 50-gun frigate.

1 . . 48 „

1 . ■ 42 „

1 28

1 . . IS-gun brig.

3 . 10-gun brigs. 3 (Scipion, Trident, and

Breslaw) . 74-gun ships.

1 (Sirene) . 60-gun ship.

1 . . 44-gun frigate.

2 . . schooners.

officer, and was thus

, Russian, under Kear-

r admiral Count Hey-

den ; flag in Azov, 74.

British, under Vice- admiral Sir E. Cod- rington ; flag in Asia, 80.

French, under Eear- admiral de Eigny ; flacr in Sirene.

Turkish fleet.

Allied fleets dispositions.

In tlie liarbour of 2\avarino — the ancient Sphakteria, rendered famous many centuries before by that Athenian triumph when Spartans for the first and only time laid down their arms and surrendered — lay practically the entire Turkish and Egyptian fleet, consisting of —

3 ships-of-the-line, 1 rasue frigate, 16 frigates, 27 corvettes, 5 fire-ships, 19 brigs, and a large number of gunboats and transports (about 40 to 50).

Into this harbour the Allied fleets sailecl, intent upon a '" naval demonstration " of the type that recent years have rendered familiar to us. Thev found the Turks

1825-1855 129

lying in a crescent, and cleared for action, whereupon Codrington anchored his vessels to leeward on the out- side of the curve, so that in the event of hostilities none of his ships would be exposed to a concentrated fire. He also sent a message to the Turkish Admiral warning him that any hostile demonstration would be construed as an act of war, and punished by the destruction of the Turkish fleet.

A little later some English boats taking a messao-e Nmanno, 27th to a Turkish ship were fired on, and a lieutenant and several men killed, and the remainder only returned in safety through the ship to which they belonged firing on the Turks. The Turk replying, a general action ensued, and lasted four hours. The Turkish ships were concentrated on, one after the other, and as they were disabled the Turks set them on fire and abandoned them.

About two-thirds of their force — one ship-of-the- Turkish ships

destroyed.

line, three 2-decker frigates, nine frigates, twenty- two corvettes, nineteen brigs, one schooner, and five fire-ships were thus burnt, and the remaining vessels severely mauled. Details of the battle vary according to the nation giving the account. The English version is that the Russians took small part in the afiair ; Avhile Russian history states that Count Heyden's flag- ship, Azov, herself sank the Turkish flagship, two frigates, and a corvette. The present-day Russian cruiser Pamiat Azova is so named in remembrance of this action, and her ensign carries the badoe of St. George (for valour) in commemoration. French

I30 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

accounts give, of course, yet a third version. So far as can be gathered all the ships-of-thc-line took their share, ^ and most were a sjood deal knocked about — the battle was bv no means a "walk over." The English line-of-battle ships were the most damaged, and presumably the most hotly engaged, — all three had to be sent home for repairs, the damage done to them being Ijeyond ]Malta"s resources to put rioht. War with Almost immediatelv after Kavarino a regular war

Turkey, 7827-29. ""

came about between Russia and Turkey, and Navarino more than anything else contributed to Russian success. Owing to that holocaust Russia had an excess of " Sea Power" which, judiciously utilised, enabled her to take Anapa and Poti, and keep up the communications of those land forces which penetrated as far south Peace signed at as Aclriauople, at which place peace was signed in

Adrianople,

1829. 1829.

Merituria, Naval operatious in this war were useful rather

4tli May 1829. , ,, . _ . rr i ^

than show}'. ivapitan Lieutenant Ivazarski of the brig Mercury, 20 guns, however, earned some laurels in an action the, exact facts of which are probably not procurable. The Russian version is that off Constanti- nople he was attacked by two Turkish ships-of-the- line, one of 110 guns, the other a 74. After a four hours' action, in which the Turks were badly injured, and silenced, Kazarski sailed away ! For this affair Kazarski and his officers were promoted, and a pistol added to the arms, because they had

' The frigates were less engaged.

IIUSSIAN WARSHIPS, 1830.

1825-1855 ^33

determined to l)lo\v up tlie ^Mercury ') la Hitcdc should she be overcome. Kazarski'.s iiame, and also that of his brig, are perpetuated as Russian ship- names to-day.

Now, despite the notoriously bad condition of the nemarha. Turkish Navy at that period, this account is evidently in need of some " editing." It is a moral impossibility that so small a craft as the Mercury could have dis- abled two .ships-of-the-liiie in four hours, even had they done no shooting ; and the most natural assumj)- tion is that the Turks were frigates, that have grown to ships-of-the-line since.-^ That Kazarski distinguished himself there is little doi;bt ; the Russians have so rarely perpetuated the names of distinguished naval officers in ships, that the fact of their having done so in this case presupposes a gallant action against heavy odds.

The war with Persia ended in 1828 with the treatj' Treaty of of iurkomachai. dj it territory was gained as tar as i828. the Ai'as (Araxes) River ; naval control of the Caspian contmi 0/ the

Caspian,

was also secured.

In the thirties the Russian fleet had a fairly high Russian fleet

in 1836.

reputation for efficiency. A certain number of definite types were adopted ; but being built of fir, the life of the vessels was short — only about eight years, though the Russians tried to keep them going for double or treble that period.

1 See 1877-78 : action between tlie Vesta and a Turkisli ironclad. It closely resembles tbe Kazarski story, and at tlie time was proved in some quarters to have been a pure invention.

134 TH!': IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NA\'Y

The types were—
Name of Tj-p^-	Guns.	Length.	l^)eain. Feet.	Dejitll. Feet.	Tonnage.
		Feet.	Tons.
Warsaw	120	206	55 i	22	4857
lUave .	1-20	201 h	521	211	4184
Imperator Alexander	110	191'	53	21 1	4244
Imperatritza Ekateriiia ii.	S4	191	52	21	3516
Imperatritza jSIarie	84	196	51	20i	3575 i
Ezekiel	80	176. J,	49	191	2918
Smolanck	74	177"	49	20	2876
A'ienna	60	171	44	17i	1884
FRIGATES.
Penelope	46	1521	40	161	1452
Marie	1 ^4	160"	42	IG',	1664
Swift	44	153i-	40-1	16^	1419
BRIGS.
Favourite	1 20	1061	30	Hi	488
^lerkur	20	94'	30 i	121	428

Seuastdpol made into a naval arsenal.

Sea of Aral fiotilla, 1847.

All ships built for the navy from 1830 till the introduction of steam, and even for some while after that, were copies of one or other of these thirteen types of ships constructed after the year 1800.

In 1830 Sevastopol was made into a fortified naval arsenal, English engineers being employed to design the forts and docks.

In 1847 a flotilla was first formed on the Sea of Aral.

The adoption of steam left the Russians somewhat behind — in 1853 two small steamers of 6 guns were commissioned in the Black Sea. In the Baltic about twenty-three steamers were built or building, but not more than a dozen or so were eflicient.

1825-1855 135

The " paper " force of ships in 185-3 was as follows : —

LALTIC 25 ships-of-the-liiie (120 and S-i guns).	Russian feet in 1853. Official list.
18 frigates .	(46 and 44 guns).
40 corvettes and smaller craft.
20 steam corvettes	(paddle) (6 guns).
3 ), J) •	(screw) (6 guns).
BLACK	Sf:A
5 ships-of-tlie-line	(120 guns).
13 „ „ .	(80 guns).
3 „	(60 or 74 guns).
7 large new-type frigates	(54 guns) {razees).
25 corvettes, brigs, etc. .	(mounting 170 guns between them).
2 steam corvettes	(paddle) (6 guns).

Of the Baltic fleet only 17 ships-of-the-line, 10 frigates, and 10 corvettes were considered effective by the Eussians. The Black Sea ships were all nominally efiective, but (with about three exceptions) owing to the bad durability of the fir were unseaworthy.

The nominal crews in each fleet were 20,000 officers and sailors, and 10,000 marines and artillery.

Shell guns were adopted into the Russian service sheii guns. about 1852.

In 1853 hostilities with Turkey were embarked on. i^«'-«'«''

■^ Turiiey, 1853.

The naval feature of the war was the battle of Sinop, Bawe 0/

Sinop, 30th

wherein the best part of the new Turkish Navy that "'""• '854. replaced the one destroj^ed at Navarino was annihilated. It is — or was — usual to speak of this affair in England as "the Massacre of Sin ope," but political exigencies are tlie only grounds of justification ; the battle was

1^,6 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

'o

leallv a Inilliantly conceived and executed surprise. Its absolute decisiveness created a great stir, and this being the first time in which shell were used l)y sliips against ships,i the fight is enrolled upon the annals of naval history as one of the most important of epochs. Fioht, in the sense to which we are accustomed, there was none, the afiair was as short as that of Santiago in the Hispano-American AVar of 1898. There was neither time nor need for tactics : the Turks had no shell, the Russians had. In five minutes the Turkish fleet was on fire, and, with the exception of a solitary steamer that escaped, every single vessel was annihilated. The Turks fought exceedingly well,' and in the brief ftussian losses, spaceallowcd them managed to kill 34 Russians and wound 230, a not insignificant number in view of the com- parative smallness of the forces engaged. The Turkish loss is unknown, but it practically amounted to their entire personnel, either killed, wounded, or prisoners. The forces eno-asjed were —

RUSSIAN

Tri Sviatitelia . 120 guns (flag). Admiral ISTahimofl'.

Eostislav . . 120 „

Imperitritza Marie 80 „

Paris . . 80 „

Tchesme . . 80 „

Grand Duke Constantine 60 „

TURKISH

7 razee frigates. 2 steamers.

2 corvettes. Covered by a small shore-battery.

Turkish loss.

' The combustible sbell used by Greig (see Appendix) were not fired from the oiiiinary shij^'s gun.

- The Turkish personnel had lately been thoroughly reorganised and improved.

BATTLE OF SIXOI'E.

1825-1855 139

Tlie Turkish version of the affair, one, too, that was very generally current on the Mediterranean at the time, was that, finding themselves caught and over- matched, the Turks set their ships on fire at once, fight- ing them till they blew up. There is probably some truth in this version. Aj^rojJOS of this, it may be mentioned that at Santiago in 1898 the Spaniards did something of the same sort.

The lesson of Sinope was variously taken. Some argued that the shell ^ had made naval warfare im- possible (a thing, by the way, that is claimed for nearly every new invention nowadays) ; others attributed the holocaust more to Turkish iuefiiciency than to Russian ability or the power of the shell. None the less, a marked impetus was given to the old idea of armouring ships ; the ironclad was no longer an idle dream, no longer the resurrection of the fad of some long since dead and gone Dutch sailor, but the only answer to the historical cry, " For God's sake keep out the shells : "

France, usually to the front with any new inven- tion, besfan the construction of ironclad floatins; batteries ; and a little later England followed suit, innciad floating

^ batteries.

From these, as every schoolboy knows, grew the sea- going ironclads, which were shell-proof for many years. Gunnery science, however, evolved a means of pene- trating armour, and in this battle with the gun, armour grew thicker and thicker. In this growth its area was naturally diminished, and in the struggle to keep out

' See Greig's use of shell in Appendix.

I40 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

shot, that are at tlic most merely mildly dangerous, the shell was absolutely forgotten. A small patch of impenetrable armour was the one thing sought after, and such caricatures of the whole theory of armoured ships as our Benbow class, the Italian Lepanto, or the French Maoenta, and to some extent all modern ironclads, arose. The man who in an Italian dockyard designed the ironclad cruisers of the Garibaldi and Cristobal Colon types ma}- truly claim to be the only ship-designer able to realise the purpose for which armour was introduced !

To resume. The shell at Sinope did not cause

the British and French Governments to hesitate one

moment in coming to hostilities with Russia in the

Crimean followlug Tear. The causes of the Crimean War can

War begins.

hardly be traced, but one of many was whether the Roman Catholics (France) or the Greek Church (Russia) should be the predominant guardian of the Church of Its silly causes, tlic Holy Scpulchrc.^ A certain amount of " pro- tecting the poor Turk '' was thrown in, but England's interests or concern in the matter were absolutely nil. We were blessed, or cursed, at that time, however, with that faddist Lord Palmerston, who was full of the idea of bringing about an Anglo-French understand- ing on the "love your enemies" principle. Nothing deeper seems to have existed. In addition, there was in England at that time a great taste for the penny dreadful literature- about Siberia and Russian tyranny,

^ Kinglake's Crimea.

- Tlie Russians have a very similar soit of literature detailing the

1825-1855 141

and Lord Palmerston was an ardent reader and devout believer in these sensational inventions. Suffering from that particular form of insanity known as "love of freedom," — which usually works out at nothing more logical than judging unknown things by a man's own experience of something else/ — Lord Palmerston was distinctly Anti-Russian in sentiment, without a thought of any reasons of importance or policy. To a great extent the country, carefully prepared, echoed these sentiments. The " massacre of Sinope" was the key and watchword. Conse- quently strained relations ensued. War might, how- ever, have been averted but for the action of the Peace Society. A self-constituted deputation of these The Peace

Society and

amiable maniacs visited St. Petersburg, and were Tsar Nikolai. received by the Tsar Nikolai. They begged him not to make war : and the Tsar, incapable of comprehend- ing that the deputation was unofficial, fell into the error of crediting it with being a direct embassy from the British Government." In consequence, this country was no longer a factor in his mind, British protests were disregarded as intentionally meaningless,

liorrible tortures inflicted upon the Irish by the English and Scotch. The one series is, of course, about as truthful as the other.

1 The term insanity is used advisedly. The plea for " Home Rule for India " raised here by politicians who have never seen that country ; the description of Jew stockbrokers in the Transvaal as "patriots struggling for freedom" ; the hysterical rubbish talked on the eve of the Grseco-Turkish War, — can only be explained on such an hypothesis. The primary factor, the absolute ignorance of the agitators concerning the subject they shriek about, is completely ignored.

- Kinglake.

142 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

and when war -was declared no man was probably more puzzled than T.-ar Nikolai. To this day the Imperial mind in Russia has never comprehended the situation, a distrust of England is ingrained into ever\- member of the House of Romanoff, and " British deceit " on the eve of the Crimean War is a stumbling- block to any understanding between Russia and England. ]More : an cxj^rcssion on the part of our <Jocernment of a desire for any understandinrj is regarded as a danger signal that England meditates a icar!^ One way and another, those amateur diplomatists, the friends of Peace, have a good deal to answer for. Nauai history Thc uaval liistoiy of the Crimean War is not

»/ the _

ctimean War, leiigtliv Or imDortaiit. In all cases — in the Baltic,

7854-55. ^ ■/

Euxine, AVliite Sea, and Pacific waters, Russian ships wisely kept inside their ports.

On the 3rd of January 1854, French and English Odessa warships had entered the Black Sea ; on the 20th of

bombarded,

20th April 7854. April Odcssa was bombarded by eight frigates.

The fleets then cruised before Sevastopol, while frigates did some small damao-e alono; the Caucasian coast. In September a huge fleet of Turkish and French warships, crowded with troops, crossed the Euxine to descend upon Sevastopol, protected by a British fleet of ten ships -of- the -line, two 50-gun frigates, and thirteen armed steamers. The Russian fleet then intact at Sevastopol was nominally superior

^ This is not a mere opinion of my own ; I lieard it in Russia many times in cii-cles wliere the holding of it meant very much indeed.

ScbJ,, f^qlivl «,/.

MAP OF TURKEY A^TD BLACK SEA.

144 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN XAVY

to the British force ; the Allies were aljsolutcly, or nearly absolutely, ignorant of its condition or strength ; the -whole move was in direct defiance to all the principles of " Sea Power," "fleets in being," and the other theories of which we hear so much to-day. It was purely a matter of fortune that Prince jMentschikofF had decided to fight on land only, otherwise the transports must have been more or less annihilated. Korniloff, the Russian Admiral, who had earned promotion over his share in the battle of Siuope, desired to attack, and, indeed, began preparations ; but ]Mentschikoff countermanded. By the Prince's orders the fleet that might have done so much The Alma, Waited Idlc in harbour till the Alma was lost. Then

21st Sept. 1854.

all, or nearly all, of the Russian ships were sunk to Sinking of the block tlic liarboui' mouth, and the crews landed

Russian fieet.

under ICorniloff devoted themselves to throwing up fortifications. It was chiefly to the efforts of these sailors (aided, it is true, by the hesitation of the Allies) that Sevastopol was not taken immediatelv after the Why the Alma. Mentschikoft' had counted upon defeating them

Russian fleet

ujas inactive, on shorc, and he had been holding the fleet in hand with the idea that after this expected victory the Russian warships would serve to totally destroy or capture the escaping remnants. Something of Scythian tactics is observable in his plans ; but he undoubtedly threw away an almost certain chance for a problematical greater efi^ect ; and he cannot be free from suspicion of having been filled with a desire to obtain military glory at the expense of sound strategy. When all

vaaBaatiS

1. CLIFF AT IXKEEMASN OVER WHICH THE RUSSIANS JIAPXIIED,

REGIMEXT AFTER REGIMENT, IN THE FOG.

2. THE HEIGHTS OF IXKEKMAXN.

3. THE FIELD OF BALAKLAVA. THE WINDMILL WAS THE CENTRE

OF THE BATTLEFIELD.

[From Photopraphs l-imUi/ supplUd by Mr. C. de Grave Sells,]

1825-1855 147

is said and done, however, Eussian strategy was "sounder" than that of the Allies. Still, luck was with the latter, and it atoned, as it so often has, for errors that would else have been fatal.

After the immolation of the Eussian ships, the war, of course, became purely military. Sevastopol was invested, and the Allied fleet bombarded its forts without impression, though many of their ships were badly injured. Inkermann and Balaklava were fought, and after nearly a year's siege Sevast6pol was abandoned. In the course of this siege Kornilofi' was mortally wounded. Subsequently Kinburn was bombarded and captured by the Allied fleet.

A large English fleet, with some French vessels, was ne war w

the Baltic,

sent up the Baltic, but here again the Eussian ships 7354-55. ran to cover. Nothing could be done against Kron- stadt, and the English Admiral was wise enough to see it. In the following year Sveaborg was Bombardment bombarded, the town and dockyard being de- stroyed.

At Kronstadt the Eussiaus were not entirely idle. Defence at

-I 1 r p • 1 ■ 1 Kronstadt.

and a large lorce 01 steamers was extemporised with a view to attempting a naval action. It is not clear, however, whether these intended to meet the small craft of the Allies, or to attempt conclusions with their big ships. In any case peace came before any use was made of them.

Allied ships visited the White Sea and some war in the

White Sea

Siberian harbours, but no naval actions were fought. ""'' ''"'^'fi"- Petropavlovsk was attacked, and the attack defeated.

148 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

When the English came Ijack the next year they found that the Russians had evacuated it. Remarks on Thc WAX, of course, was not one of tlie first im-

the war.

portance. It demonstrated the extreme difiicnlty of attacking Russia ; any othcv results secured 1jy it have lono- since been neg-atived.

One other thing, however, was indirectly demon- strated by the " Crimean " War, though curiously enough no attention seems ever to have been bestowed upon it in Ens^land. This is, that, so far as the British Empire is concerned, Russian expansion of coastline ofters the best chances of a successful war against her. For instance, the more Chinese coast that may come under the Russian flag, the greater is tlie possible area ao-ainst which Eno-land could act. Port Arthurs and Yladivostoks may be impregnable, but posts of this sort cannot be indefinitely multiplied, 'and the Power holding undisputed command of the sfea (as England certainly would in a war with Russia) also has undis- puted power to destrov the coast between the fortified Coast ejrtens/on. spots. lu craviug for an extended coastline, Russia

Russia's ^

weakness. jg n;ierely creating elements of weakness for herself; no land force, however excellent, can be mobile enouo-h — or anything like mobile enough — to defend a long line of coast. And if the damao-e sustained is not o-reat, to meet it is exceedingly expensive, and a heavy drain on resources. To believe that Russia's occupation of the Port Arthur peninsula is a menace to England, is to credit her with a stupidity for which there is no warrant.

S -3

IX

THE EARLIER IRONCLADS

1855-1877

TN one way and another, as much by "suicide"' as by anything else, the Russian Navy had become nearly non-existent when the Crimean War ended. As lias already been shown, however, manv of the destroyed vessels were well-nigh useless when the Russians scuttled them ; the better, and only really efficient ships, were kept out of danger during the war.

Directly the war was over, Russia began to re- Keorg, organise her navy. Steamers were hastily laid down, old ships overhauled or reconstructed ; the personneJ too came in for the o'eneral revision.

In 1859 the Russian fleet (according to tlieir navy lists of that year) consisted of 73 steamers and 85 sailing vessels, besides a number of small gun vessels, chiefly screw steamers.

Condition in 1859.

I ^2

THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

Details of the fleet in 1839 are as follows : —

	Strain.			Sailinij.
i	screw line-of-battle	.sliips.	12	battleships.
11	,, frigates		7	frigates.
12	,, corvettes.		/	corvettes.
1	„ lugger-		7	brigs.
41	various steamers.		11	schooners.
1	tender.		7	xebecs.
73			5 3 4 1.5 S5	luggers. clippers. yachts. transports. baranes.

A fair proportion were proltably ineffective. The personnel was constituted as follows : —

16 admirals.

30 vice-admirals.

39 rear-admirals. Ill captains, first class.

95 captains, second class (commanders). 2-57 senior lieutenant.s. 607 lieutenants. 296 " mitclimen." Marine artillery, 281 officers. ^Marines afloat, 131 oflicers. Personnel of all ranks, about 40,000 sailors and 20,000 marines.

This personnel, I gather, is the purel}' nominal paper force ; it is identical with what Russia had before the Crimean War. Probably about half this number of sailors and marines were actually available.

The Navv Staff consisted of —

The General Admiral. A Deputy.

^Master of ordnance of reserve artillerj'.

Inspector of naval architects. Chief of ^Marine Chancery. 2 adjutant-generals. 4 vice-admirals.

'855-1877 '53

To the Ministry of Marine, a president, ten admirals, a vice-admiral, six officer-inspectors, a lieutenant-general at the head of the hydrographic department, a medical director-general, an auditor-general, and ten chief clerks were allotted.

Other departments were the Engineering Depart- ment, for the care of naval fortresses ; the Marine Training Department, under an admiral as director ; the Marine Intendancy, under a lieutenant - general of marines ; the Naval Commissariat ; also shipbuilding, timber, and Xaval Artiller)^ Departments.

The guns then in use were as follows : —

Denominaiion of Gun. Weight of Solid Slwt

36-pounder . . ... 32 lbs. 7i oz.

24:-pouiider . . . 21 lbs. 10| oz.

18-i30under . . 16 lbs. 3 oz.

12-pounder . 10 lbs. 13 oz.

8-pouuder . . 7 lbs. 3 oz.

6-poTmder . ■ 5 lbs. 6i oz.

The 36-pounder was 9 ft. 7 in. long, and weighed just under 3^- tons. The 24-pounder was 9 ft. 4 in. long, and weighed a trifle over 2 tons.

For coast defence a monster gun was in process of adoption. This gun was 16^ ft. long, 11 J ft. in circum- ference at the base, 7 ft. at the muzzle. The bore was 13 in. diameter, and the length of the bore 13^ ft.

This piece weighed 22 tons, threw a 340-lb. shot, and had a charge of nearly 80 lbs. of powder. There is no record of any attempt to use it on shipboard. The Americans, who then, as now, were prone to be the first to take up and experiment with any new weapon,

154 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

Fifst ironclad.

were at that time engaged with the Niagara and her sisters, carrying 11 -in. 135-pounder guns; and the G8-pounder was a recognised piece in all navies except the Russian. Russia for a long time stuck to the 3 2 -pounder as the most easily handled gun.

This affection for a light piece is still to be found in the Russian Navy. As we shall see later, Russia at the present day has adopted the 3-in. quickfirer when other nations use the 4'7-in., and in lieu of the 4"7-in. The 12-in. is the heaviest bio- wun she has ever gone in for, and a tendency to prefer the 10-in. has been mani- fest lately, — that being the heaviest piece in the Peresvet class, and in the Rostislav. Russia, in fine, is the only Naval Power that has never been bitten with the craze for monster guns in her ships.

Gradually, however, the 68-pounder found its way on shipboard, and the coming of the ironclad produced

other chauQ-es in materiel. The

Russians early took to iron for ship construction, and, foUowino- in the wake of their opponents in the Crimean War, decided to have an ironclad navv. In England, therefore, they ordered the Pervenetz, launched in 1863. Practically this ship (she still exists) is, and always was, a floating battery. She carried at that time about two dozen 68-pounders,

I855-I877

155

Length . Beam Draught . Present armament

and was a formidable ship, plated all over with 4^ in. iron. The dimensions are : —

Displacement . . . . 3279 tons.

. 220 ft. . 52i- ft. . circa 16 ft. . Six 8-in.

i^ine 6-in.

Four 9-pounclers.

Seven small Q.F.

The engines were made by Messrs. Maudslay, Sons, & Field of Lambeth, London, and were of 1067 horse-power. The trial speed was 9 knots — the ship was never built to be a "flyer." Rectangular box boilers were fitted, and are still in her. She was launched at Blackwall, having been built by the firm of which the present Thames Ironworks Company are the lineal descendants.

It is interesting to note that despite the Crimean War, Russia turned to Great Britain for as- sistance in re- constructing her navy, just as she had turned in the past.^

In the following vear (18G4) she launched the xremi and

° ■' ^ ' Natron Menia.

Kreml at St. Petersburg, and the next year again the Netron Menia (Touch-me-not), sisters to the Pervenetz.

■^ A Scotchman imported about this time to supervise construction, is still at the Baltic Works.

156 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

seuastopoi and Id all navics the best of the old wooden line-

Petropaulousk.

of-battle ships on the stocks were cut down, and armoured. In this fashion Russia added to her navy the seagoing broadside ships Sevastopol (1863) and Petropavlovsk (1865). Details of these are : —

Displacement . . . 6210 tons.

Length 295 ft.

Y,(iAm . . 52 ft.

Armament . Twent3f-one 9-ton guns.

Armour . . . . 4-| in. iron.

Horse-power . . . 2800.

Trial speed . 11 knots.

These ships are now broken up. Effect of The monitor and its deeds in the American Civil

American

dull War. War made a great impression upon the Russians. They immediarely began to lay down a number of iron

Monitors. monitors, and in the year 1864 most of these were launched, though they were not completed till some years later. Originally each carried a couple of big smooth-bore guns, but these were long ago replaced by 9-in. 15-ton breechloaders, of no great power or streng;th.-

These monitors still fig-ure to some extent in the Russian Navv list, but thev have of course no present value, unless it be as tertiary fortifica- tions. Several have been broken up, and the rest

1 Muzzle energ}-, 3035 ; muzzle velocitj-, 1260 ; weight of shell, 275 lbs.; length of gun, 13 ft.; nominal muzzle perforation, 10^ in. of iron — inferior to that of a modern 6-in. quickfirer. War game value, D.

'855-1877

159

THE EEOyoXOSETZ.

distributed al^out at minor ports. Their names are

as follows : —

Brononosetz, Edinorvg, Koldoime, Latnik, Lava,

Ouragau, Peroune, Streletz, Tipliooii, and Vest-

clioune.

Displacement

from 1400 to

1800 tons. Side

armour, five

plates, each 1

in. thick ; turret armour, eleven such plates. This

turret armour is in value equivalent to about 3 in.

of modern armour, the series of plates oiferiug very

small resistance.

Having taken to the monitor, Russia practically

adopted it. Nothing in the nature of a seagoing

vessel was attempted for some time, saving only the

broadside, iron- hulled ironclad Kniaz Poj arski Kniaz Pojarshi. launched in 1867 at St. Peters- buro;. She was inspired by the British Penelope, and is one of

the earliest examples of a ship with recessed ports.

She is still on the navy list, but is scarcely worth

reconstruction, though some tinkering was recently

attempted.

i6o THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

Her principal details are : —

Displaccinciit

Length

Beam

Draught

Armour

Guns

Horse-power Trial speed Sea speed

5000 tons.

272 ft.

49 ft.

circa 25 ft.

4r', in. on complete belt ami over loattery.

Originally eight 8-in. and two 6-in., h)Ut several of these have been removed.

2835.

12 '5 knots.

9 knots.

English infiuence.

Smertch.

Tcharodeika and Russalka.

At this time Engiaud had the semi-seagoing turret- ships "Wivern and Scorpion/ as well as the seagoing turret-ships Captain and j\Ionarch. Russia, following the Enoiish lead, commenced to build a species of Wivern, and also laid down the Minin, a vessel of the IMonarch type.

Before the Wivern type she had, however, gone in for rhe double turreted monitor, and the Smertch of 1460 tons was launched in 1864. She carried the same armament as the Bronono- setz type, but only one gun in each turret. These turrets had 6 - in. armour in one solid thickness on them.

This ship is now relegated to harbour service, and is practically removed from the list.

In 1867 the Tcharodeika and Russalka, vessels of about 2000 tons, of the same type as the Smertch, but

1 Originally U.S. Confederate rams.

183

w4Mm

1855-1877 i67

carrying two guns in each turret, were launched. The Tcharodeika still exists for harbour service and coast defence ; the Eussalka was lost in the Gulf of Finland three or four years since. She put to sea in a gale, and no trace of her has ever been found since.

Four ships of the British Wivern type were v/imm type. launched in 1868 — two types, one a copy of the Wivern, the other an adaptation of the old British Prince Albert and Royal Sovereign ^ with several turrets.

Details of these ships are : —

Admiral Spiridotf and Admiral Tcliitchagoff. SpirMoffand

Displacement . circa 3500 ton.s. wiuern type.

Length 234 ft.

Beam . . 42^ ft.

Draught (mean) . . 18 ft.

Armour (belts and turrets) . 6 in.

Armament . Two 11 -in. B.L. -

Six small Q.F. or machine. (Two turrets.)

The xA^dmiral Greig and Adrciiral Lazareff are oioreigand

Lazareff.

exactly the same dimensions. The only difference is that the belt is thinner (4^ in. only) and that there are three turrets — each with one 11 -in. B.L. gun in in it.

None of these ships are seaworth}^ ; the Russians, Renmrhs. however, consider that they may still possess some

' Not, of cour.se, the present Royal Sovereign.

- 19 calibres long; muzzle energy, 8000; muzzle velocity, 1496; weight of projectile, 1000 lbs. ; date of manufacture, 1867. War game value, C.

i6S THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

coast defence value, and the Lazareff was reboilered last year. The reboilering of the others is either under consideration or in process of being carried out. Eventually it is likely that they will be rearmed with lighter and more powerful pieces — the Lazareff, at least, will probably 1)e so treated.

The Minin was launched in 1869, but the capsizing of the British Captain soon afterwards produced a strono- distrust in the Minin, althoug-h she Avas more of the ^Monarch than the Captain type. Work upon this ship languished, she was never properly com^jleted, and at a later date practically rebuilt. Details of her Avill therefore be found upon a later page in the proper chronological order of her rebuilding.

The turret-ship being at this time in full favour in the British Xavy, and great things expected of the Devastation and Thunderer, the Russians laid down a larger edition of these ships, the Peter Veliky, launched in 187-2.

The details of this ship are : —

Displacement

Leugtli

Beam

Draught

Armour

Guns

9665.
328 ft.
62i ft.
rirca 20 ft.
Belt, 14-8 in.	(iron).
Redoubt, 9 in.
Turrets, 12 in.	,,
Four 12-in.i

' 17 calibres long ; weight, 40 tons ; model, 1877 : muzzle velocity, 1705; muzzle energy, 10,000 ft. ; tons weight of projectile, 990 lbs. AVar game value, C.

1855-1877

171

A proposal to rearm this ship is under cousideratiori . but nothino; had been done in January 1899.^

With the Peter Velikv the construction of seagoing Armoured

" cruiser General

ironclads stopped for nearly ten years, and armoured Admiral. cruisers — which Russia may almost claim as her own invention — were commenced. The original idea of an armoured cruiser was a vessel protected at the water line by armour, but otherwise a cruiser pure and simple. The original armoured cruiser was the proto- type of the deck-protected cruiser of to-day,^ and the Russians were the first to devise this kind of ship. In 18 73 they launched the General Admiral, a vessel without any protection to her guns, but

with what was in those days a fairly efficient protection aoainst beino- sunk.

Details of the General Admiral are as follows : —

qtENE^RAL AfMlRAL (^RUSSWk\

Displacement Length Beam . Draught Armour belt

circa 4600. •28.5 ft. 48 ft.

cirra 2.5 ft. 6-in. belt.

1 See description of Kronstadt dockyard, later.

- The curved deck inside is merely a substitution for the heavier outside belt.

172 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

Annaiiient

Horse-power Trial speed Present sea speeil

Six 8-in. B.L.1 Two 6-iu. B.L. Ten macliine or small

Q.F. Two torpedo tubes

above water. 4472. 12 knots. circa 8 knots.^

Gerzog Edinburgski.

The circular ironclads-

Novgorod.

The guns are carried in an overhanging battery, on the upper deck. Originally she had but one funnel, but having been recently reboilered, now carries two. A peculiar turtle-back stern is a feature of this ship, which, with her sister the Gerzog Edinburgski (launched 1875), is now relegated to training service.

The year in which the General Admiral was launched (1873) saw also the launch of a still more unique Russian warship invention, the circular ironclad Novgorod, of about 2500 tons displacement. She was designed by the late Admiral Popofi', and launched at Nikolaitf on the Black Sea. The idea of this extra- ordinary craft was in theory most admirable.

The circular turret then claimed to detiect any shot hitting it, — 6 in. on a circular turret were held equal to something like 10 or 12 in. of ordinary vertical armour. Popofl's idea was to apply to the hull what other designers had applied to the gun protection.

With this end in view he designed the Novgorod, a circular hull 121 ft. in diameter, and drawing 13^ ft. of water. Two 11-in. guns were mounted in a barbette

' War game value, D.

Maj' be a little more.

1855-1877 175

amidships, aud this barbette, as well as the whole side, is covered with armour 9 to 7 in. thick. Engines develojnng 2000 horse-power moved the vessel at a speed of about 6 knots, and six screws formed the propelling powei'.

Two years later a larger edition, the Vice-Admiral The Popos. Popoff, of oooO tons, was launched. She was of the same drauoht. but 120 ft. in diameter. The truns (12- in. 40-tonuers, similar to those in the Peter Yeliky) were mounted on the disappearing system. The sides are 16 in. thick, — the barbette 9 in., and there is a fiat 3-in. deck ; 3066 horse-power gave a trial speed of 8 J knots. There are four screws.

Had these ships been able to make anything like a Remarks. decent speed, it is by no means impossible that Europe would have imitated, and circular ships might be found in every navy to-day. The low speed, however, at once releo-ated them to the rank of floatins; forts, and they remained as unique curios of naval architecture — nothing more.

Such mobility as they had was soon heavily dis- ihew attempt

to cruise.

counted. On a trial cruise they went up the Dneiper very nicely for some distance, till they turned to retire. Then the current caught them, and they were carried out to sea, whirled helplessly round and round, every soul on board hopelessly incapacitated by vertigo. The lesson was read. Since then the Popoffkas have abandoned the role of the ironclad for that of float- ins; forts, and in the Turco-Russian War that followed soon afterwards, no attempt to use them was made.

i855-i877_ ^n

During this period, 1855-1877, a number of un- armoured ships were built. Of those which still survive, mention ma)^ be made of the "'flat-irons" Stichit (1856), Mina (1861), Pistchal and Siekira (for the Caspian Sea) (1866), and Jorsh (1874), — all carrying one big gun.

The unai'moured cruisers Krev.sser and Djijdit, 1450 tons, which took some five years to build, were launched at St. Petersburg in 1875 and 1876. They have no fisjlitino- value.

Other vessels launched in this period are Abrek ^ 1069 tons, Askold' 2229 tons, Bayau ' 1998 tons, Bombory (Black Sea) 760 tons, Don (Black Sea) 354 tons, Japonec 1472 tons, Jemtchug 1781 tons, Ermak ^ 706 tons, Kasbek (Black Sea) 692 tons, Kelasurz (Black Sea) 307 tons, Morz 456 tons, Narra 379 tons, Pitsunda (Black Sea), 335 tons, Psezuappa (Black Sea) 335 tons, Salgair (Black Sea) 360 tons, Skobeleft' (originally some other name) 2397 tons, Sobol 456 tons, Sokol^ (Black Sea) 1057 tons, Souk-Su (Black Sea) 307 tons, Svetlana ^ 3200 tons, Tunguz 706 tons, and Voyin (Black Sea) 1652 tons.

In 1877 nearly all these were obsolete and of very small fiorhting value. Some are still on the list, others have been broken up. New vessels have taken the old names in many instances. The ships built in England for the Russian Governments during the period were the transports, etc., Artelstchik 550 tons (Millwall), Sextant and Kompas 251 tons (Blackwall),

1 All these are now broten up, and new sliips bear their names.

12

178 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

Krasnaia Gorka IKKi tons (Blackwall), the yacht Strielna 185 tons (^Milhvall). tho paddlers Erckhik 920 tons (Low Walker, Xewcastle), Baku 440 tons (Blackwall), Tchihischlar 177 tons (Low Walker, Newcastle), and the training; ship Beresan 3050 tons (Greenock).

Ahout the end of this period the total of warships in the Prussian Navy was 2:23. ^ thus distributed : —

Baltic Fleet . 137

Black Sea Fleet 31

Caspian Flotilla 19

White Sea 3

Sea of Aral Flotilla . 6

Siberian Fleet 27

223

The i^ersonnel was-

Admirals of all ranks	9-5
Other officers of all ranks	234-5
Civil functionaries	966
Seamen	about 25,000
Cadets, etc.	169

It will be noted that marines no longer figure separately. In the period under review the marines — who were analogous to the military element afloat in the British Navy at the time of the Armada, and in the French Navy durino- the Great AVar. rather than to marines as we nnderstaud them — the '" marines " were absorbed into the navv generally. Longer than anv

o

^ These figures probably include torpedo boats, a number of which were ordered from Yarrow about 1876 ; while numerous third-class boats were built or building in Russia. It also includes transjwrts, etc.

^855-1877

'79

other nation, Russia held out against tlie change whereby the difference between those \\\\o fought the shijjs and those who scaled them was abohslied. To-day there are those who predict some similar fusion^ between the executive and sailor branch, who do the fighting, and the engineering branch, who to a partial extent represent the old branch who sailed the ship. There is, however, less analogy — the enoineers liaA'e nothing;' to do with navigation or steering the ship : their work is hmited to attending to the main engines and every other species of machinery on board. Practically, they are the modern equivalent of the rowers in ancient war- ships, and these, in thoroughly efficient navies like the Athenian, specialised as strictly as the engineering dejDartment in the British Kavy to-day — more strictl}', jjossibly, as a stoker nowaday.s receives a certain amount of deck trainino- and drill.

^ The U.S. iSTavy has taken steps toward some such fusion.

X

THE TURCO-RUSSIAX WAPu 1877-78

IT THEN the Turco-Russiau War of 1877-78 broke Russian fleet. ' ' Qut, tlic oolj seagoiug Russiau battleships were the Minin, Kniaz Pojarski, Petropaxlovsk. Sevastojiol, Peter Veliki, General Admiral, and (ierzog Edin- bourski. Of these the ]Minin was under reconstrnc- tion, some of the others were on distant stations, and the Petropavlovsk was the only one anywhere near the spot. She was a very old ship, of next to no value even in those days, and in the face of the large Turkish fleet remained inactive at Spezia throughout the war, — an operation of circumstances that might be held worse than a defeat both on her own crew and on the Russian sailors o'enerallv. Black Sea Fleet. In tlic Black Sca tlicrc was nothing ; or rather, there was worse than nothing, a number of old tubs of no fighting value whatever. About twenty merchant steamers were purchased and armed, and a number of torpedo boats (launches we should call them nowadays) were sent across country by rail from Petersbourg, but practically at the outbreak, and in the early stages of the war, Russia was worse ofi" than she would have been without a fleet at all. For the consecjuent forced

ISO

THE TURCO-RUSSIAN WAR, 1877-78 iSi

inactivity, as in the case of the Petropa\'lovsk at Spezia, might be assumed to liave a fatal eiiect on the morale of the men. Inaction soon neutralises the finest fleet, and its effects are likely enough to spread to the military in a long campaign.

The Turks, on the other hand, had what passed for a very fine fleet in those days — aliout a dozen ^ sea- going ironclads, and six or seven lio;ht draught monitors, up the Danube. As has been before observed,- Russia had no " Sea Power," and in this case at least " Sea Power" had a full meanino-. With a fleet like she now has in the Black Sea, Russia could have settled the war in a week or two.

In those days the torpedo was a new weapon, and Torpedoes. though possessed by all Powers, was more associated with the name of Russia than anv other. These torpedoes the Turks were supposed to be particularly afraid of, and this has been put forward as a reason for their extraordinary inactivity ; actually, however, circumstances, lack of ammunition, or defects in machinery, may be considered more probable causes. The Turkish admiral, Hobart Pasha, was an ex-British «osartPas/ia. officer hardly likely to have been frightened by such an untried weapon as the torpedo then was. The most of his subsec[uent actions, moreover, point clearly

' Specific numbers are dangei'ous where Turkish ships are conoerned — as many as fifteen could be named, but the Turks have a way of doubling their .ships b}- re-naniing them. The superiority, however, was so tremendous that two or three, or for that matter half a dozen, ships more or less would liave made no difference.

2 See p. :^4.

A\ XI ILLAII AXD MOYINI ZAFFU:.

FETH-I-BULEND AXD MUKADIM-I-HAIR.

ASSAr.-I-SHEFKET AKD NEDJIM SBEFKET.

LUTFI DJEL AND HAFIZ RAHAM.

SOME OF THE TUKKISH "WAltSHIl'S, 1877.

THE TURCO-RUSSIAN WAR, 1877-78 183

enough to u cousideialjle stud}- of defence against torpedo attack, and, further, that defence was success- ful as a passive defence could be.

In this connection it may not Ije without interest to mention that near the village of Upottery, in

HOBART PASHAS TOEPEDO POND AT THE PRESENT DAY.

Devonsliire, is a pond, or rather the remains of one, which rustics have pointed out to me as where the Turkish admiral duriuo" a visit to England had played about with torpedoes. This was some two or three years previous to the war, and so far as I could glean from the very non-technical descriptions of the

i84 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

village lilack.sniith (wlio as a hoy had hecn employed to fish thiug.s fiut of tlic water), experiiueiits, wliieli if I'ougli and ready were eertaiid}- very catholic, had been carried out. Certain it is that this village black- smith knew a good deal more about torpedo defence some twelve vears ago than the ordinary citizen knows even in these days of Xavy Leagues. All of which goes to help prove that Llob- art Pasha was not the cijjher subsequent his- torians have made him

.SKETCH M-Vr OF THE CRI.ME.A. ASD AD.IACENT COAST.'?.

out to be ; if he was paralysed it was more through the way the Russian conducted operations tha,n from any general inabilitv. What the Turks failed to recosnise was that a vigorous offence was the best defence against torpedo attack, and that nothing else could possibly

THE TURCO-RUSSIAN WAR, 1877-78 185

avail. This neither llobait^ nor his officers seem to have grasped, while the Russians saw and acted on it.

The first place where the Turkish fleet should have Ijeen in evidence was the Danube, but the Russians were swift to concentrate efforts on preventing that. Nor was the river easy for Turkish ironclads to ascend ; in the upper reaches things were left to the little monitors already there, lower down Hobart did get a few ships up the river, and the Russians promptly dropped mines around them.

This fixed the Turks, who staved there exchanoing- shots with a Russian mortar and small o-un batterv, a shell from Avhich struck an ironclad, Lutfi Djel, s/n/r/ngo/t/ic

Lutfi Djel.

and blew her up. The Russian theory was that a shell had dropped down her funnel ; the Turks had some va2;ue tale of an accidem; in the enoine-room. As the Russians sjave the Iron Cross to a o-unner who was considered to have fired the lucky shot, and none of the Turks immediately concerned ever survived the explosion to give eA'idence, the balance of such evidence as there is is in favour of the shell.

It may be remarked en 'passant that mystery Mstances 0/

mysterious

surrounds the fate of almost fifty iDer cent. o{ endings of

warships.

the ships that have been sunk in modern warfare. To take the last decade only, the monitor Javary went down in the Brazilian Civil War in much the same style as the Lutfi Djel — a puff of white smoke, a great cloud

' Assuming that a good many Turkish ships were not merely hulks through parts of the engines being missing — a perfectly possible con- tingency.

iS6 THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY

of black, then — iiotliiiMj;. In tliis ciise a .sliore-liatteiy was Ijeini;- engaged. How tin.' King Yuen went down at Yalu lias never been dcsciiljed, the loss of the famous Chill Yuen has a good deal of uncertaint}' still about it,^ while the sinking of the Isla de Cuba and Isla de Luzon at I\Ianila in the IIisi)ano-American war — ships that were subsequently, according to ofiicial reports, got up almost undamaged — pu/zles one when taken in conjunction with earlier and mcst detailed accounts of how they were blown to bits. Thefirst Having disposed of the seagoing turret-ship, the

successful

torpedo flotilla Russians next decided to sink the river monitors Seife

attack ever

?!'"'*' -^^^ and Feth-ul-Islam and a g-unboat, which were attacked

May 1877, ^ '

by torpedo boats on the night of the 25th of May, about ten days after the destruction of the Lutfi Djel. Four boats, the Tsarvitch, Xenia, Djidjit, and Tsarevna, set out from Braila on aii excellent nio-lit for such work, very thick weather and heavy rain. The flotilla was under Lieutenant Doubasoft' in the Tsarvitch, with Lieutenant Tchestakotf in the Xenia, second in com- mand, abreast of him. Astern came the other two boats under Sub-lieutenants Persin and Bali.

This attack is of .special interest, and the order followed has therefore some importance. Doubasoff directed the attack to be made bv the Tsarvitch and

^ A Japanese officfv who served in the Takachiho at Yalu told me that they hit this ship near tlu- funnel vrith a 10-in. shell. Previously to that she had been steering very wildly, and apparently was quite out of control, and looked to be foundering. From an officer in the Chinese service, on the other hand, I heard that one of the Chinese ironclads put a bis shell into her bv mistake.

THE TURCO-RUSSIAN WAR, 1877-78 1S7

Xenia, the Djidjit was to support them in case of defeat, the Tsarevna to be in reserve, and act according to circumstances.

The boats were all armed with spar torpedoes, and Armament

and torpedoes.

the greatest speed they could manage (without being so nois)^ that the enemy's attention would be attracted) was about five knots.

Having got within 150 vards unnoticed, the two attacking boats put on full speed ahead, and were within 70 yards before they were hailed from the monitor. In a modern attack, of course, torpedoes could have been fired long before the boats were seen, the spar torpedoes, however, necessitated close contact.

The alarm oriven, the Turks trained their bio- auns at the boats, but owing to miss-fires, or because the interval was too short, nothing happened. The Tsarvitch struck the monitor with her torpedo in the ne Tsaruitch's

attack.

stern. The explosion was very violent, nearly swamp- ing the boat, and the men were ordered to jump over- board, the impression being that she was going down.

The monitor does not seem to have been very much injured, since as the boat went astern she fired her turret guns at her, and the crew opened a rifle fire.

The Xenia now steamed at the monitor, and struck ne xenias

attack.

her under the turret just as the big guns went ofi". The explosion hurled a lot of wreckage into the air, some of which fouled the Xenia's screw, and she was only got clear by her crew pushing along the side. All this while rifle fire was beino- exchano-ed, but no Russian was hit, and at the most only three Turks.